Editing Hylomorphism (section)

==Body–soul hylomorphism==
===Basic theory===
{{See also|On the Soul|Aristotle's biology}}
Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism [[Aristotle's biology|to living things]]. He defines a [[Soul (spirit)|soul]] as that which makes a living thing alive.<ref>''On the Soul'' 413a20-21</ref> Life is a property of living things, just as knowledge and health are.<ref>''On the Soul'' 414a3-9</ref> Therefore, a soul is a form—that is, a specifying principle or cause—of a living thing.<ref>''On the Soul'' 412a20, 414a15-18</ref> Furthermore, Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as form to matter.<ref>''On the Soul'' 412b5-7, 413a1-3, 414a15-18</ref>

Hence, Aristotle argues, there is no problem in explaining the unity of body and soul, just as there is no problem in explaining the unity of wax and its shape.<ref>412b5-6</ref> Just as a wax object consists of wax with a certain shape, so a living organism consists of  a body with the property of life, which is its soul. On the basis of his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle rejects the [[Pythagoreanism|Pythagorean]] doctrine of [[metempsychosis]], ridiculing the notion that just any soul could inhabit just any body.<ref>''On the Soul'' 407b20-24, 414a22-24</ref>

According to Timothy Robinson, it is unclear whether Aristotle identifies the soul with the body's structure.<ref>Robinson 45-47</ref> According to one interpretation of Aristotle, a properly organized body is already alive simply by virtue of its structure.<ref name="Robinson 46">Robinson 46</ref> However, according to another interpretation, the property of life—that is, the soul—is something in addition to the body's structure. Robinson uses the analogy of a car to explain this second interpretation. A running car is running not only because of its structure but also because of the activity in its engine.<ref name="Robinson 46"/> Likewise, according to this second interpretation, a living body is alive not only because of its structure but also because of an additional property: the soul, which a properly organized body needs in order to be alive.<ref>Robinson 47</ref> John Vella uses [[Frankenstein's monster]] to illustrate the second interpretation:<ref>Vella 92</ref> the corpse lying on Frankenstein's table is already a fully organized human body, but it is not yet alive; when Frankenstein activates his machine, the corpse gains a new property, the property of life, which Aristotle would call the soul.

=== Living bodies ===
Some scholars have pointed out a problem facing Aristotle's theory of soul-body hylomorphism.<ref>Shields, ''Aristotle'' 290-93</ref> According to Aristotle, a living thing's matter is its body, which needs a soul in order to be alive. Similarly, a bronze sphere's matter is bronze, which needs roundness in order to be a sphere. Now, bronze remains the same bronze after ceasing to be a sphere. Therefore, it seems that a body should remain the same body after death.<ref>Shields, ''Aristotle'' 291</ref> However, Aristotle implies that a body is no longer the same body after death.<ref>''On the Soul'' 412b19-24</ref> Moreover, Aristotle says that a body that has lost its soul is no longer potentially alive.<ref>412b15</ref> But if a living thing's matter is its body, then that body should be potentially alive by definition.

One approach to resolving this problem<ref>Shields, ''Aristotle'' 293</ref> relies on the fact that a living body is constantly replacing old matter with new. A five-year-old body consists of different matter than does the same person's seventy-year-old body. If the five-year-old body and the seventy-year-old body consist of different matter, then what makes them the same body? The answer is presumably the soul. Because the five-year-old and the seventy-year-old bodies share a soul—that is, the person's life—we can identify them both as the body. Apart from the soul, we cannot identify what collection of matter is the body. Therefore, a person's body is no longer that person's body after it dies.

Another approach to resolving the problem<ref>Shields, "A Fundamental Problem"</ref> relies on a distinction between "proximate" and "non-proximate" matter. When Aristotle says that the body is matter for a living thing, he may be using the word "body" to refer to the matter that makes up the fully organized body, rather than the fully organized body itself. Unlike the fully organized body, this "body" remains the same thing even after death. In contrast, when he says that the body is no longer the same after its death, he is using the word "body" to refer to the fully organized body.

=== Intellect ===
{{See also|Nous|Active intellect|Passive intellect}}
Aristotle says that the intellect (''[[nous]]''), the ability to think, has no bodily organ (in contrast with other psychological abilities, such as sense-perception and imagination).<ref>''On the Soul'' 429a26-27</ref> Aristotle distinguishes between two types of intellect.<ref>''On the Soul'' 15-25</ref> These are traditionally called the "[[passive intellect]]" and the "[[Active intellect|active (or agent) intellect]]".<ref>Robinson 50</ref> He says that the  "[[Active intellect|active (or agent) intellect]]" is not mixed with the body<ref>''On the Soul'' 429a24-25</ref> and suggests that it can exist apart from it.<ref>''On the Soul'' 413b24-26, 429b6</ref> Hence, scholars face the challenge of explaining the relationship between the intellect and the body in Aristotle.

According to one interpretation, a person's ability to think (unlike his other psychological abilities) belongs to some incorporeal organ distinct from his body.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 337</ref> This would amount to a form of dualism.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 337</ref> However, according to some scholars, it would not be a full-fledged [[Mind-body dualism#Substance dualism|Cartesian dualism]].<ref>Shields, "Some Recent Approaches" 165</ref> This interpretation creates what Robert Pasnau has called the "mind-soul problem" within Aristotelian hylomorphism: if the intellect belongs to an entity distinct from the body, and the soul is the form of the body, then how is the intellect part of the soul?<ref>Pasnau 160</ref>

Another interpretation rests on the distinction between the passive intellect and the agent intellect. According to this interpretation, the passive intellect is a property of the body, while the agent intellect is a substance distinct from the body.<ref>McEvilley 534</ref><ref>Vella 110</ref> Some proponents of this interpretation think that each person has his own agent intellect, which presumably separates from the body at death.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Two Intellects" 207</ref><ref>Vella 110</ref> Others interpret the agent intellect as a single divine being, perhaps the [[unmoved mover]], Aristotle's God.<ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Psychology" 339</ref><ref>Caston, "Aristotle's Two Intellects" 199</ref>

A third interpretation<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject"</ref> relies on the theory that an individual form is capable of having properties of its own.<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject" 142</ref> According to this interpretation, the soul is a property of the body, but the ability to think is a property of the soul itself, not of the body. If that is the case, then the soul is the body's form and yet thinking need not involve any bodily organ.<ref>Shields, "Soul as Subject" 145</ref>