Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

===Background===
After [[World War II]], the U.S. military desired better strategic [[aerial reconnaissance]] to help determine Soviet capabilities and intentions, and to prevent being caught off-guard as it had been in the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]]. The Air Force commissioned the 'Beacon Hill Report' from [[MIT Lincoln Laboratory|Project Lincoln]] at the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]], which was researched in 1951–1952 and delivered in 1952. The committee was led by Carl F. P. Overhage and was overseen by the Air Force's [[Gordon P. Saville]], and included [[James Gilbert Baker]] and [[Edwin H. Land]], who would design the specialized optics in the U-2.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=327-330}}

During the early 1950s, the best intelligence the American government had on facilities deep inside the Soviet Union were World War II German [[Luftwaffe]] photographs taken during the war of territory west of the [[Ural Mountains]], so [[United States aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union|overflights]] to take [[Aerial photography|aerial photographs]] of the Soviet Union would be necessary. The committee suggested a plane with advanced optics, flying above {{convert|70000|ft|m|-2}}.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992}}<ref>{{cite book | last = Temple | first = L | title = Shades of Gray National Security and the Evolution of Space Reconnaissance | publisher = American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics | location = Reston, Va | year = 2005 | isbn = 1563477238|page=50 }}</ref><ref name="beacon">{{Cite web |title=Beacon Hill Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance |author=Project Lincoln: Massachusetts Institute of Technology |work=governmentattic.org |date=15 June 1952 |access-date=24 May 2020 |url=https://www.governmentattic.org/12docs/USAF-BeaconHillReport_1952.pdf |archive-date=3 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200803114402/https://www.governmentattic.org/12docs/USAF-BeaconHillReport_1952.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

After 1950, Soviet air defenses consistently intercepted all aircraft near the country's borders—sometimes even those in Japanese airspace. Existing US reconnaissance aircraft, primarily bombers converted for reconnaissance duty such as the [[Boeing B-47 Stratojet|Boeing RB-47]], were vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery, missiles, and fighters. Richard Leghorn of the [[United States Air Force]] suggested that an aircraft that could fly at {{convert|60000|ft|m|-2}} should be safe from the [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17|MiG-17]], the Soviet Union's best [[interceptor aircraft]], which could barely reach {{convert|45000|ft|m|-2}}. He and others believed that Soviet radar, which used American equipment provided during the war, could not track aircraft above {{convert|65000|ft|m|-2}}.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=4–5,22}}

At the time, the highest-flying aircraft available to the US and its allies was the [[English Electric Canberra]], which could reach {{convert|48000|ft|m|-2}}. The British had already produced the PR3 photo-reconnaissance variant, but the USAF asked for English Electric's help to further modify the American-licensed version of the Canberra, the [[Martin B-57 Canberra|Martin B-57]], with long, narrow wings, new engines, and a lighter airframe to reach {{convert|67000|ft|m|-2}}. The U.S. [[Air Research and Development Command]] mandated design changes that made the aircraft more durable for combat, but the resulting [[Martin RB-57D Canberra|RB-57D]] aircraft of 1955 could only reach {{convert|64000|ft|m|-2}}. The Soviet Union, unlike the United States and Britain, had improved radar technology after the war, and could track aircraft above {{convert|65000|ft|m|-2}}.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=5–7}}