Editing Marbury v. Madison (section)

==Decision==
On February 24, 1803,{{efn|In retaliation for Adams's appointment of the "Midnight Judges", Jefferson and the new Democratic-Republican-controlled Congress passed a bill that canceled the Supreme Court's 1802 term. This prevented all the Court's pending cases, including ''Marbury v. Madison'', from being decided until 1803.}} the Supreme Court issued a unanimous 4–0{{efn|Due to illnesses, justices [[William Cushing]] and [[Alfred Moore]] did not participate in the Court's decision.}} decision against Marbury. The Court's opinion was written by Chief Justice John Marshall, who structured the Court's opinion around a series of three questions it answered in turn:
* First, did Marbury have a right to his commission?
* Second, if Marbury had a right to his commission, then was there a legal remedy for him to obtain it?
* Third, if there was such a remedy, then could the Supreme Court legally issue it?{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 41}}

===Marbury's right to his commission===
The Court began by holding that Marbury had a legal right to his commission. Marshall reasoned that all appropriate procedures were followed: the commission had been properly signed and sealed.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§ 2.2.1, p. 41}} Madison had argued that the commissions were void if not delivered. The Court disagreed, saying that the delivery of the commission was merely a custom, not an essential element of the commission itself.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§ 2.2.1, pp. 41–42}}

{{Blockquote|text=The [President's] signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission, and the great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete. ... The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, but not by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the appointment, which must precede it and which is the mere act of the President.|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 158, 160.}}

The Court said that because Marbury's commission was valid, Madison's withholding it was "violative of a vested legal right" on Marbury's part.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 42}}

===Marbury's legal remedy===
Turning to the second question, the Court said that the law provided Marbury a remedy for Madison's unlawful withholding of his commission. Marshall wrote that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." This rule derives from the ancient Roman legal maxim {{lang|la|ubi jus, ibi remedium}} ("where there is a legal right, there is a legal remedy"), which was well established in the English [[common law]].{{sfnp|Amar|1989|p=447}}{{sfnp|Amar|1987|pp=1485–86}} In what the American legal scholar [[Akhil Reed Amar]] called "one of the most important and inspiring passages" of the opinion,{{sfnp|Amar|1987|p=1486}} Marshall wrote:
{{Blockquote
|text=The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 163.
}}
The Court then confirmed that a [[mandamus|writ of mandamus]]{{mdash}}a type of court order that commands a government official to perform an act his official duties legally require him to perform{{mdash}}was the proper remedy for Marbury's situation.{{sfnp|Brest|Levinson|Balkin|Amar|2018|pp=124–25}} But this raised the issue of whether the Court, which was part of the judicial branch of the government, had the power to command Madison, who as secretary of state was part of the executive branch of the government.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 41}} The Court held that so long as the remedy involved a mandatory duty to a specific person and not a political matter left to discretion, the courts could provide the legal remedy.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§ 2.2.1, pp. 42–43}} Borrowing a phrase John Adams had drafted in 1779 for the [[Constitution of Massachusetts|Massachusetts State Constitution]], Marshall wrote: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."<ref>{{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 41}}, quoting ''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 163.</ref>

===The Supreme Court's jurisdiction===
[[File:USCapitol1800.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.25|A painting of the [[U.S. Capitol]] as it appeared around the time of the ''Marbury'' decision ({{circa|1800}}). In addition to being the home of the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]], the Capitol also housed the [[Supreme Court of the United States|U.S. Supreme Court]] from 1801 until the [[United States Supreme Court Building|Supreme Court Building]]'s completion in 1935.<ref>{{cite report |title=The Old Supreme Court Chamber, 1810–1860 |publisher=U.S. Senate Commission on Art |department=Office of Senate Curator |id=S. Pub. 113-3 |date=2015-06-24 |orig-year=2014-02-10 |url=https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/art/resources/pdf/Old_Supreme_Court.pdf}}</ref>]]
This brought the Court to the third question: did the Supreme Court have proper [[jurisdiction]] over the case that would allow it to legally issue the writ of mandamus that Marbury wanted?{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;43}} The answer depended entirely on how the Court interpreted the [[Judiciary Act of 1789]]. Congress had passed the Judiciary Act to establish the American federal court system. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act sets out the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdictions.

{{blockquote|text=And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive ''jurisdiction'' over all cases of a civil nature where a state is a party ... [and] suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers ...  The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue ... writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.|source=Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 13 (emphasis added)|sign=}}

Marbury had argued that the wording of Section 13 had given the Supreme Court the authority to issue writs of mandamus when hearing cases under exclusive (original) jurisdiction, not only under appellate jurisdiction.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;43}} As Marshall explains in the opinion, {{em|original jurisdiction}} gives a court the power to be the first to hear and decide a case; {{em|appellate jurisdiction}} gives a court the power to hear an appeal from a lower court's decision and to "revise and correct" the previous decision.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}} The portion of Section 13 that speaks of the Court's power to issue writs of mandamus appears after its sentence on appellate jurisdiction, not with the earlier sentences on original jurisdiction, but a semicolon separates it from the clause on appellate jurisdiction. Section 13 does not make clear whether the mandamus clause was intended to be read as part of the appellate clause or on its own—in the opinion, Marshall quoted only the end of the section{{sfnp|Van Alstyne|1969|p=15}}—and the wording of the law can plausibly be read either way.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, p.&nbsp;50}}

In the end, the Court agreed with Marbury and interpreted Section 13 of the Judiciary Act to have authorized the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving disputes over writs of mandamus.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;44}}{{sfnp|Fallon|Manning|Meltzer|Shapiro|2015|pp=69–70}} This interpretation, however, meant that the Judiciary Act conflicted with Article III of the Constitution. Article III defines the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as follows:

{{blockquote|text=In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have ''original Jurisdiction''. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have ''appellate Jurisdiction'', both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.|source=U.S. Constitution, Article&nbsp;III, Section&nbsp;2 (emphasis added).}}

Article III says that the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction over cases where a [[U.S. state]] is a party to a lawsuit or where a lawsuit involves foreign dignitaries. Neither of these categories covered Marbury's lawsuit, which was a dispute over a writ of mandamus for his justice of the peace commission. According to the Constitution, therefore, the Court did not have original jurisdiction over a case like Marbury's.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}}{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;44}}

Because the Court had interpreted the Judiciary Act to have given it original jurisdiction over lawsuits for writs of mandamus, this meant the Judiciary Act had taken the Constitution's initial scope for the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which did not cover cases involving writs of mandamus, and expanded it to include them. The Court ruled that Congress cannot increase the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as it was set down in the Constitution, and it therefore held that the relevant portion of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act violated Article III of the Constitution.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;44}}

===Judicial review and striking down the law===
{{main|Judicial review in the United States}}
[[File:Marbury v Madison John Marshall by Swatjester.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|Inscription on the wall of the [[United States Supreme Court Building|Supreme Court Building]] from ''Marbury v. Madison'', in which [[Chief Justice John Marshall]] (statue, foreground) outlined the concept of [[judicial review]].]]
After ruling that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act conflicted with the Constitution, the Court struck down that section in its first ever declaration of the power of judicial review.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}}{{sfnp|Currie|1997|p=53}} The Court ruled that American federal courts have the power to refuse to give any consideration to congressional legislation that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Constitution{{mdash}}a move colloquially known as "striking down" laws.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=207}}

The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the federal judiciary the power of judicial review.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|pp=207–08}} Nevertheless, the Court's opinion gives many reasons in support of the judiciary's possession of the power. First, Marshall reasoned that the written nature of the Constitution inherently established judicial review.{{sfnp|Prakash|Yoo|2003|p=914}}{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}} Borrowing from Alexander Hamilton's essay ''[[Federalist No. 78]]'', Marshall wrote:
{{Blockquote
|text=The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. ... Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 176–77.<ref>Quoted in part in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;45}}, and {{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}.</ref>
}}
Second, the Court declared that deciding the constitutionality of the laws it applies is an inherent part of the American judiciary's role.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} In what has become the most famous and most frequently quoted line of the opinion, Marshall wrote:
{{Blockquote
|text=It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 177.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}}.</ref>
}}
Marshall reasoned that the Constitution places limits on the American government's powers, and that those limits would be meaningless unless they were subject to judicial review and enforcement.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} He reasoned that the Constitution's provisions limiting Congress's power{{mdash}}such as the prohibitions on [[ex post facto law|''ex post facto'' laws]] and [[Bill of attainder|bills of attainder]]{{mdash}}meant that in some cases judges would be forced to choose between enforcing the Constitution or following Congress.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, pp. 52–53}} Marshall held "virtually as a matter of iron logic" that in the event of conflict between the Constitution and statutory laws passed by Congress, constitutional law must be supreme.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}}

Third, the Court said that denying the supremacy of the Constitution over Congress's acts would mean that "courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law."<ref>{{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}, quoting ''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 178.</ref> This, Marshall wrote, would make Congress omnipotent, because none of the laws it passed would ever be invalid.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}
{{Blockquote
|text=This doctrine ... would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 178.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}.</ref>
}}

Marshall then gave several other reasons in favor of judicial review. He reasoned that the authorization in Article III of the Constitution that the Court can decide cases arising "under this Constitution" implied that the Court had the power to strike down laws conflicting with the Constitution.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} This, Marshall wrote, meant that the [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founders]] were willing to have the American judiciary use and interpret the Constitution when judging cases. He also said that federal judges' oaths of office—in which they swear to discharge their duties impartially and "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States"—requires them to support the Constitution.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, p. 53}} Lastly, Marshall reasoned that judicial review is implied in the [[Supremacy Clause]] of [[Article Six of the United States Constitution|Article VI of the U.S. Constitution]], because it declares that the supreme law of the United States is the Constitution and laws made "in Pursuance thereof".{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, p. 53}}{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 46}}

Having given his list of reasons, Marshall concluded the Court's opinion by reaffirming the Court's ruling on the invalidity of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and, therefore, the Court's inability to issue Marbury's writ of mandamus.
{{Blockquote
|text=Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 180.
}}