Editing Grumman F-14 Tomcat (section)

===Background===
[[File:F-111B NAN7-65.jpg|thumb|The [[F-111B]] was designed to fulfill the carrier-based interceptor role, but had weight and performance problems, and was not suited to the types of aerial combat that were predominant over Vietnam.]]

Beginning in the late 1950s, the U.S. Navy sought a long-range, high-endurance interceptor to defend its [[carrier battle group]]s against long-range [[anti-ship missile]]s launched from the jet bombers and submarines of the [[Soviet Union]]. They outlined the idea of a Fleet Air Defense (FAD) aircraft with a more powerful radar and longer range missiles than the [[F-4 Phantom II]] to intercept both enemy bombers and missiles at very long range.<ref>Thomason 1998, pp. 3–5.</ref> Studies into this concept led to the [[Douglas F6D Missileer]] project of 1959, but this large subsonic aircraft would have limited ability to evade supersonic fighters or defend itself once it fired its missiles, and the project was canceled in December 1961.<ref>{{cite book|last=Simonsen|first=Erik|title=A Complete History of U.S. Combat Aircraft Fly-Off Competitions: Winners, Losers, and What Might Have Been|year=2016|publisher=Specialty Press|location=Forest Lake, MN|isbn=978-1-58007-227-4 |page=108}}</ref>

The Navy still sought long-range defensive aircraft, but with higher performance than the Missileer. The Navy was directed to participate in the [[F-111 Aardvark#Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX)|Tactical Fighter Experimental]] (TFX) program with the [[U.S. Air Force]] (USAF) by [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]], who favored versatile aircraft that could be shared by both services, reducing procurement and development costs. To this end, he had already directed the USAF to buy the F-4 Phantom II—which was developed for the Navy and could serve both as a [[fighter-bomber]] and an [[interceptor aircraft]]—instead of buying more [[F-105 Thunderchief]] and [[F-106 Delta Dart]] aircraft to fill each respective role.<ref>Dwyer, Larry. [http://www.aviation-history.com/mcdonnell/f4.html "The McDonnell F-4 Phantom II."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111127154136/http://www.aviation-history.com/mcdonnell/f4.html |date=27 November 2011}} aviation-history.com, 31 March 2010. Retrieved: 24 March 2012.</ref>

The TFX had adequate speed, range and payload for the FAD role, but was designed primarily as a fighter-bomber and [[interdictor]] that lacked the maneuverability and overall performance that the Navy expected. The Navy strenuously opposed the TFX as it feared compromises necessary for the Air Force's need for a low-level attack aircraft would adversely impact the aircraft's performance as a fighter. Their concerns were overridden, and the project went ahead as the [[F-111B]]. Lacking recent experience in naval fighters, the F-111's main contractor, [[General Dynamics]], partnered with [[Grumman]] to provide the experience needed to develop a naval version. Weight and performance issues plagued the program, and with the F-111B in distress, Grumman began studying improvements and alternatives. In 1966, the Navy awarded Grumman a contract to begin studying advanced fighter designs. Grumman narrowed down these designs to its Model 303 design.<ref name=Spick_p71-2>Spick 2000, pp. 71–72.</ref>

Through this same period, experience in Vietnam against the more agile [[MiG]] fighters demonstrated that the Phantom lacked the maneuverability needed to win in any engagement. This led to the [[VFAX]] program to study new fighter aircraft that would either replace or supplant the Phantom in the fighter and ground-attack roles while the TFX worked the long-range interception role.<ref>Spangenberg, George. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20120204215346/http://www.georgespangenberg.com/vf15.htm "Spangenberg Fighter Study Dilemma."]}} georgespangenberg.com. Retrieved: 24 March 2012.</ref> Grumman continued work on its 303 design and offered it to the Navy in 1967, which led to fighter studies by the Navy. The company continued to refine the design into 1968.<ref name=Spick_p71-2/>

Around this time, [[Thomas F. Connolly|Vice Admiral Thomas F. Connolly]], Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, flew the developmental [[F-111A]] variant on a flight and discovered that it had difficulty going supersonic and had poor carrier landing characteristics. He later testified before Congress about his concerns against the official Navy position and, in May 1968, Congress stopped funding for the F-111B, allowing the Navy to pursue an answer tailored to its requirements.<ref>{{cite news |author=Thomas. Robert McG. Jr. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/09/us/thomas-connolly-86-top-gun-admiral-dies.html |title=Thomas Connolly, 86, Top-Gun Admiral, Dies |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=9 June 1996 |access-date=29 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171111095405/http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/09/us/thomas-connolly-86-top-gun-admiral-dies.html |archive-date=11 November 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>