Editing Glass–Steagall legislation (section)

==Legislative history==
{{Main article|1933 Banking Act}}

Between 1930 and 1932, Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) introduced several versions of a bill (known in each version as the Glass bill) to regulate or prohibit the combination of commercial and investment banking and to establish other reforms (except deposit insurance) similar to the final provisions of the 1933 Banking Act.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 50-53 and 203-204.  Perkins 1971, pp. 497-505.</ref> On June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law. Glass originally introduced his banking reform bill in January 1932. It received extensive critiques and comments from bankers, economists, and the Federal Reserve Board. It passed the House on February 16, 1932, the Senate on February 19, 1932, and [[Glass–Steagall Act of 1932|signed into law]] by [[Herbert Hoover|President Hoover]] eight days later.<ref>Herring, E. Pendleton, "American Government and Politics: First Session of the Seventy-second Congress." American Political Science Review 25, no. 5, 846-874.</ref> The Senate passed a version of the Glass bill that would have required commercial banks to eliminate their securities affiliates.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 72-73.</ref>

The final Glass–Steagall provisions contained in the 1933 Banking Act reduced from five years to one year the period in which commercial banks were required to eliminate such affiliations.<ref>Patrick 1993, pp. 172-174.  Kelly III 1985, p. 54, fn. 171.  Perkins 1971, p. 524.</ref> Although the deposit insurance provisions of the 1933 Banking Act were very controversial, and drew veto threats from President [[Franklin Delano Roosevelt]], President Roosevelt supported the Glass–Steagall provisions separating commercial and investment banking, and Representative Steagall included those provisions in his House bill that differed from Senator Glass's Senate bill primarily in its deposit insurance provisions.<ref>Patrick 1993, pp. 168-172.  Burns 1974, pp. 41-42 and 79.  Kennedy 1973, pp. 212-219.</ref> Steagall insisted on protecting small banks while Glass felt that small banks were the weakness to U.S. banking.

Many accounts of the Act identify the [[Pecora Commission|Pecora Investigation]] as important in leading to the Act, particularly its Glass–Steagall provisions, becoming law.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 103-128 and 204-205.  Burns 1974, p 78.</ref> While supporters of the Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking cite the Pecora Investigation as supporting that separation,<ref>Perino 2010</ref> Glass–Steagall critics have argued that the evidence from the Pecora Investigation did not support the separation of commercial and investment banking.<ref>Bentson 1990, pp. 47-89.  Cleveland and Huertas 1985, pp. 172-187.</ref>

This source states that Senator Glass proposed many versions of his bill to Congress known as the Glass Bills in the two years prior to the Glass–Steagall Act being passed. It also includes how the deposit insurance provisions of the bill were very controversial at the time, which almost led to the rejection of the bill once again.

The previous Glass Bills before the final revision all had similar goals and brought up the same objectives, which were to separate commercial from investment banking, bring more banking activities under Federal Reserve supervision, and to allow branch banking. In May 1933, Steagall's addition of allowing state-chartered banks to receive federal deposit insurance and shortening the time in which banks needed to eliminate securities affiliates to one year was known as the driving force of what helped the Glass–Steagall act to be signed into law.