Editing Feeling (section)

==Historical and philosophical views==
The English word ''feeling'' derives from Old English ''fēlan'', meaning "to touch or perceive through the senses", and later acquired the meaning of internal emotional experience. Early philosophical and psychological approaches to feeling laid the foundation for later distinctions between [[Affect (psychology)|affect]], [[emotion]], and [[cognition]]. These perspectives treated feeling not merely as emotional fluctuation but as a central dimension of human experience, evaluative thought, and even moral judgement.{{sfnp|Harre|Parrott|1996}}

The systematic study of affect and feeling ({{lang|de|gefühl}}){{efn|In German psychology, the term {{lang|de|gefühl}} (meaning “feeling”) has long been used to refer to subjective emotional experience, and it continues to play a role in German-language affective science and phenomenology.{{sfnp|Harre|Parrott|1996}}}} in psychology began in the late 19th century with the work of [[Wilhelm Wundt]], often considered the founder of experimental psychology. Wundt proposed that affective experience could be described along three dimensions: pleasant–unpleasant, arousing–subduing, and strain–relaxation.{{sfnp|Wundt|1897}} These affective dimensions laid the groundwork for later theories of emotional valence and arousal.{{sfnp|Harre|Parrott|1996}}

A decade later, [[William James]] proposed a physiological theory of emotion in which feelings are the perception of bodily changes caused by external stimuli. In his classic 1884 essay, he wrote: "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble", arguing that feeling follows bodily reaction rather than preceding it.{{sfnp|James|1884}}

In the early 20th century, [[Carl Jung]] developed a typology in which feeling was one of the [[Jungian cognitive functions|four fundamental functions]] of consciousness, alongside [[thinking]], [[Sensation (psychology)|sensation]], and [[intuition]]. Unlike emotion, which he considered reactive and affective, Jung defined feeling as a rational function that judges and evaluates rather than perceives or reacts. In this view, feeling can be used to assign value or make decisions, independent of sensory experience.{{sfnp|Sharp|1987}}

Meanwhile, in phenomenological philosophy, [[Max Scheler]] emphasized that feeling is a unique mode of access to values. Rather than viewing feelings as subjective or irrational, Scheler argued that they are intentional acts that disclose the worth of things—what he called "value-feelings" ({{lang|de|wertgefühle}}).{{sfnp|Scheler|1973}} This idea positioned feeling not only as affective but also as [[epistemological]].

Contemporary philosopher [[Martha Nussbaum]] has continued the philosophical development of feeling by arguing that emotions are a form of evaluative judgement. Drawing from classical philosophy, she suggests that emotions are not opposed to rationality but are instead shaped by beliefs about what is valuable and significant.{{sfnp|Nussbaum|2001}} In her account, feelings are deeply intertwined with ethical reasoning and human flourishing.