Editing Herman Kahn (section)

== Cold War theories ==

Kahn's major contributions were the several strategies he developed during the Cold War to contemplate "the unthinkable"{{spaced ndash}}namely, [[nuclear warfare]]{{spaced ndash}}by using applications of [[game theory]]. Kahn is often cited (with [[Pierre Wack]]) as a father of [[scenario planning]].<ref>Schwartz, Peter, ''The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World,'' New York: Currency Doubleday, 1991, p. 7</ref>

Kahn argued for deterrence and believed that if the Soviet Union believed that the United States had a second strike capability then it would offer greater deterrence, which he wrote in his paper titled "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1888.html|title=The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence|last=Kahn|first=Herman|date=1960}}</ref>

The bases<!--plural of "basis"--> of his work were [[systems theory]] and [[game theory]] as applied to economics and military strategy. Kahn argued that for deterrence to succeed, the Soviet Union had to be convinced that the United States had [[Second strike|second-strike]] capability in order to leave the [[Politburo]] in no doubt that even a perfectly coordinated massive attack would guarantee a measure of retaliation that would leave them devastated as well:

{{quote|At the minimum, an adequate deterrent for the United States must provide an objective basis for a Soviet calculation that would persuade them that, no matter how skillful or ingenious they were, an attack on the United States would lead to a very high risk if not certainty of large-scale destruction to Soviet civil society and military forces.<ref>"On Thermonuclear War", Herman Kahn</ref>}}

In 1962, Kahn published a 16-step escalation ladder.  By 1965 he had developed this into a 44-step ladder.<ref>[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3235.pdf Concepts and Models of Escalation], The Rand Corporation 1984</ref>

# Ostensible Crisis
# Political, Economic and Diplomatic Gestures
# Solemn and Formal Declarations
# Hardening of Positions – Confrontation of Wills
# Show of Force
# Significant Mobilization
# "Legal" Harassment – Retortions
# Harassing Acts of Violence
# Dramatic Military Confrontations
# Provocative Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations
# Super-Ready Status
# Large Conventional War (or Actions)
# Large Compound Escalation
# Declaration of Limited Conventional War
# Barely Nuclear War
# Nuclear "Ultimatums"
# Limited Evacuations (20%)
# Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force
# "Justifiable" Counterforce Attack
# "Peaceful" World-Wide Embargo or Blockade
# Local Nuclear War – Exemplary
# Declaration of Limited Nuclear War
# Local Nuclear War – Military
# Unusual, Provocative and Significant Countermeasures
# Evacuation (70%)
# Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior
# Exemplary Attack on Military
# Exemplary Attacks Against Property
# Exemplary Attacks on Population
# Complete Evacuation (95%)
# Reciprocal Reprisals
# Formal Declaration of "General" War
# Slow-Motion Counter-"Property" War
# Slow-Motion Counterforce War
# Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo
# Constrained Disarming Attack
# Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack
# Unmodified Counterforce Attack
# Slow-Motion Countercity war
# Countervalue Salvo
# Augmented Disarming Attack
# Civilian Devastation Attack
# Controlled General War
# Spasm/Insensate War