Editing Fact (section)

==In philosophy==

In [[philosophy]], the concept ''fact'' is considered in the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge, called [[epistemology]] and [[ontology]], which studies concepts such as [[existence]], [[being]], [[Becoming (philosophy)|becoming]], and [[reality]]. Questions of [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] and truth are closely associated with questions of fact. A fact can be defined as something that is the case, in other words, a [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]].<ref>"A fact, it might be said, is a state of affairs that is the case or obtains." – [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. ''States of Affairs'']</ref><ref>Wittgenstein, ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]],'' Proposition 2: What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.</ref>

Facts may be understood as [[information]], which makes a true sentence true: "A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true."<ref name="ocp">Oxford Companion to Philosophy</ref> Facts may also be understood as those things to which a true sentence refers. The statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the Solar System" is ''about'' the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the [[Solar System]].<ref>Alex Oliver, ''Fact'', in {{cite book
| title     = Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
| first     = Edward
| last      = Craig
| publisher = Routledge, Oxford
| year      = 2005
| isbn        = 0-415-32495-5
}}</ref>

===Correspondence and the slingshot argument===

[[Pascal Engel|Pascal Engel's]] version of the [[correspondence theory of truth]] explains that what makes a sentence true is that it ''corresponds'' to a fact.<ref>{{cite book
| title     = Truth
| first     = Pascal
| last      = Engel
| publisher = McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP
| year      = 2002
| isbn        = 0-7735-2462-2
}}</ref> This theory presupposes the existence of an objective world.

The [[Slingshot argument]] claims to show that all true statements stand for the same thing, the [[truth value]] ''true''. If this argument holds, and facts are taken to be what true statements stand for, then one arrives at the counter-intuitive conclusion that there is only one fact: ''the truth''.<ref>The argument is presented in many places, but see for example [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Davidson]], ''Truth and Meaning'', in {{cite book
| title     = Truth and Interpretation
| first     = Donald
| last      = Davidson
| publisher = Clarendon Press, Oxford
| year      = 1984
| isbn        = 0-19-824617-X
}}</ref>

===Compound facts===

Any non-trivial true statement about [[reality]] is necessarily an abstraction composed of a complex of [[object (philosophy)|objects]] and [[property (philosophy)|properties]] or [[relations (philosophy)|relations]]. Facts "possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations".<ref name="ocp"/> For example, the fact described by the true statement "Paris is the capital city of France" implies that there is such a place as Paris, there is such a place as France, there are such things as capital cities, as well as that France has a government, that the government of France has the power to define its capital city, and that the French government has chosen Paris to be the capital, that there is such a thing as a ''place'' or a ''government'', and so on. The verifiable accuracy of all of these assertions, if facts themselves, may coincide to create the fact, that Paris is the capital of France.

Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to identify the constituent parts of negative, modal, disjunctive, or moral facts.<ref>''Fact'', in ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy'', Ted Honderich, editor. (Oxford, 1995) {{ISBN|0-19-866132-0}}</ref>

===Fact–value distinction===
{{Main|Fact–value distinction}}

Moral philosophers since [[David Hume#Ethics|David Hume]] have debated whether [[values]] are objective, and thus factual. In ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]'' Hume pointed out there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ''ought'' to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what ''is'' the case.  This is called the [[is–ought distinction]].  Those who insist there is a logical gulf between [[Fact–value distinction|facts and values]], such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values (e.g., "it is good to give food to hungry people") from facts (e.g., "people will die if they can't eat"), include [[G. E. Moore]], who called attempting to do so the [[naturalistic fallacy]].

===Factual–counterfactual distinction===
{{Main|Counterfactual conditional}}

[[Factuality]]—what has occurred—can also be contrasted with counterfactuality: what ''might have'' occurred, but did not. A counterfactual conditional or [[subjunctive conditional]] is a conditional (or "if–then") statement indicating what ''would be'' the case if events had been other than they were. For example, "If Alexander had lived, his empire would have been greater than Rome." This contrasts with an indicative conditional, which indicates what ''is'' (in fact) the case if its antecedent ''is'' (in fact) true—for example, "If you drink this, it will make you well." Such sentences are important to [[modal logic]], especially since the development of [[possible world]] semantics.{{Citation needed|date=July 2021}}