Editing Foreign relations of Qatar (section)

===Regional relations===
In September, 2014. QFFD contributed in enhancing stability for Syrian refugees. Qatar Charity facilitated access to quality education through the rehabilitation of 6 Formal schools in Turkey, [[Gaziantep]], [[Urfa]], [[Kilis]], targeting a total number of 13,540 beneficiaries and 12,860 girls and boys.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Qatar Fund for Development Support Syrian refugees in Turkey towards stability - Turkey |url=https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/qatar-fund-development-support-syrian-refugees-turkey-towards-stability |access-date=2022-04-08 |website=ReliefWeb |date=11 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

On July 10, 2017, according to documents obtained by Al Arabiya, Qatar agreed to quit supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. In order to avoid undermining relations with the Gulf, it also removed non-citizens from Qatar and refused to provide shelter to anyone from a GCC nation.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Will Qatar's Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood Change after Gulf Reconciliation? |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/will-qatars-relationship-muslim-brotherhood-change-after-gulf-reconciliation |access-date=2022-08-03 |website=The Washington Institute |language=en}}</ref>

On March 27, 2022, The [[United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office|United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism]] (UNOCT) and Qatar on their fourth high-level strategic discussion, discussed strategic priorities and worked together to ensure that the UN effectively supports member states in their efforts to combat terrorism. Out of a total of 35 other contributors, the state of Qatar is the second greatest contributor to the UN trust fund for counter-terrorism.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Fourth High-Level Strategic Dialogue between the State of Qatar & UNOCT {{!}} Office of Counter-Terrorism |url=https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/events/fourth-high-level-strategic-dialogue-between-state-qatar-unoct |access-date=2022-08-03 |website=www.un.org |language=en}}</ref>

Some [[financial economist]]s have interpreted the 2014 Saudi-Qatari rift as the tangible political sign  of a growing economic rivalry between oil and [[natural gas]] producers, which could "have deep and long-lasting consequences" beyond the Middle East.<ref>{{cite news|url= https://www.academia.edu/6702258|work= Al Hayat|location=London|title=A GCC House Divided: Country Risk Implications of the Saudi-Qatari Rift |author=M. Nicolas J. Firzli|date=6 April 2014|access-date=9 April 2014}}</ref>

In March 2014 Qatar made overtures to [[Oman]] in order to counteract the influence of Saudi Arabia on politics in the region.<ref>[http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/114539 "Qatar, Oman seek to enhance ties to counter Saudi Arabia’s sway over PGCC"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140313161158/http://tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/114539 |date=13 March 2014 }} ''Tehran Times''. 7 March 2014</ref>

In May 2017, an alleged hack of state media led to stories quoting the Emir as enquiring US resentment towards Iran and remarking on Hamas. Doha reported it as false and gave no indication on where it originated. However, news organizations in the region reported the emir's comments as fact. This led to Saudi Arabia, UAE, [[Egypt]] and Bahrain [[2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis|cutting diplomatic ties]] with Qatar on 5 June 2017.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/whats-going-on-with-qatar/|title=Analysis {{!}} What's going on with Qatar?|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=5 June 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40155829|title=Qatar row: Five countries cut links with Doha|date=5 June 2017|work=BBC News|access-date=5 June 2017}}</ref>

Qatar voiced support for the [[Operation Olive Branch|Turkish invasion of northern Syria]] aimed at ousting U.S.-backed [[People's Protection Units|Syrian Kurds]] from the enclave of [[Afrin, Syria|Afrin]]. Spokeswoman of [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Qatar)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]], Lulwah Rashif Al-Khater said that: "The launching of the Turkish military operation last Saturday was motivated by legitimate concerns related to its national security and the security of its borders, in addition to protecting [[Syria]]'s territorial integrity from the danger of secession. [[Turkey]], a NATO member, has always been a stabilizing factor in the region."<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://qasioun-news.com/en/news/show/127172|title=Qatar: Turkey's Olive Branch Operation in Afrin is Legitimate – Qasion News Agency|accessdate=20 June 2023|archive-date=30 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130204826/http://qasioun-news.com/en/news/show/127172|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In mid-March 2024, the Emir of Qatar, HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and President of the [[European Council]], HE [[Charles Michel]], discussed about enhancing cooperation between Qatar and the [[European Union]], as well as addressing key regional and global issues, with specific focus on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.qna.org.qa/en/newsbulletins/2024-03/13/0058-HH-the-Amir-Receives-Phone-Call-from%C2%A0European-Council-President | title=404_page }}</ref>