Editing Materialism (section)

=== Non-reductive materialism ===
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Materialism is often associated with [[Reduction (philosophy)|reductionism]], according to which the objects or phenomena individuated at one level of description, if they are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some other level of description—typically, at a more reduced level.

''Non-reductive materialism'' explicitly rejects this notion, taking the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the existence of real objects, properties or phenomena not explicable in the terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. [[Jerry Fodor]] held this view, according to which empirical laws and explanations in "special sciences" like psychology or geology are invisible from the perspective of basic physics.<ref>Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. ''RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science''. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. {{ISBN|9780262060790}}. ([http://mitp-content-server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books_pres_0&id=5895&fn=9780262560276_sch_0001.pdf Excerpt of Ch. 1]).</ref>