Editing Maxime Weygand (section)

== Military career ==
[[File:Maxime Weygand jeune officier.jpg|thumb|Weygand as a junior officer in the early 1890s]]

During the [[Dreyfus affair]], Weygand was one of the most anti-Dreyfusard officers of his regiment, supporting the widow of Colonel [[Hubert-Joseph Henry]], who had committed suicide after the discovery of the falsification of the charges against Captain [[Alfred Dreyfus]].

He was promoted to captain in 1896.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=12}} Weygand chose not to attempt the difficult preparation to the ''[[École Supérieure de Guerre]]'' (the French staff college) because of his desire, he said, to keep contact with the troops. This did not prevent him from later becoming an instructor at the [[École de cavalerie, Saumur|cavalry school at Saumur]]. Along with [[Joseph Joffre]] and [[Ferdinand Foch]], Weygand attended the [[Imperial Russian Army]] manoeuvres in 1910; his account mentions a great deal of pomp and many gala dinners, but also records Russian reluctance to discuss military details.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=23}} Promoted with unusual rapidity to [[lieutenant colonel]] in 1912,{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=12}} he attended in 1913 the ''Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires'', set up in January 1911<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/dems/plaquette_chem.pdf |year=2011 |title=100 ans de formation des futurs chefs de la Défense |website=Direction de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur |publisher=Centre des hautes études militaires |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240517232825/https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/dems/plaquette_chem.pdf |archive-date=2024-05-17 |url-status=live |language=fr |quote=En janvier 1911, débute à Paris, sur le site de l’École militaire, la première session du CHEM... lieutenant-colonel Maxime Weygand (session 1913) }}<!-- previously dead link; corrected URL and added preemptive archive *due to* previously dead link --></ref> to teach [[combined arms]] operations and staff work,{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=12}} despite not having been ''"breveté"'' (passed staff college).{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=11}} During his studies, he was noticed for his brilliance in staff work by Joffre and Foch.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=12–13}} Weygand attended the last pre-war French grand manoeuvres in 1913 and commented that it had revealed "intolerable insufficiencies" such as two divisions becoming mixed up.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=18}}

=== First World War ===
[[File:Maarschalk Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), Bestanddeelnr 158-1095 (cropped).jpg|thumb|For much of the war, Weygand served under Ferdinand Foch (pictured) as a staff officer. Foch was promoted in 1918 to generalissimo of Entente forces, with Weygand as his chief of staff.]]
[[File:Waffenstillstand gr.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Painting by [[Maurice Pillard Verneuil]], depicting the signing of the Armistice. Weygand is first on the right, Foch standing in the centre.]]

==== Early war ====
At the outbreak of the war, he was posted as a staff officer with the [[5th Hussar Regiment|5ème Hussars]]. His regiment was deployed to the Franco-German border on 28 July 1914 and later fought at the [[Battle of Morhange]]. On 17 August, he became chief of staff to [[Ferdinand Foch]], the commander of the new [[9th Army (France)|Ninth Army]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=13, noting deployment in 28 July, war with Germany on 3 August, and promotion to Foch's staff on 17 August}} Weygand served under Foch for much of the rest of the war.

The professional partnership between Foch and Weygand was close and fruitful, with Weygand operating as a highly competent subordinate able to translate Foch's instructions into clearer orders, analyse ideas, and collate information. Foch referred to Weygand with praise, believing that their views were practically identical.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=17–18, noting Foch's remark: "Ask Weygand, it is the same"}} Weygand finalised the plans for the 9th Army's attack at the [[First Battle of the Marne]] and, in doing so, became one of the first staff officers to reconnoitre the battlefield from the air.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21. "At one point he flew with one of France's earliest military avaiators, [[Marcel Brindejonc des Moulinais|Marcel-Georges Brindejonc des Moulinais]], to make a personal reconnaissance of the battlefield, at the time a novel achievement for a senior staff officer"}} Weygand supported Foch, who was appointed to coordinate the Belgian, British, and French forces in the northern sector, during the [[Race to the Sea]] and [[First Battle of Ypres|First Ypres]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21}} Weygand was promoted to full colonel in early 1915.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=21}}

The mounting French casualties over the course of 1915 were reflected in Weygand's campaign notes; the need for further cooperation between French and British armies utilised Weygand's communicative skills and he developed a working relationship with some British counterparts.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=26, noting as exception [[Edward Spears]]}} Weygand was promoted to [[Brigadier General#France|général de brigade]] in 1916. He later wrote of the [[Battle of the Somme|Anglo-French Somme Offensive in 1916]], at which Foch commanded French Army Group North, that it had seen "constant mix-ups with an ally [the British] learning how to run a large operation and whose doctrines and methods were not yet in accordance with ours".{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=70}} At a meeting on 3 July 1916 where Joffre and Haig came to non-speaking terms, Weygand, Foch, and [[Sir Henry Wilson, 1st Baronet|Henry Wilson]] were able to restore a working relationship between the armies. He also took effective command of the army group as alternate when Foch was in ill health; during tensions between Foch and subordinates, Weygand helped to mediate disputes.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=27–28}}

After Joffre was replaced by [[Robert Nivelle]] in late 1916, criticism of Foch also intensified, leading to Foch being relieved of his northern command; Weygand saw the politician's treatment of Foch as intolerable. At Foch's suggestion, Weygand's name was submitted for command of an infantry brigade, but after Foch was assigned out of inactivity to instead create a contingency plan for a German invasion of France via Switzerland, Weygand decided to stay with Foch.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=28–30}} As part of this planning, Weygand served as head of a mission to Switzerland to discuss Anglo-French support if Switzerland were breached by German troops.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=30}} Weygand later accompanied the British [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], General [[Sir William Robertson, 1st Baronet|Sir William Robertson]], on an inspection of the [[Italian front (World War I)|Italian front]] in early 1917 to discuss Anglo-French support for Italy's [[Battles of the Isonzo|Isonzo campaign]]. When Weygand and Foch were briefed on the [[Nivelle offensive]], the two men expressed misgivings.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=31}} After its failure, Nivelle was removed as French commander-in-chief and replaced with [[Philippe Petain]]. Foch was appointed chief of the army general staff in 19 May 1917; writing to his wife, Weygand expressed his loyalty to Foch and gave up his applications for a field command.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=32}}

==== Supreme War Council ====
British prime minister [[David Lloyd George]] pushed for the creation of a [[Supreme War Council]], which was formally established on 7 November 1917. Keen to sideline the British [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], General [[Sir William Robertson, 1st Baronet|Sir William Robertson]], he insisted that, as French Army chief of the General Staff, Foch could not also be French permanent military representative (PMR) on the SWC.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=266}} [[Paul Painlevé]], [[Prime Minister of France|French prime minister]] until 13 November, believed that Lloyd George was already pushing for Foch to be Supreme Allied Commander so wanted him as PMR not French Chief of Staff.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=171}}

The new prime minister, [[Georges Clemenceau]], wanted Foch as PMR to increase French control over the Western Front, but was persuaded to appoint Weygand, seen very much as Foch's sidekick, instead.{{sfn|Jeffery|2006|pp=206–11, 219–20}} Clemenceau told US President [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s envoy, Colonel [[Edward M. House]] that he would put in a "second- or third-rate man" as PMR and "let the thing drift where it will".{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=173}}

Weygand was the most junior of the PMRs (the others being the Italian [[Luigi Cadorna]], the American [[Tasker H. Bliss]], and the British [[Henry Hughes Wilson, 1st Baronet|Henry Wilson]], later replaced by [[Henry Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson|Henry Rawlinson]]).{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=180}} He was promoted [[Divisional General#France|général de division]] (equivalent to the Anglophone rank of [[major general]]) in 1918. This promotion was specifically because of his appointment as a PMR.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=178}}

However, Clemenceau only agreed to set up an Allied General Reserve if Foch rather than Weygand were earmarked to command it. The Reserve was shelved for the time being at a SWC Meeting in London (14–15 March 1918) as the national commanders in chief, [[Philippe Pétain]] and [[Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig|Sir Douglas Haig]], were reluctant to release divisions.{{sfn|Jeffery|2006|pp=206–11, 219–20}}

==== Supreme Allied Command Staff ====
[[File:The Hundred Days Offensive, August-november 1918 Q9245.jpg|thumb|right|Foch and Weygand arriving at [[British Fourth Army]] headquarters on 12 August 1918 to meet [[King George V]]]]

Weygand was in charge of Foch's staff when his patron was appointed [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in the spring of 1918, and was Foch's right-hand man throughout his victories in the late summer and until the end of the war.

Weygand initially headed a small staff of 25–30 officers, with Brigadier General Pierre Desticker as his deputy. There was a separate head for each of the departments, e.g. Operations, Intelligence, Q (Quartermaster). From June 1918 onwards, under British pressure, Foch and Weygand poached staff officers from the French Commander-in-Chief [[Philippe Pétain]] (Lloyd George's tentative suggestion of a multinational Allied staff was vetoed by President Wilson). By early August Colonel Payot (responsible for supply and transport) had moved to Foch's HQ, as had the Military Missions from the other Allied HQs; in Greenhalgh's words this "put real as opposed to nominal power into Foch's hands". From early July onwards, British military and political leaders came to regret Foch's increased power, but Weygand later recorded that they had only themselves to blame as they had pushed for the change.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|pp=229–231}}

Like Foch and most French leaders of his era (Clemenceau, who had lived in the US as a young man, was a rare exception), Weygand could not speak enough English to "sustain a conversation" (German, not English, was the most common second language in which French officers were qualified). Competent interpreters were therefore vital.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|pp=9, 229–31}}

Weygand drew up the memorandum for the meeting of Foch with the national commanders-in-chief (Haig, Pétain and [[John J. Pershing]]) on 24 July 1918, the only such meeting before the autumn, in which Foch urged (successfully) the liberation of the Marne salient [[Third Battle of the Aisne|captured by the Germans in May]] (this offensive would become the [[Second Battle of the Marne]], for which Foch was promoted Marshal of France), along with further offensives by the British and by the Americans at St Mihiel.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=322}} Weygand personally delivered the directive for the [[Battle of Amiens (1918)|Amiens attack]] to Haig.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2005|p=248}} Foch and Weygand were shown around the [[Battle of Saint-Mihiel|liberated St. Mihiel sector]] by Pershing on 20 September.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=335}}

Weygand later (in 1922) questioned whether Pétain's planned offensive by twenty-five divisions in Lorraine in November 1918 could have been supplied through a "zone of destruction" through which the Germans were retreating; his own and Foch's doubts about the feasibility of the plans were another factor in the seeking of an armistice.{{sfn|Greenhalgh|2014|p=362}} In 1918 Weygand served on [[Armistice with Germany (Compiègne)|the armistice]] negotiations, and it was Weygand who read out the armistice conditions to the Germans at [[Compiègne]], in the [[Compiègne Wagon|railway carriage]]. He can be spotted in photographs of the armistice delegates, and also standing behind Foch's shoulder at Pétain's investiture as [[Marshal of France]] at the end of 1918.

==== Paris Peace Conference ====
[[File:1 FI 1 28 - Le maréchal Foch, les généraux Weygand et Gouraud au garde à vous, place Broglie. 21 novembre 1920.jpg|thumb|Marshal Foch with Generals Weygand and Gouraud at the [[Place Broglie]] on 21 November 1920]]

Weygand agreed with Foch that French security – the consequences of which were impressed during a tour of the liberated German-occupied zones in late 1918 – required territorial expansion to the [[River Rhine]] as a [[buffer zone]]. Their dislike of politicians, who they viewed as having little understanding of war realities or military issues, intensified when the French political class ruled out creating a French client state in the [[Rhineland]]. They similarly agreed that the then-proposed [[League of Nations]] would do little to ensure peace and that the planned alliances between France, Britain, and the United States would be insufficient to guarantee French security.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=45–46}}

Foch's untactful expression of his views unnerved the [[Big Four (World War I)|Big Four]] civilian leaders at the peace conference: American president [[Woodrow Wilson]], British prime minister [[David Lloyd George]], French president [[Georges Clemenceau]], and Italian prime minister [[Vittorio Emanuele Orlando]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=46}} Weygand harboured similar disdain, calling them in a diary "the four old men". Because of Foch's popularity as victor of the war, he could not be easily criticised. Attacks therefore fell on Weygand who was conspiratorially accused, by among others Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George, as driving Foch's radical positions.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=46–47. "Portrayed as Foch's evil genius[,] Wilson demanded his removal. Lloyd George noted at meeting Weygand would whisper in Foch's ear... Wilson now claimed that Weygand was using Foch to further his own personal political aims"}}

=== Interwar ===
==== Poland ====
[[File:Misja aliancka w Polsce (1920).jpg|thumb|right|Weygand, first row second from right, standing next to British [[Cabinet Secretary (United Kingdom)|Cabinet Secretary]] [[Maurice Hankey, 1st Baron Hankey|Marice Hankey]], serving as part of the [[Interallied Mission to Poland]]. August 1920.]]
[[File:Gare de l'Est - arrivée du général Weygand au retour de Pologne.jpg|thumb|Weygand at [[Gare de l'Est]] on his return from Poland in August 1920]]

During the [[Polish–Soviet War]], Weygand was a member of the [[Interallied Mission to Poland]] of July and August 1920, supporting the infant [[Second Polish Republic]] against the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic]]. (He had not been on the 1919 [[French Military Mission to Poland]] headed by General [[Paul Prosper Henrys]].) The Interallied Mission, which also included French diplomat [[Jean Jules Jusserand]] and the British diplomat Lord [[Edgar Vincent D'Abernon]], achieved little: its report was submitted after the [[Polish Armed Forces (Second Polish Republic)|Polish Armed Forces]] had won the crucial [[Battle of Warsaw (1920)|Battle of Warsaw]]. Nonetheless, the presence of the Allied missions in Poland gave rise to a myth that the timely arrival of Allied forces saved Poland.{{sfn|Davies|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o3FWGRxVlSYC&pg=PA222 222]}}

Weygand travelled to [[Warsaw]] expecting to assume command of the [[Polish Armed Forces (Second Polish Republic)|Polish army]], yet those expectations were quickly dashed. He had no good reply for [[Józef Piłsudski]], who on 24 July during their first meeting asked "How many divisions do you bring?" Weygand had none to offer. From 27 July Weygand was an adviser to the Polish Chief of Staff, [[Tadeusz Rozwadowski]]. It was a difficult position; most Polish officers regarded him as an interloper, and spoke only Polish, which he did not understand. At the end of July he proposed that the Poles hold the length of the [[Bug River]]; a week later he proposed a purely defensive posture along the [[Vistula]] river; both plans were rejected. One of his few lasting contributions was to insist on replacing the existing system of spoken orders by written documents; he also provided advice on logistics and construction of modern entrenchments.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=49}} [[Norman Davies]] writes: "on the whole he was quite out of his element, a man trained to give orders yet placed among people without the inclination to obey, a proponent of defence in the company of enthusiasts for the attack".{{sfn|Davies|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o3FWGRxVlSYC&pg=PA222 222]}} During another meeting with Piłsudski on 18 August, Weygand became offended and threatened to leave, depressed by his failure and dismayed by Poland's disregard for the Allied powers.

At the station at Warsaw on 25 August he was consoled by the award of the [[Virtuti Militari]], 2nd class; at Paris on the 28th he was cheered by crowds lining the platform of the [[Gare de l'Est]], kissed on both cheeks by the premier, [[Alexandre Millerand]].{{sfn|Davies|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o3FWGRxVlSYC&pg=PA222 222]}} Promoted to ''général corps d'armée'' and advanced to ''Commandeur'' in the [[Legion of Honour]],{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=50}} Weygand could not understand what had happened and admitted in his memoirs what he said to a French journalist already on 21 August 1920: "the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, the army was Polish".<ref name="Drozdowski">{{cite news |title = Opinia gen. Weyganda o zwycięstwie pod Warszawą | last = Genty | newspaper = [[Kurier Warszawski]] | location = Warsaw | id = nr 232 | date = 22 August 1920 | page = 3 |trans-title=Gen. Weygand's view on the victory at Warsaw |language=pl}}, as cited in: {{cite book | editor = Marian Marek Drozdowski | others = Hanna Eychhorn-Szwankowska, Jerzy Wiechowski | title = Zwycięstwo 1920 |trans-title=Victory 1920 | year = 1990 | publisher = Editions Dembinski | isbn = 2-87665-010-X | oclc = 24085711 | page = 151 |language=pl}}, also reprinted in: {{cite news |title=Generał Weygand o zwycięstwie |url=http://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/plain-content?id=162606 |newspaper=Gazeta Polowa |date=28 August 1920 |access-date=27 September 2011}}</ref> As Norman Davies notes: "He was the first uncomprehending victim, as well as the chief beneficiary, of a legend already in circulation that he, Weygand, was the victor of Warsaw. This legend persisted for more than forty years even in academic circles".{{sfn|Davies|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o3FWGRxVlSYC&pg=PA222 222]}}

==== Levant and ''CHEM'' directorship ====
[[File:French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon map en.svg|thumb|right|The French mandate in Syria was reorganised into two major divisions centred on [[Damascus]] and [[Aleppo]], with a special district reserved for [[Alawites]], during Weygand's tenure.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=53}} ]]

Weygand returned from Poland to his duties with the interallied council overseeing the implementation of the Versailles treaty and the [[Treaty of Lausanne|renegotiation of peace]] with [[Turkey]] after they rejected the [[Treaty of Sèvres]]. Weygand declined to serve on a proposed French occupation force to occupy the Ruhr valley after Germany refused to meet reparation payments; he similarly refused appointment to Poland.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=51}}

In 1922, the Poincaré ministry appointed Weygand [[High Commissioner of the Levant]] to govern the [[Mandate for Syria and Lebanon|French mandate in Lebanon and Syria]], replacing [[Henri Gouraud]]. Putting an end of Gouraud's coercive pacification campaigns, Weygand was largely conciliatory and devolved most policing responsibilities to local gendarmes. He also supervised infrastructure projects to support export of cotton and silk, reformed the school system, and established [[Damascus University]] in June 1923.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=53}}<ref>Arguing that a university had existed in Damascus since 1919, but that Weygand joined three separate departments into what was then called the Syrian University: {{cite journal |last=Mubayed |first=Sami |title=The founding of Damascus University 1903–1936: an essay in praise of the pioneers |journal=Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies |volume=18 |year=2018 |pages=179–200 |doi=10.5617/jais.6715 |url=https://journals.uio.no/JAIS/article/download/6715/5759/20565 }}</ref> Administration in the mandate was also reformed and the basis for the modern borders of Syria and Lebanon established. Weygand's wife Renée joined him there and they enjoyed their time in Beirut. However, with the left-wing victory in the May 1924 elections, Weygand was recalled in place of [[Maurice Sarrail]] that December.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=53–54, noting Sarrail was promptly removed after he shelled Damascus during the [[Great Syrian Revolt]]}}

[[File:Turenne-Weygand-a-01.jpg|thumb|right|A cover of Weygand's biography of [[Turenne]], pictured above. The book was first published in 1929.<!-- Weygand was elevated to the Academie in 1931; this cover, given the sub nomine, must postdate that -->]]

Weygand returned to France in 1925 embittered, seeing his recall as the product of political machinations and intra-army rivalries. Regardless, he was awarded the [[Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=54}} Denied command in Morocco against the [[Rif War]] out of fear for his success, command in Syria since it would embarrass the government, and command in Germany due to his closeness with Foch, he was made director of the ''Centre de Hautes Etudes Militaries'' (Center for Higher Military Studies) from 1925 to 1930.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=55, 56–57}} While Weygand supported development of a doctrine of rapid armoured assault with close air support, the government's view – which feared professionalisation of the army as a threat to regime stability and saw investment in tanks as financially ruinous – prevailed.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=55–56 (noting the left-wing government's fear of a professional military and opposition to French military adventurism), 57–58 (noting Weygand's article in 1921 "in which he foresaw armoured divisions composed of fast tanks and self-propelled artillery... supported by aircraft strikes" as well as Weygand's doubts over tank speed and reliability in 1926)}}<ref>{{cite journal |last=Weygand |first=Maxime |title=La Cavalerie de la " Revue de Cavalerie " |year=1921 |volume=31 |issue=1 |journal=Revue de Cavalerie |pages=2–9 |quote=La guerre de demain sera plus encore que celle d'hier une guerre de machinisme... Que la cavalerie aille donc vers la machine, convaincue, par ailleurs, que celle-ci n'est pas pour la faire disparaître, mais pour lui donner un supplément de force |trans-quote=The war of tomorrow will be even more than that of yesterday a war of machinery... Let the cavalry therefore go towards the machine, convinced that this is not to end it, but to strengthen it }}</ref> The further programme to shorten conscripts' service was voted through in the late 1920s to Weygand's disapproval: he feared that the left was intending to replace the professional army with a purely defensive national guard while drowning units in basic training, making it impossible to train for large unit operations.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=58}} Settling at [[Morlaix]] in [[Brittany]] near Foch, the five years at the ''Centre'' also gave him time to write two books, biographies of French marshals Foch and [[Turenne]].{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=58–59}}

==== Head of the army ====
[[File:Maxime Weygand, Joseph Paul-Boncour, Maurice Gamelin, 1932.jpg|thumb|Weygand, second from left, with Gamelin, on right, in 1932.]]

The opening of the question of succession as chief of the general staff from 1927 placed Weygand again in the spotlight: Foch, for his part, supported his protégé and made his views clear before his death in 1929. The left-wing war minister [[Paul Painlevé]] supported [[Louis Maurin]]. But after Petain's announced his support for Weygand and buttressed it with the recommendation that Weygand should be further appointed inspector-general on Petain's retirement (designating Weygand as commander-in-chief on mobilisation), the topic of the appointment became thoroughly politicised.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=59–60}} The end of Briand's government in November 1929 led to a right-wing government under [[André Tardieu]] until February 1930 that made [[André Maginot]] war minister. Attacked as a right-wing Catholic cavalry officer with aristocratic haughtiness and designs against the Third Republic with profligate plans for military expenditure in a time of austerity, Weygand was forced to disavow in a statement to Parliament any political activities and affirm his loyalty to the republican regime.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=60–61}} The eventual compromise saw Weygand made chief of staff with the more politically-safe [[Maurice Gamelin]] as deputy; Weygand was appointed chief of staff on 3 January 1930 at the age of 63.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=61}}<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6584966q/f13.image |title=Décret portant affectation d'un officier général |journal=Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets |volume=62 |issue=2 |page=101 |language=fr |date=3 January 1930 |via=Gallica }}</ref> On Petain's retirement to the post of air defence inspector on 10 February 1931, Weygand took up the vice presidency of the ''[[Conseil supérieur de la guerre]]'' as well as inspector-general of the army; Gamelin was appointed chief of staff in his place.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65429912/f72.image |title=Conseil supérieur de la guerre et inspection général de l'armée |date=10 February 1931 |language=fr |journal=Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets |volume=63 |issue=34 |page=1776 |via=Gallica }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65429912/f72.image |title=État-major général de l'armée |date=10 February 1931 |language=fr |journal=Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets |volume=63 |issue=34 |page=1776 |via=Gallica }}</ref>

Weygand's remained as vice president of the ''Conseil'' until his mandatory requirement at the age of 68 in February 1935.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=70}}<ref name="generals.dk">{{cite web  |title=Biography of General Maxime Weygand |website=Generals.dk |url=http://www.generals.dk/general/Weygand/Maxime/France.html |access-date=2007-07-30 }}</ref> During his years in charge of the military, he attempted to push for military modernisation and increased service requirements to match the threat posed by Germany. However, the [[Great Depression in France|Great Depression]] came with substantial political instability, including street violence, and fourteen prime ministers between January 1930 and 1935. Attempts to broker international disarmament agreements were collapsed and the politicians were unwilling in depressed economic conditions to invest in new equipment or expand military pay.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=63–66}} Amid the breakdown in French civil-military relations in the 1930s, Weygand was neutral and "never indicated any support for any such projects" to replace the republican system with a military dictatorship.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=69}} He was, however, able to successfully lobby for creation of a [[Division Legere Mecanique|light mechanised division]] as well as creation of a seven motorised infantry division in the early 1930s; he was also able to lobby for extension of conscripts' service to two years in 1934.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=67, 70}}<ref>{{cite web |last=House |first=Jonathan M |title=Toward combined arms warfare: a survey of 20th-century tactics, doctrine, and organization |year=1984 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/house.pdf |page=61 |quote=Chief of Staff Maxime Weygand took significant steps towards motorization and mechanization during the early 1930s... seven infantry divisions became motorized... In 1934, Weygand continued the trend towards armored cavalry by forming the first "light mechanized division" (Division Légère Mèchanique, or DLM...) }}</ref>

==== Retirement and return to the Levant ====
From 1931 he had been admitted to the [[Académie Française]] as Seat 35 in place of Joffre, deceased.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=73}} On his retirement he was retained on the active list at full pay but was unassigned. This allowed him leave to travel: as an administrator of the [[Suez Canal Company]] he visited Egypt and the court of [[Fuad I of Egypt|Fuad I]]; he travelled also to eastern Europe and Britain on military matters.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=74}} He spent some of this time writing articles in military journals on the state of the army, arguing that the now-superior German army could be held back by a well-equipped defence before motorised units would be eventually able to start a counteroffensive. However, he disagreed with [[Charles de Gaulle]]'s arguments for a centralised armour force on the grounds that it would undermine troop cohesion and greatly stress French industrial capacity. While he never criticised his successor Gamelin, he published a short book ''La france, est-elle défendue?'' [''France, is it defended?''] in 1937 warning of German military superiority and the possibility of a sudden attack.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=70–71, noting also on p. 72 that France had by the late 1930s come into a serious population disadvantage vis-à-vis Germany }}<ref>{{cite book |last=Weygand |first=Maxime |title=La France, est-elle défendue? |publisher=Flammarion |year=1937}}</ref> His thoughts in the years before [[Invasion of Poland|Hitler's invasion of Poland]] saw him again press for further material rearmament even as his views on the need for a fully-professional army softened; he also wrote a book called ''Histoire de l'armée française'' in 1938 arguing against the prevailing defensive strategy and expressing fear over the reliability of colonial troops in metropolitan France.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=73, 74}}

Weygand was recalled for active service in August 1939 by [[Édouard Daladier]]'s government and appointed again to the Levant, resigning his position in the Suez Canal Company. The government may have sought to keep him away from Gamelin's command. Regardless, he was officially dispatched to negotiate with Turkey, Greece, and Romania for French security interests. He also was tasked with inspecting and training the colonial garrisons.{{sfn|Clayton|2015|pp=75–76}}

=== Second World War ===
[[File:Weygand-mai 1940-A.jpg|thumb|right|Weygand, leaving the [[Élysée Palace]] in May 1940 after being named commander-in-chief of French forces]]
[[File:Reynaud-Pétain-Weygand-mai1940-A.jpg|thumb|right|Weygand, foreign minister [[Paul Baudouin]], prime minister [[Paul Reynaud]], and deputy prime minister [[Philippe Pétain]] leaving a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 21 May 1940. On Weygand's right sleeve are the five stars of a [[général d'armée]]. ]] Immediately after the German army arrived in France, Weygand feared a [[Paris Commune|Paris Commune-like event]] might happen.<ref>Philip Nord: ''France 1940 – Defending the Republic'', New Haven (CT): Yale University Press 2015, pp. 114/115.</ref>

Weygand's service during the Second World War is controversial and debated. His reputation came under substantial criticism from [[Charles de Gaulle]] and his allies after the war.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hage |first=F E |date=2011-01-24 |title=none |journal=French History |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=134–135 |doi=10.1093/fh/crr012 |issn=0269-1191 |quote=Weygand is a controversial figure in French history... De Gaulle's hatred of Weygand was by moments absurd, for example when he criticised the choice of Weygand as generalissimo because he was 'without a drop of French blood in his veins' }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Catros |first=Simon |date=2016 |title=none |journal=French History |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=285–286 |doi=10.1093/fh/crw006 |issn=0269-1191 |quote=Controversial figure in twentieth-century French history... }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Greenhalgh |first=Elizabeth |date=2011 |title=none |journal=First World War Studies |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=250–252 |doi=10.1080/19475020.2011.613248 |issn=1947-5020 |quote=This balance [in the historical record] was destroyed, along with Weygand's reputation, by Charles de Gaulle's hijacking of the liberation of France, by the post-war insistence on trying Weygand as a security risk to the state along with Marshal Pétain, and by de Gaulle's petty refusal in 1965 to permit a funeral mass in the church of Saint Louis des Invalides for the 98-year-old general who had served France faithfully and well. }}</ref>{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=x. "In the climate of the Liberation, de Gaulle and the Resistance were presented as the only paths of honour, and any senior figure who had served Vichy was considered to have been dishonourable and probably treacherous"}}{{sfn|Clayton|2015|p=140. "For many [Weygand] made a convenient scapegoat, especially in timeswhen his most bitter critic, de Gaulle, towered of his country's life"}} Much of this criticism related to claims that Weygand was negligent in rearming France while head of the army, was defeatist or incompetent during the [[Battle of France]] thereby leading to France's defeat in 1940, and was a German collaborator in the [[Vichy regime]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Young |first=Robert J. |date=2009 |title=none |doi=10.1353/jmh.0.0187 |journal=Journal of Military History |volume=73 |issue=1 |pages=303–304 |issn=1543-7795 }}</ref>

==== Recall to service ====
{{Further|Battle of France#Weygand Plan}}

By late May 1940 the military disaster in France after the [[Battle of France|German invasion]] was such that the Supreme Commander—and political neutral—[[Maurice Gamelin]], was dismissed, and Weygand—a figurehead of the right—was recalled from Syria to replace him.

Weygand arrived on 17 May and started by cancelling the flank counter-offensive ordered by Gamelin, to cut off the enemy armoured columns which had punched through the French front at the Ardennes. Thus he lost two crucial days before finally adopting the solution, however obvious, of his predecessor. But it was by then a failed manoeuvre, because during the 48 lost hours, the [[German Army (1935–1945)|German Army]] infantry had caught up behind their tanks in the breakthrough and had consolidated their gains.

Weygand then oversaw the creation of the Weygand Line, an early application of the [[Hedgehog defence|hedgehog tactic]]; however, by this point the situation was untenable, with most of the Allied forces trapped in Belgium. Weygand complained that he had been summoned two weeks too late to halt the invasion.<ref>Current Biography 1940, p{{page needed|date=March 2013}}</ref>
{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|pp=206–7}}

==== Armistice ====
{{further|Second Armistice at Compiegne}}

On 5 June the German second offensive (''[[Fall Rot]]'') began.{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|p=189}} On 8 June Weygand was visited by de Gaulle, newly appointed to the government as Under-Secretary for War. According to de Gaulle's memoirs Weygand believed it was "the end" and gave a "despairing laugh" when de Gaulle suggested fighting on. He believed that after France was defeated Britain would also soon sue for peace, and hoped that after an armistice the Germans would allow him to retain enough of a French Army to "maintain order" in France. Weygand later disputed the accuracy of de Gaulle's account of this conversation, and remarked on its similarity to a dialogue by [[Pierre Corneille]]. De Gaulle's biographer [[Jean Lacouture]] suggests that de Gaulle's account is consistent with other evidence of Weygand's beliefs at the time and is therefore, allowing perhaps for a little literary embellishment, broadly plausible.{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|p=193}}

[[Fascist Italy (1922–1943)|Fascist Italy]] entered the war and [[Italian invasion of France|invaded France]] on 10 June. That day Weygand barged into the office of Prime Minister [[Paul Reynaud]] and demanded an armistice.{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|pp=195–6}} Weygand was present at the Anglo-French Conference at the Château du Muguet at [[Briare]] on 11 June, at which the option was discussed of continuing the French war effort from [[Brittany]] or [[French North Africa]]. The transcript shows Weygand to have been somewhat less defeatist than de Gaulle's memoirs would suggest.{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|p=197}} At the Cabinet meeting on the evening of 13 June, after another Anglo-French conference at Tours, Marshal Pétain, Deputy Prime Minister, strongly supported Weygand's demand for an armistice.{{sfn|Lacouture|1991|p=201}} On June 14 Weygand warned General [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]], the new commander-in-chief of the British forces in France, that the French Army was collapsing and incapable of fighting further, leading him to evacuate the final [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] contingents remaining on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |url=https://archive.org/details/masterscommander0000robe_g9v1 |title=Masters and Commanders: The Military Geniuses Who Led the West to Victory in World War II |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-141-02926-9 |edition=1 |location=London |pages=38 |language=en |ref=None |via=Internet Archive }}</ref>

The French government moved to [[Bordeaux]] on 14 June. At Cabinet on 15 June Reynaud urged that they should follow the Dutch example, that the Army should lay down its arms so that the fight could be continued from abroad. Pétain was sympathetic,{{sfn|Atkin|1997|pp=82–6}} but he was sent to speak to Weygand (who was waiting outside, as he was not a member of the Cabinet).{{sfn|Williams|2005|pp=325–7}} After no more than fifteen minutes Weygand persuaded him that this would be a shameful surrender. [[Camille Chautemps]] then proposed a compromise proposal, that the Germans be approached about possible armistice terms.{{sfn|Atkin|1997|pp=82–6}} The Cabinet voted 13–6 for the Chautemps proposal.{{sfn|Williams|2005|pp=325–7}}

After Reynaud's resignation as Prime Minister on 16 June, [[President of France|President]] [[Albert Lebrun]] felt he had little choice but to appoint Pétain, who already had a ministerial team ready, as prime minister. Weygand joined the new government as Minister for Defence, and was briefly able to veto the appointment of [[Pierre Laval]] as minister of foreign affairs.

==== Vichy regime ====
[[File:BA144 Ain-Arnat-Sétif Prise d-armes viste Weugand 1940.jpg|thumb|BA144 [[Ain-Arnat]]-Sétif (French Algeria): Weygand inspection 1940]]

The [[Vichy France|Vichy regime]] was set up in July 1940. Weygand continued to serve in Pétain's cabinet as [[List of Defence Ministers of France|Minister for National Defence]] until September 1940. He was then appointed Delegate-General in French North Africa.

In North Africa, he persuaded young officers, tempted to join the [[French Resistance]] against the [[German military administration in occupied France during World War II|German occupation]], to go along with the armistice for the present, by letting them hope for a later resumption of combat. With the complicity of Admiral [[Jean-Marie Charles Abrial]], he deported opponents of Vichy to [[concentration camp]]s in Southern [[French Algeria|Algeria]] and [[French protectorate in Morocco|Morocco]]. Those imprisoned included [[Gaullism|Gaullists]], [[Freemasonry in France|Freemasons]], and [[History of the Jews in France|Jews]], and also [[French Communist Party|communists]], despite their obedience at the time to the [[Soviet Union]]'s orders not to support the resistance. He also arrested the foreign volunteers of the ''[[Légion Etrangère]]'', foreign refugees who were in France legally but were without employment, and others. He applied [[Vichy anti-Jewish legislation]] very harshly. With the complicity of the ''Recteur'' (University chancellor) [[:fr:Georges Hardy (historien)|Georges Hardy]], Weygand instituted, on his own authority, by a mere ''"note de service"'' (n°343QJ of 30 September 1941), a school ''numerus clausus'' (quota). This drove out most Jewish students from the colleges and the primary schools, including children aged 5 to 11. Weygand did this without any order from Pétain, "by analogy", he said, "to the law about Higher Education".

Weygand acquired a reputation as an opponent of collaboration when he protested in Vichy against the [[Paris Protocols]] of 28 May 1941, signed by Admiral [[François Darlan]]. These agreements authorized the [[Axis powers]] to establish bases in French colonies: at [[Aleppo]], [[First Syrian Republic|Syria]]; [[Bizerte]], [[French protectorate of Tunisia|Tunisia]]; and [[Dakar]], [[History of Senegal|Senegal]]. The Protocols also envisaged extensive French military collaboration with Axis forces in the event of Allied attacks against such bases. Weygand remained outspoken in his criticism of Germany.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kitson |first=Simon |title=The hunt for nazi spies: fighting espionage in Vichy France |date=2008 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-43893-1 }}{{page needed |date=May 2024}}</ref>

Weygand opposed [[Wehrmacht]] bases in French territory not to help the Allies or even to keep France neutral, but rather to preserve the integrity of the [[French colonial empire|French Empire]] and maintain prestige in the eyes of the natives. Weygand apparently favoured limited [[Collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy|collaboration with Germany]]. The Weygand General Delegation (4th Office) delivered military equipment to the [[Panzer Armee Afrika]]: 1,200 French trucks and other [[Armistice Army]] vehicles (Dankworth contract of 1941), and also heavy artillery with 1,000 shells per gun. However, [[Adolf Hitler]] demanded full unconditional collaboration and pressured the [[Government of Vichy France|Vichy government]] to dismiss Weygand in November 1941 and recall him from North Africa. A year later, in November 1942, following the [[Operation Torch|Allied invasion of North Africa]], the Germans arrested Weygand. He remained in custody in Germany and then in the [[Itter Castle]] in North Tyrol with [[General Gamelin]] and a few other [[French Third Republic]] personalities until May 1945. He was liberated by [[United States Army]] troops after the [[Battle for Castle Itter]].