Editing Epicureanism (section)

==Philosophy==
===Physics===
In his letter to [[Herodotus]] (not the historian), Epicurus presented three principles as to the nature of the physical world, i.e. that that which exists cannot come into being from that which does not exist, that which is destroyed does not cease to exist, and all that exists now always did exist and always will.<ref>Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 38-39</ref> The object of these principles was to establish the fact that all that constitutes the world is permanent and unchanging.<ref>Long, A.A.; Sedley, D.N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 26.</ref> Epicurean physics held that the entire universe consisted of two things: matter and void.<ref>{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=11–13}}</ref> Matter is made up of atoms, which are tiny bodies that have only the unchanging qualities of shape, size, and weight.<ref name="Wilson-2015a">{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|p=page=9}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|p=21}}</ref> The Epicureans believed that atoms were unchanging because the world was ordered and that changes had to have specific and consistent sources, e.g. a plant species only grows from a seed of the same species,<ref name="O'Keefe-2010j" /><ref name="Sharples-1998">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|last=Sharples|first=R. W.| publisher=Routledge| year=1998| location=New York, NY| pages=34–35}}</ref> but that in order for the universe to persist, what it is ultimately made up of must not be able to be changed or else the universe would be essentially destroyed.<ref name="Sharples-1996b" /><ref name="O'Keefe-2010j" />

Epicurus holds that there must be an infinite supply of atoms, although only a finite number of types of atoms, as well as an infinite amount of void.<ref name="Wilson-2015a" /> Epicurus explains this position in his letter to Herodotus:

<blockquote>Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counterchecks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.loebclassics.com/view/diogenes_laertius-lives_eminent_philosophers_book_x_epicurus/1925/pb_LCL185.573.xml|title=Lives of Eminent Philosophers: Volume II: Books 6-10|last=Diogenes|first=Laertius|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1925|location=Cambridge, Mass|pages=573–575|translator-last=Hicks|translator-first=R. D.|url-access=subscription }}</ref></blockquote> Because of the infinite supply of atoms, there are an infinite number of worlds, or ''cosmoi''.<ref name="Wilson-2015a" /> Some of these worlds could be vastly different from our own, some quite similar, and all of the worlds were separated from each other by vast areas of void (''metakosmia'').<ref name="Wilson-2015a" />

Epicureanism states that atoms are unable to be broken down into any smaller parts<ref name="Sharples-1996b">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n48 35]–37}}</ref> because void is necessary for matter to move. Anything which consists of both void and matter can be broken down, while if something contains no void then it has no way to break apart because no part of the substance could be broken down into a smaller subsection of the substance.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010j">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=18–20}}</ref> Atoms are constantly moving in one of four different ways.<ref name="Wilson-2015b">{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|p==11}}</ref> Atoms can simply collide with each other and then bounce off of each other.<ref name="Wilson-2015b" /> When joined with each other and forming a larger object, atoms can vibrate as they collide into each other while still maintaining the overall shape of the larger object.<ref name="Wilson-2015b" />

When not prevented by other atoms, all atoms move at the same speed naturally downwards in relation to the rest of the world.<ref name="Wilson-2015b" /><ref name="O'Keefe-2010k">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=25–28}}</ref> This downwards motion is natural for atoms; however, as their fourth means of motion, atoms can at times randomly swerve out of their usual downwards path.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010k" /> This swerving motion is what allowed for the creation of the universe, since as more and more atoms swerved and collided with each other, objects were able to take shape as the atoms joined together. Without the swerve, the atoms would never have interacted with each other, and simply continued to move downwards at the same speed.<ref name="Wilson-2015b" /><ref name="O'Keefe-2010k" /> Epicurus also felt that the swerve was what accounted for humanity's free will.<ref name="Sharples-1996e">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicurus, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n78 64]–66}}</ref> If it were not for the swerve, humans would be subject to a never-ending chain of cause and effect.<ref name="Sharples-1996e" /> This was a point which Epicureans often used to criticize [[Democritus]]' [[Democritean theory of atoms|atomic theory]].<ref name="Sharples-1996e" />

===Epistemology===
Epicurean philosophy employs an [[Empiricism|empirical]] epistemology, one based on the senses.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010p">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|page=85}}</ref>

====Sense perception====
Epicureans believed that senses also relied on atoms. Every object was continually emitting particles from itself that would then interact with the observer.<ref name="Wilson-2015c">{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|pp=54–55}}</ref> All sensations, such as sight, smell, or sound, relied on these particles.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" /> While the atoms that were emitted did not have the qualities that the senses were perceiving, the manner in which they were emitted caused the observer to experience those sensations, e.g. red particles were not themselves red but  were emitted in a manner that caused the viewer to experience the color red.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" /> The atoms are not perceived individually, but rather as a continuous sensation because of how quickly they move.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" />

The Epicureans believed that all sense perceptions were true,<ref>{{Cite book |title = The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited | last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n93 84]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref><ref name="O'Keefe-2010q">{{harvnb|O'Keefe| 2010 | pp=97–98}}</ref> and that errors arise in how we judge those perceptions.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/> When we form judgments about things (''hupolepsis''), they can be verified and corrected through further sensory information.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/><ref name="Bakalis-2005">{{Cite book|title=Handbook of Greek Philosophy: From Thales to the Stoics Analysis and Fragments|last=Bakalis|first=Nikolaos|publisher=Trafford Publishing|year=2005|location=Canada|pages=193–197}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition|url=https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish|url-access=limited|last=Konstan|first=David|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2011|editor-last=Fish|editor-first=Jeffrey|location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish/page/n75 62]–63|isbn=9780521194785|editor-last2=Sanders|editor-first2=Kirk R.}}</ref> For example, if someone sees a tower from far away that appears to be round, and upon approaching the tower they see that it is actually square, they would come to realize that their original judgement was wrong and correct their wrong opinion.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010r">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=103–104}}</ref>

====Criterion of truth====
Epicurus is said to have proposed three [[Problem of the criterion|criteria of truth]]: sensations (''aisthêsis''), preconceptions (''prolepsis''), and feelings (''pathê'').<ref name="Sharples-1996f">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|page=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n32 19]}}</ref> A fourth criterion called "presentational applications of the mind" (''phantastikai epibolai tês dianoias'') was said to have been added by later Epicureans.<ref name="Sharples-1996f"/><ref name="Asmis-2009">{{Cite book| title = The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited|last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher = Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James | location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n102 93]–94|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref> These criteria formed the method through which Epicureans thought we gained knowledge.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010p"/>

Since Epicureans thought that sensations could not deceive, sensations are the first and main criterion of truth for Epicureans.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/> Even in cases where sensory input seems to mislead, the input itself is true and the error arises from our judgments about the input. For example, when one places a straight oar in the water, it appears bent. The Epicurean would argue that the image of the oar, that is, the atoms traveling from the oar to the observer's eyes, has been shifted and thus really does arrive at the observer's eyes in the shape of a bent oar.<ref name="Sharples-1996c">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n25 12]–13}}</ref> The observer makes the error in assuming that the image he or she receives correctly represents the oar and has not been distorted in some way.<ref name="Sharples-1996c" /> In order to not make erroneous judgments about perceivable things and instead verify one's judgment, Epicureans believed that one needed to obtain "clear vision" (''enargeia'') of the perceivable thing by closer examination.<ref name="Sharples-1996d">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n25 12]–16}}</ref> This acted as a justification for one's judgements about the thing being perceived.<ref name="Sharples-1996d" /> ''Enargeia'' is characterized as sensation of an object that has been unchanged by judgments or opinions and is a clear and direct perception of that object.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited | last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009 | editor-last=Warren|editor-first = James | page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n94 85]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref>

An individual's preconceptions are his or her concepts of what things are, e.g. what someone's idea of a horse is, and these concepts are formed in a person's mind through sensory input over time.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n31 18]–19}}</ref> When the word that relates to the preconception is used, these preconceptions are summoned up by the mind into the person's thoughts.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=101–103}}</ref> It is through our preconceptions that we are able to make judgments about the things that we perceive.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010r"/> Preconceptions were also used by Epicureans to avoid the paradox proposed by Plato in the ''[[Meno]]'' regarding learning.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" /> Plato argues that learning requires us to already have knowledge of what we are learning, or else we would be unable to recognize when we had successfully learned the information.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" /> Preconceptions, Epicureans argue, provide individuals with that pre-knowledge required for learning.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" />

Our feelings or emotions (''pathê'') are how we perceive pleasure and pain.<ref name="Asmis-2009"/> They are analogous to sensations in that they are a means of perception, but they perceive our internal state as opposed to external things.<ref name="Asmis-2009" /> According to Diogenes Laertius, feelings are how we determine our actions. If something is pleasurable, we pursue that thing, and if something is painful, we avoid that thing.<ref name="Asmis-2009" />

The idea of "presentational applications of the mind" is an explanation for how we can discuss and inquire about things we cannot directly perceive.<ref name="Tsouna-2016">{{Cite journal|last=Tsouna|first=Voula|date=2016|title=Epicurean Preconceptions|journal=Phronesis|volume= 61| issue = 2 | page=215 | doi=10.1163/15685284-12341304}}</ref> We receive impressions of such things directly in our minds, instead of perceiving them through other senses.<ref name="Sharples-1996f"/> The concept of "presentational applications of the mind" may have been introduced to explain how we learn about things that we cannot directly perceive, such as the gods.<ref name="Sharples-1996f" /><ref name="Tsouna-2016" />

===Ethics===
{{Hedonism}}
Epicureanism bases its ethics on a hedonistic set of values, seeing pleasure as the chief good in life.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010c" /><ref>{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|page=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n97 84]}}</ref> Hence, Epicurus advocated living in such a way as to derive the greatest amount of pleasure possible during one's lifetime, yet doing so moderately in order to avoid the suffering incurred by overindulgence in such pleasure.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010c" />  Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love, and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|pp=95–96}}</ref> Since the political life could give rise to desires that could disturb virtue and one's peace of mind, such as a lust for power or a desire for fame, participation in politics was discouraged.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|pp=84–85}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|page=145}}</ref> Further, Epicurus sought to eliminate the fear of the gods and [[Death anxiety|of death]], seeing those two fears as chief causes of strife in life.<ref>{{harvnb|O'Keefe| 2010 | pp=155–171}}</ref>

====Pleasure====
{{blockquote|When we say ... that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not by an unbroken succession of drinking bouts and of revelry, not by sexual lust, nor the enjoyment of fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.|Epicurus|''"Letter to Menoeceus"''<ref name="ReferenceA">Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus", contained in Diogenes Laertius, ''Lives of Eminent Philosophers'', Book X</ref>}}
Epicureans had a very specific understanding of what the greatest pleasure was, and the focus of their ethics was on the avoidance of pain rather than seeking out pleasure.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> As evidence for this, Epicureans say that nature seems to command us to avoid pain, and they point out that all animals try to avoid pain as much as possible.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|p=93}}</ref> Epicureanism divided pleasure into two broad categories: ''pleasures of the body'' and ''pleasures of the mind''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=117–121}}</ref> ''Pleasures of the body'' involve sensations of the body, such as the act of eating delicious food or of being in a state of comfort free from pain, and exist only in the present.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> One can only experience pleasures of the body in the moment, meaning they only exist as a person is experiencing them.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=118–119}}</ref> ''Pleasures of the mind'' involve mental processes and states; feelings of joy, the lack of fear, and pleasant memories are all examples of pleasures of the mind.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> These pleasures of the mind do not only exist in the present, but also in the past and future, since memory of a past pleasant experience or the expectation of some potentially pleasing future can both be pleasurable experiences.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f" /> Because of this, the pleasures of the mind are considered to be greater than those of the body.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f" />

Emphasis was placed on pleasures of the mind rather than on physical pleasures.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010c">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=107–115}}</ref> The Epicureans further divided each of these types of pleasures into two categories: ''kinetic pleasure'' and ''katastematic pleasure''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=119–120}}</ref><ref>Konstan, David, "Epicurus", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/epicurus/</ref><ref>J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor. Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasures, in The Greeks On Pleasure. Eds. J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor. Clarendon Press, 1982</ref> Absence of pain, [[aponia]], and lack of disturbance of mind, [[ataraxia]], are two of the katastematic pleasures and often seen as the focal ones to [[Epicurus]].<ref>Cicero, De Fin i 37-38</ref><ref>{{cite journal |first=Clay |last=Splawn |title=Updating Epicurus's Concept of ''Katastematic'' Pleasure |journal=Journal of Value Inquiry |year=2002 |volume=36 |issue=4 |page=473 |doi=10.1023/A:1021997823870|s2cid=146146475 }}</ref> ''Kinetic pleasure'' is the physical or mental pleasures that involve action or change.<ref name="Sharples-1996a">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n104 91]–92}}</ref> Eating delicious food, as well as fulfilling desires and removing pain, which is itself considered a pleasurable act, are all examples of kinetic pleasure in the physical sense.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /><ref name="Warren-2002">{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia|last=Warren|first=James|publisher=University of Cambridge|year=2002|location=New York, NY|page=4}}</ref> According to Epicurus, feelings of joy would be an example of mental kinetic pleasure.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /> ''Katastematic pleasure'' is the pleasure one feels while in a state without pain.<ref name="Warren-2002" /> Like kinetic pleasures, katastematic pleasures can also be physical, such as the state of not being thirsty, or mental, such as freedom from a state of fear.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /><ref name="Sharples-1996a" />

While the pursuit of pleasure formed the focal point of the philosophy, this was largely directed to the "static pleasures" of minimizing pain, anxiety and suffering. From this understanding, Epicureans concluded that the greatest pleasure a person could reach was the complete removal of all pain, both physical and mental.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010n">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|page=120}}</ref> The ultimate goal then of Epicurean ethics was to reach a state of ''aponia'' and ''ataraxia''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010n" />

====Desire====
{{blockquote|I learn that your bodily inclination leans most keenly towards sexual intercourse. If you neither violate the laws nor disturb well established morals nor sadden someone close to you, nor strain your body, nor spend what is needed for necessities, use your own choice as you wish. It is sure difficult to imagine, however, that none of these would be a part of sex because sex never benefitted anyone.|Epicurus|''Vatican Sayings'', LI<ref>[[Epicurus]], ''[http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_51/ Vatican Saying 51]''</ref>}}
In order to do this an Epicurean had to control their desires, because desire itself was seen as painful.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010g" /> Not only will controlling one's desires bring about ''aponia'', as one will rarely suffer from not being physically satisfied, but controlling one's desires will also help to bring about ''ataraxia'' because one will not be anxious about becoming discomforted since one would have so few desires anyway.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010h" /> The Epicureans divide desires into three classes: natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and vain and empty:<ref name="O'Keefe-2010g">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=124–125}}</ref>

*''Natural and necessary'': These desires are limited desires that are innately present in all humans; it is part of human nature to have them.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010g" /> They are necessary for one of three reasons: necessary for happiness, necessary for freedom from bodily discomfort, and necessary for life.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010g" /> Clothing and shelter would belong to the first two categories, while something like food would belong to the third.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010g" />
*''Natural but not necessary'': These desires are innate to humans, but they do not need to be fulfilled for their happiness or their survival.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010h">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=126–127}}</ref> Wanting to eat delicious food when one is hungry is an example of a natural but not necessary desire.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010h" /> The main problem with these desires is that they fail to substantially increase a person's happiness, and at the same time require effort to obtain and are desired by people due to false beliefs that they are actually necessary.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010h" /> It is for this reason that they should be avoided.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010h" />
*''Vain and empty'': These desires are neither innate to humans nor required for happiness or health; indeed, they are also limitless and can never be fulfilled.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010i">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=125–126}}</ref> Desires of wealth or fame would fall in this class, and such desires are to be avoided because they will ultimately only bring about discomfort.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010i" />

If one follows only natural and necessary desires, then, according to Epicurus, one would be able to reach ''aponia'' and ''ataraxia'' and thereby the highest form of happiness.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010i" /> Unnecessary and, especially, artificially produced desires were to be suppressed.<ref>{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=125–127}}</ref>

====Politics====
{{blockquote|It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life.<ref name="classics">{{cite web |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/princdoc.html |title=Epicurus Principal Doctrines 5 and 31 transl. by Robert Drew Hicks |date=1925 }}("Justly" here means to prevent a "person from harming or being harmed by another".)</ref>}} 
The Epicurean understanding of [[justice]] was inherently self-interested. Justice was deemed good because it was seen as mutually beneficial.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010e">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=139–140}}</ref> Individuals would not act unjustly even if the act was initially unnoticed because of possibly being caught and punished.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010d">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=142–145}}</ref> Both punishment and fear of punishment would cause a person disturbance and prevent them from being happy.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010d" />

Epicurus was also an early thinker to develop the notion of justice as a [[social contract]], and in part attempts to address issues with the society described in [[Plato]]'s ''[[Republic (Plato)|Republic]]''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010a">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=139–142}}</ref> The social contract theory established by Epicureanism is based on mutual agreement, not divine decree.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010a" /> He defined justice as an agreement made by people not to harm each other.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010e" /> The point of living in a society with laws and punishments is to be protected from harm so that one is free to pursue happiness.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010a" /> Because of this, laws that do not contribute to promoting human happiness are not just.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010a" /> He gave his own unique version of the [[ethic of reciprocity]], which differs from other formulations by emphasizing minimizing harm and maximizing happiness for oneself and others.

Epicurean ideas on politics disagree with other philosophical traditions, namely the Stoic, Platonist and [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] traditions.<ref name="Cambridge University Press">{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge companion to epicureanism|date=2009|publisher=Cambridge University Press|editor-last=Warren |editor-first=James |isbn=9780521873475|location=Cambridge, UK|oclc=297147109}}</ref> To Epicureans all our social relations are a matter of how we perceive each other, of customs and traditions. No one is inherently of higher value or meant to dominate another.<ref name="worldcat.org"/> That is because there is no metaphysical basis for the superiority of one kind of person, all people are made of the same atomic material and are thus naturally equal.<ref name="worldcat.org"/> Epicureans also discourage political participation and other involvement in politics.<ref name="worldcat.org"/> However Epicureans are not [[apolitical]], it is possible that some political association could be seen as beneficial by some Epicureans.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> Some political associations could lead to certain benefits to the individual that would help to maximize pleasure and avoid physical or mental distress.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/>

====Friendship====
{{blockquote|of all the things which wisdom has contrived which contribute to a blessed life, none is more important, more fruitful, than friendship|quoted by Cicero<ref>''On Goals'', 1.65</ref>}}
Epicurus laid great emphasis on developing friendships as the basis of a satisfying life. The avoidance or freedom from hardship and fear is ideal to the Epicureans.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> While this avoidance or freedom could conceivably be achieved through political means, it was insisted by Epicurus that involvement in politics would not release one from fear and he advised against a life of politics.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> Epicurus also discouraged contributing to political society by starting a family, as the benefits of a wife and children are outweighed by the trouble brought about by having a family.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> Instead Epicurus encouraged a formation of a community of friends outside the traditional political state. This community of virtuous friends would focus on internal affairs and justice.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> However, Epicureanism is adaptable to circumstance as is the Epicurean approach to politics.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/> The same approaches will not always work in protection from pain and fear. In some situations it will be more beneficial to have a family and in other situations it will be more beneficial to participate in politics. It is ultimately up to the Epicurean to analyse their circumstance and take whatever action befits the situation.<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/>

====Death====
Epicureanism rejects [[immortality]]. It believes in the soul, but suggests that the soul is mortal and material, just like the body.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|p=52}}</ref> Epicurus rejected any possibility of an afterlife, while still contending that one need not fear death: "Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved, is without sensation, and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us."<ref>Russell, Bertrand.  [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ey94E3sOMA0C ''A History of Western Philosophy''], [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ey94E3sOMA0C&q=A+History+of+Western+Philosophy pp. 239–40]</ref> From this doctrine arose the Epicurean Epitaph: ''Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo'' ("I was not; I have been; I am not; I do not mind."), which is inscribed on the gravestones of his followers and seen on many ancient gravestones of the [[Roman Empire]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-06-26 |title=Death is Not the End |url=https://catholicexchange.com/death-is-not-the-end/ |access-date=2023-09-14 |website=Catholic Exchange |language=en-US}}</ref>

====Gods====
Epicureanism does not deny the existence of the gods; rather it denies their involvement in the world. According to Epicureanism, the gods do not interfere with human lives or the rest of the universe in any way<ref name="O'Keefe-2010o">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=155–156}}</ref> – thus, it shuns the idea that frightening weather events are divine retribution.<ref>James Warren (ed.), ''The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism'', p. 124</ref> One of the fears the Epicurean ought to be freed from is fear relating to the actions of the gods.<ref>James Warren (ed.), ''The Cambridge companion to Epicureanism'', p. 105</ref>

The manner in which the Epicurean gods exist is still disputed. Some scholars say that Epicureanism believes that the gods exist outside the mind as material objects (the [[Philosophical realism|realist]] position), while others assert that the gods only exist in our minds as ideals (the [[Idealism|idealist]] position).<ref name="O'Keefe-2010o" /><ref name="Sedley-2011">{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition|url=https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish|url-access=limited|last=Sedley|first=David|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2011|editor-last=Fish|editor-first=Jeffrey|location=United Kingdom|pages=[https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish/page/n42 29]–30|chapter=Epicurus' theological innatism|isbn=9780521194785|editor-last2=Sanders|editor-first2=Kirk R.}}</ref><ref name="Konstan-2011">{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition|url=https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish|url-access=limited|last=Konstan|first=David|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2011|editor-last=Fish|editor-first=Jeffrey|location=United Kingdom|pages=[https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish/page/n66 53]–54|chapter=Epicurus on the gods|isbn=9780521194785|editor-last2=Sanders|editor-first2=Kirk R.}}</ref> The realist position holds that Epicureans understand the gods as existing as physical and immortal beings made of atoms that reside somewhere in reality.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010o" /><ref name="Konstan-2011" /> However, the gods are completely separate from the rest of reality; they are uninterested in it, play no role in it, and remain completely undisturbed by it.<ref>{{Cite journal|author1-link=Jaap Mansfeld|last=Mansfeld|first=Jaap|date=1993|title=Aspects of Epicurean Theology|journal=Mnemosyne|volume=46|issue=2|pages=176–178|doi=10.1163/156852593X00484}}</ref> Instead, the gods live in what is called the ''metakosmia'', or the space between worlds.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Lucretius|last=Buchheit|first=Vinzenz|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2007|editor-last=Gale|editor-first=Monica R.|location=New York, NY|pages=110–111|chapter=Epicurus' Triumph of the Mind}}</ref> Contrarily, the idealist (sometimes called the "non-realist position" to avoid confusion) position holds that the gods are just idealized forms of the best human life,<ref name="Sedley-2011"/><ref>{{harvnb| O'Keefe| 2010| pp=158–159}}</ref> and it is thought that the gods were emblematic of the life one should aspire towards.<ref name="Sedley-2011"/> The debate between these two positions was revived by A. A. Long and David Sedley in their 1987 book, ''The Hellenistic Philosophers'', in which the two argued in favour of the idealist position.<ref name="Sedley-2011"/><ref name="Konstan-2011" /> While a scholarly consensus has yet to be reached, the realist position remains the prevailing viewpoint at this time.<ref name="Sedley-2011"/><ref name="Konstan-2011" />