Editing Great White Fleet (section)

==Concerns and preparations==
Roosevelt's stated intent was to give the Navy practice in navigation, communication, coal consumption, and fleet maneuvering; Navy professionals maintained, however, that such matters could be served better in home waters. In light of [[Battle of Tsushima#Departure|what had happened to the Russian Baltic Fleet]], they were concerned about sending their own fleet on a long deployment, especially since part of the intent was to impress a modern, battle-tested navy that had not known defeat. The fleet was untested in making such a voyage, and Tsushima had proven that extended deployments had no place in practical strategy.{{sfn|Hart|1965|pp=23–24}} The [[Imperial Japanese Navy|Japanese Navy]] was close to coaling and repair facilities; while American ships could coal in the Philippines, docking facilities were far from optimal. An extended stop on the [[West Coast of the United States]] during the voyage for overhaul and refurbishment in dry dock would be a necessity. Planning for the voyage, however, showed a dearth of adequate facilities there, as well. The main sea channel of the [[Mare Island Naval Shipyard]] near [[San Francisco]] was too shallow for battleships, which left only the [[Puget Sound Navy Yard]] in [[Bremerton, Washington]], for refit and repair. The [[San Francisco Naval Shipyard|Hunter's Point civilian yard]] in San Francisco could accommodate capital ships, but had been closed due to lack of use and was slated for demolition. Roosevelt ordered that Hunter's Point be reopened, facilities be brought up to date, and the fleet to report there.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=30–31}}

Also, the question of adequate resources for coaling existed. This was not an issue when the Atlantic Fleet cruised the Atlantic or Caribbean, as fuel supplies were readily available. However, the United States did not enjoy a worldwide network of [[coaling station]]s like that of Great Britain, nor did it have an adequate supply of [[auxiliary vessel]]s for resupply. During the Spanish–American War, this lack had forced Admiral [[George Dewey]] to buy a collier-load of British coal in [[Hong Kong]] before the [[Battle of Manila Bay]] to ensure his squadron would not run out of steam at sea. The need had been even more pressing for the Russian Baltic Fleet during its long deployment during the Russo-Japanese War, not just for the distance it was to steam, but also because, as a belligerent nation in wartime, most neutral ports were closed to it due to international law. While the lack of support vessels was pointed out and a vigorous program of building such ships suggested by Rear Admiral [[George W. Melville]], who had served as chief of the Bureau of Equipment, his words were not heeded adequately until World War II.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=31–34}}

Federal regulations that restricted supply vessels for Navy ships to those flying the United States flag, complicated by the lack of an adequate [[United States Merchant Marine]], proved another obstacle. Roosevelt initially offered to award Navy supply contracts to American skippers whose bids exceeded those of foreign captains by less than 50%.<ref>James R. Reckner, ''Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet'', 2001, p. 16</ref> Many carriers declined this offer because they could not obtain enough cargo to cover the cost of the return trip. Two months before the fleet sailed, Roosevelt ordered the Navy Department to contract 38 ships to supply the fleet with the 125,000 tons of coal it would need to steam from [[Hampton Roads]], Virginia, to San Francisco. Only eight of these were American-registered; most of the other 30 were of British registry. This development was potentially awkward, since part of the mission was to impress Japan with the perception of overwhelming American naval power. Britain had become a military ally of Japan in 1902 with the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]], which obliged it to aid Japan should a foreign power declare war against it. Technically, the list of potential combatants included the United States. The British government decided to play both sides of the political fence with the intent of moderating any Japanese-American friction that might arise.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=34–35}}

Prior to the ships’ departure, Congress raised concerns about funding. According to the Naval Historical Center, Maine Senator [[Eugene Hale]] made his intention known to withhold funding for the effort. Roosevelt's response was that if Congress was unwilling to fund the trip, he already had the funds to send the fleet out into the Pacific.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=OVtFbZqPskgC&pg=PA37 The World Cruise of the Great White Fleet: Honoring 100 Years of Global Partnerships and Security], Naval Historical Center</ref> If Congress wanted the fleet to return home, though, they would have to fund the other half of the trip.<ref>[https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Great-White-Fleet-visited-S-F-100-years-ago-3216437.php Great White Fleet visited S.F. 100 years ago], "Congress had appropriated funds for half the voyage, but Roosevelt said he would send the fleet to the Pacific, and the politicians would have to put up the money if they wanted to get it back."</ref> As noted by Roosevelt biographer Edmund Morris, the President would not be deterred. He stated "I am Commander-in-Chief, and my decision is absolute in the matter."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=O9r_p6Kbi24C&pg=PA502 Theodore Rex]</ref>