Editing Edward Teller (section)

==Manhattan Project==
{{Main|Manhattan Project}}

[[File:Teller-edward.jpg|thumb|upright|right|Teller's ID badge photo from [[Los Alamos National Laboratory|Los Alamos]]]]

===Los Alamos Laboratory===
In 1942, Teller was invited to be part of [[Robert Oppenheimer]]'s summer planning seminar at the [[University of California, Berkeley]], on the origins of the [[Manhattan Project]], the US effort to develop the first [[nuclear weapon]]s. A few weeks earlier, Teller had been meeting with his friend and colleague [[Enrico Fermi]] about the prospects of [[Nuclear warfare|atomic warfare]], and Fermi had nonchalantly suggested that perhaps a weapon based on [[nuclear fission]] could be used to set off an even larger [[nuclear fusion]] reaction. Even though he initially explained to Fermi why he thought the idea would not work, Teller was fascinated by the possibility and was quickly bored with the idea of "just" an atomic bomb even though this was not yet anywhere near completion. At the Berkeley session, Teller diverted discussion from the fission weapon to the possibility of a fusion weapon—what he called the "Super", an early conception of the [[hydrogen bomb]].{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=63–67}}{{sfn|Rhodes|1986|pp=415–420}}

[[Arthur Compton]], the chairman of the [[University of Chicago]] physics department, coordinated the [[uranium]] research of [[Columbia University]], [[Princeton University]], the University of Chicago, and the University of California, Berkeley. To remove disagreement and duplication, Compton transferred the scientists to the [[Metallurgical Laboratory]] at Chicago.{{sfn|Rhodes|1986|pp=399–400}} Even though Teller and Mici were now American citizens, they had relatives in enemy countries, so Teller did not at first go to Chicago.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|p=158}} In early 1943, construction of the [[Los Alamos Laboratory]] in New Mexico began.  With Oppenheimer as its director, the laboratory's purpose was to design an [[atomic bomb]]. Teller moved there in March 1943.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|pp=163–165}} In Los Alamos, he annoyed his neighbors by playing piano late at night.<ref name=StanfordDeath />

Teller became part of the Theoretical (T) Division.{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|pp=76–77}}{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=85–87}} He was given a secret identity of Ed Tilden.{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|p=95}} He was irked at being passed over as its head; the job was instead given to [[Hans Bethe]]. Oppenheimer had him investigate unusual approaches to building fission weapons, such as [[autocatalysis]], in which the efficiency of the bomb would increase as the [[nuclear chain reaction]] progressed, but proved to be impractical.{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=85–87}} He also investigated using [[uranium hydride]] instead of uranium metal, but its efficiency turned out to be "negligible or less".{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|p=181}} He continued to push his ideas for a fusion weapon even though it had been put on a low priority during the war (as the creation of a fission weapon proved to be difficult enough).{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|pp=76–77}}{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=85–87}} On a visit to New York, he asked [[Maria Goeppert-Mayer]] to carry out calculations on the Super for him. She confirmed Teller's own results: the Super was not going to work.{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=117–118}}

A special group was established under Teller in March 1944 to investigate the mathematics of an [[implosion-type nuclear weapon]].{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|pp=129–130}} It too ran into difficulties. Because of his interest in the Super, Teller did not work as hard on the implosion calculations as Bethe wanted. These too were originally low-priority tasks, but the discovery of spontaneous fission in [[plutonium]] by [[Emilio Segrè]]'s group gave the implosion bomb increased importance. In June 1944, at Bethe's request, Oppenheimer moved Teller out of T Division, and placed him in charge of a special group responsible for the Super, reporting directly to Oppenheimer. He was replaced by [[Rudolf Peierls]] from the [[British contribution to the Manhattan Project|British Mission]], who in turn brought in [[Klaus Fuchs]], who was later revealed to be a [[atomic spies|Soviet spy]].{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|pp=160–162}}{{sfn|Herken|2002|pp=117–118}} Teller's Super group became part of Fermi's F Division when he joined the Los Alamos Laboratory in September 1944.{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|pp=160–162}} It included [[Stanislaw Ulam]], Jane Roberg, [[Geoffrey Chew]], Harold and Mary Argo,{{sfn|Hoddeson|Henriksen|Meade|Westfall|1993|p=204}} and [[Maria Goeppert Mayer|Maria Goeppert-Mayer]].{{sfn|Dash|1973|pp=296–299}}

Teller made valuable contributions to bomb research, especially in the elucidation of the implosion mechanism. He was the first to propose the [[Pit (nuclear weapon)|solid pit]] design that was eventually successful. This design became known as a "[[Pit (nuclear weapon)#Christy pits|Christy pit]]", after the physicist [[Robert F. Christy]] who made it a reality.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/robert-f-christy |publisher=Atomic Heritage Foundation |title=Robert F. Christy |access-date=November 14, 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| publisher=Restricted data blog| last=Wellerstein| first=Alex| title=Christy's Gadget: Reflections on a death| url=http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/10/05/christys-gadget/| access-date=October 7, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.webofstories.com/play/hans.bethe/94 |title=Hans Bethe 94 – Help from the British, and the 'Christy Gadget' |publisher=Web of Stories |access-date=October 12, 2014 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.webofstories.com/play/robert.christy/8 |title=Constructing the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb |publisher=Web of Stories |access-date=October 12, 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141010073928/http://www.webofstories.com/play/robert.christy/8 |archive-date=October 10, 2014 }}</ref> Teller was one of the few scientists to watch (with eye protection) the [[Trinity nuclear test]] in July 1945, rather than follow orders to lie on the ground with backs turned. He later said that the atomic flash "was as if I had pulled open the curtain in a dark room and broad daylight streamed in".<ref>{{cite journal|title=Edward Teller, RIP |url=http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/edward-teller-rip |journal=The New Atlantis |date=Fall 2003 |issue=3 |pages=105–107 |access-date=November 15, 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303233937/http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/edward-teller-rip |archive-date=March 3, 2016 }}</ref>

===Decision to drop the bombs===
In the days before and after the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon (the [[Trinity test]] in July 1945), Hungarian [[Leo Szilard]] circulated the [[Szilard petition|Szílard petition]], which argued that [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki#Proposed demonstration|a demonstration to the Japanese of the new weapon]] should occur prior to [[Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|actual use on Japan]], and that the weapons should never be used on people. In response to Szilard's petition, Teller consulted his friend Robert Oppenheimer. Teller believed that Oppenheimer was a natural leader and could help him with such a formidable political problem. Oppenheimer reassured Teller that the nation's fate should be left to the sensible politicians in Washington. Bolstered by Oppenheimer's influence, he decided to not sign the petition.{{sfn|Blumberg|Panos|1990|pp=82–83}}

Teller therefore penned a letter in response to Szilard that read:{{blockquote|I am not really convinced of your objections. I do not feel that there is any chance to outlaw any one weapon. If we have a slim chance of survival, it lies in the possibility to get rid of wars. The more decisive a weapon is the more surely it will be used in any real conflict and no agreements will help.

Our only hope is in getting the facts of our results before the people. This might help to convince everybody that the next war would be fatal. For this purpose actual combat-use might even be the best thing.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/1945-Teller-to-Szilard.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/1945-Teller-to-Szilard.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title=Edward Teller to Leo Szilard |date=July 2, 1945 |publisher=Nuclear Secrecy blog |access-date=November 15, 2015}} Copy in the J. Robert Oppenheimer papers (MS35188), Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 71, Folder, Teller, Edward, 1942–1963</ref>}}

On reflection on this letter years later when he was writing his memoirs, Teller wrote:{{blockquote|First, Szilard was right. As scientists who worked on producing the bomb, we bore a special responsibility. Second, Oppenheimer was right. We did not know enough about the political situation to have a valid opinion. Third, what we should have done but failed to do was to work out the technical changes required for demonstrating the bomb [very high] over Tokyo and submit that information to President Truman.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|p=206}} }}

Unknown to Teller at the time, four of his colleagues were solicited by the then secret May to June 1945 [[Interim Committee]]. It is this organization which ultimately decided on how the new weapons should initially be used. The committee's four-member ''Scientific Panel'' was led by Oppenheimer, and concluded immediate military use on Japan was the best option:{{blockquote|The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender&nbsp;... Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use&nbsp;... We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/interim-committee/interim-committee-recommendations_1945-06-16.htm |title=Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons by the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee, June 16, 1945 |publisher=[[Nuclear Age Peace Foundation]] |access-date=March 2, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110204224440/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/interim-committee/interim-committee-recommendations_1945-06-16.htm |archive-date=2011-02-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref>}}

Teller later learned of Oppenheimer's solicitation and his role in the Interim Committee's decision to drop the bombs, having secretly endorsed an immediate military use of the new weapons. This was contrary to the impression that Teller had received when he had personally asked Oppenheimer about the Szilard petition: that the nation's fate should be left to the sensible politicians in Washington. Following Teller's discovery of this, his relationship with his advisor began to deteriorate.{{sfn|Blumberg|Panos|1990|pp=82–83}}

In 1990, the historian [[Barton Bernstein]] argued that it is an "unconvincing claim" by Teller that he was a "covert dissenter" to the use of the bomb.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Essay Review-From the A-Bomb to Star Wars: Edward Teller's History. Better A Shield Than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology |journal=Technology and Culture |volume=31 |issue=4 |date=October 1990 |page=848}}</ref> In his 2001 ''Memoirs'', Teller claims that he did lobby Oppenheimer, but that Oppenheimer had convinced him that he should take no action and that the scientists should leave military questions in the hands of the military; Teller claims he was not aware that Oppenheimer and other scientists were being consulted as to the actual use of the weapon and implies that Oppenheimer was being hypocritical.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|pp=206–209}}