Editing Europa (rocket) (section)

===Background===
During the early 1950s, the British government had identified the need to develop its own series of [[ballistic missile]]s due to advances being made in this field, particularly by the [[Soviet Union]] and the United States.<ref name = "hill 249">Hill 2001, p. 249.</ref> A British programme to develop such a missile, named [[Blue Streak (missile)|Blue Streak]], was promptly initiated; however, there were key questions over the then-relatively unknown scenario of what such a vehicle would encounter when attempting [[atmospheric entry|re-entry]] to the atmosphere, there were fears that such a vehicle might simply burn up like a meteor and therefore be unachievable.<ref name = "hill 249"/><ref>Laycock and Laycock 2005, pp. 51-52.</ref> Accordingly, during 1955, the [[Black Knight (rocket)|Black Knight]] research rocket programme was commenced for this purpose.<ref name = "hill 22">Hill 2001, p. 22.</ref><ref>Massie and Robins 1986, p. 226.</ref> Following several launches, the Black Knight came to be regarded as a successful programme, having produced a relatively low cost and reliable rocket, and thus there was impetus present to proceed with further development of the platform.<ref name = "hill 188">Hill 2001, p. 188.</ref>

On 13 April 1960, the [[Secretary of State for Defence|Defence Minister]] [[Harold Watkinson]] announced the cancellation of Blue Streak as a military programme, and went on to state that: "the Government will now consider with the firms and other interests concerned, as a matter of urgency, whether the Blue Streak programme could be adapted for the development of a launcher for space satellites."<ref name="Hansard">{{cite journal | url= https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1960/apr/13/long-range-ballistic-missile-blue-streak#S5CV0621P0_19600413_HOC_208 |title= Long-Range Ballistic Missile (Blue Streak) |journal= Hansard |date= April 1960}}</ref><ref name="hill 13"/> While development of the Blue Streak missile continued with the view of using it as a capable satellite launcher, the rate of work was substantially slowed. Aerospace author C.N. Hill wrote that this declaration had been made: "Mainly, I suspect, to minimise the political damage that ensued from the [Blue Streak] decision".<ref name="hill 13">Hill 2001, p. 13.</ref>

In 1957, a proposed design, known as [[Black Prince (rocket)|Black Prince]], was put forward by [[Desmond King-Hele]] and [[Doreen Gilmour]] of the [[Royal Aircraft Establishment]] (RAE) during 1957.<ref name="Harvey 38">Harvey 2003, p. 38.</ref> As envisioned by this proposal, an [[expendable launch system]] could be developed using a mix of preexisting and in-development assets; the multi-stage launcher was to be formed of a Blue Streak first stage, a [[Black Knight (rocket)|Black Knight]] (or later a [[Black Arrow (rocket)|Black Arrow]]) second stage, and a military solid rocket as a third stage.<ref name="britain in space">{{cite web | url=http://www.britain-in-space.co.uk/1950/blackprince.html | title=Black Prince Project | work=Britain in Space | access-date=27 April 2012 | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120318141852/http://www.britain-in-space.co.uk/1950/blackprince.html | archive-date=18 March 2012 }}</ref>

In 1960, the [[Royal Aircraft Establishment]] at Farnborough was given the job of considering how the Blue Streak missile could be adapted as a satellite launching vehicle, in conjunction with other rocket stages. Accordingly, the 1957 concept design for a combined Blue Streak-Black Knight launcher was put forward once again, and this time received a favourable appraisal; the project was assigned the [[rainbow code]] of ''Black Prince''; in official documentation, the platform was referred to as the ''Blue Streak Satellite Launch Vehicle'' (BSSLV).<ref name="hill 125 126">Hill 2001, pp. 125-126.</ref> However, it was quickly recognised that the programme's cost would be a major issue, one estimate of the total development costs would have been equal to half of the British [[university]] budget.<ref name="hill 13 14">Hill 2001, pp. 13-14.</ref>

Along with the high costs involved, it was becoming clear that, due to British military satellites already being delivered by American launchers and the domestic science community being perceived as lacking the funding to conduct multiple major research satellite programmes at once, domestic demand for such a launcher was not guaranteed. Accordingly, it was decided that it would be preferable for other nations to be involved in the programme in order to share the burden of the costs and to be predisposed to making use of the launcher.<ref name="hill 14">Hill 2001, p. 14.</ref> Diplomatic approaches were made to various nations, however it became obvious that the members of the [[Commonwealth of Nations]] alone were not prepared to provide the necessary backing for such a programme.<ref name="hill 135">Hill 2001, p. 135.</ref>