Editing Diplomatic history (section)

==Historiography==

===Ranke===
In the 5th century BCE the Greek historian  [[Thucydides]] was highly concerned with the relations among states. However [[Leopold von Ranke]] (1795–1886), the leading German historian of the 19th century, codified the modern form of diplomatic history.  Ranke wrote largely on the history of [[Early Modern Europe]], using the diplomatic archives of the European powers (particularly the [[Republic of Venice]]) to construct a detailed understanding of the history of Europe ''wie es eigentlich gewesen ist'' ("as it actually happened").  Ranke saw diplomatic history as the most important kind of history to write because of his idea of the "Primacy of Foreign Affairs" (''Primat der Aussenpolitik''), arguing that the concerns of international relations drive the internal development of the state. Ranke's understanding of diplomatic history relied on using as sources the large number of official documents produced by modern western governments; he argued that historians should examine such sources in an objective and neutral spirit.<ref name="Matusumoto pages 314-316"/><ref>Philipp Müller, "Doing historical research in the early nineteenth century. Leopold Ranke, the archive policy, and the relazioni of the Venetian Republic." ''Storia della storiografia'' 56 (2009): 81–103. [https://www.academia.edu/download/64762971/2009_Muller_-_Doing_Archival_Research_SDS_2009_2.pdf online]</ref>

===20th century scholars===
Ranke's understanding of the dominance of foreign policy, and hence an emphasis on diplomatic history, remained the dominant paradigm in historical writing through the first half of the twentieth century.  In the early 20th centuries, work by prominent diplomatic historians such as [[Charles Webster (historian)|Charles Webster]], [[Harold Temperley]], and [[Bernadotte Everly Schmitt]] focused on great European events, especially wars and peace conferences. A notable breakthrough in diplomatic historiography occurred in 1910 when the French government start to publish all of the archives relating to the [[war of 1870]].<ref name="Matusumoto pages 314-316"/>

Ranke's approach, combined with the effects of the [[War Guilt Clause]] in the [[Treaty of Versailles]] (1919) that blamed Germany, stimulated a massive outpouring in many languages on the [[origins of the war of 1914]].<ref>M. H. Cochran, "Historiography and war guilt." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 43.1 (1928): 76-89 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2143067.pdf online]</ref> The Bolsheviks in Russia published key secret papers from the Allies in 1918 and other governments commissioned carefully edited, multivolume collections of key documents in their possession. Numerous historians wrote multi-volume histories of the origins of the war.  In the interwar period, most diplomatic historians tended to blame all of the Great Powers of 1914 for the First World War, arguing that the war was in effect everybody's responsibility. In general, the early works in this vein fit fairly comfortably into Ranke's emphasis on ''Aussenpolitik''.<ref>Christoph Cornelissen and Arndt Weinrich, eds. ''Writing the Great War: The Historiography of World War I from 1918 to the Present'' (2021) [https://www.berghahnbooks.com/downloads/OpenAccess/CornelissenWriting/9781789204698_OA.pdf#page=09 online]</ref>

Historian [[Muriel Chamberlain]] notes that after the First World War:
: diplomatic history replaced constitutional history as the flagship of historical investigation, at once the most important, most exact and most sophisticated of historical studies.<ref>Muriel E Chamberlain, ''Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy 1789-1914'' (1988) p 1</ref>
She adds that after 1945, the trend reversed, allowing political, intellectual and social history to displace diplomatic history.

For the first half of the 20th century, most diplomatic history working within the narrow confines of the ''Primat der Aussenpolitik'' approach was very narrowly concerned with foreign-policy making elites with little reference to broader historical forces. The most notable exceptions to this tendency were [[A. J. P. Taylor]] and [[W. N. Medlicott|William Medlicott]] in Britain, [[Pierre Renouvin]] in France, and [[William L. Langer]] in the United States, who examined economic and domestic political forces.<ref name="Matusumoto pages 314-316"/>

===Causes of World War Two===
{{Main|Causes of World War II}}
[[File:Moscow negotiations paaskivi yrjokoskinen nykopp paasonen 1939.png|thumb|After the Second World War, [[Juho Kusti Paasikivi|J. K Paasikivi]] (in the middle), the 7th [[President of the Republic of Finland]], was remembered as a main architect of [[Finland]]'s foreign policy, especially with the [[Soviet Union]], which was at that time the war enemy of Finland.<ref>{{Cite book|editor-last=Wilsford|editor-first=David|title=Political leaders of contemporary Western Europe: a biographical dictionary|publisher=Greenwood|year=1995|pages=347–352}}</ref>]]
Sir [[Winston Churchill]]'s multi-volume ''[[The Second World War (book series)|The Second World War]]'', especially the first volume ''The Gathering Storm'' (1948) set the framework and the interpretation for much later [[historiography]].  His interpretation, echoing his own position before the war, that World War II was caused by the mad ambitions of [[Adolf Hitler]]; Churchill damned the cowardly and weak-willed British and French leaders who used [[appeasement]] in a futile effort to avoid the war. Churchill did not consider the argument that the alternative to appeasement was a premature war that Germany would win in 1938. The British historian [[A. J. P. Taylor]]'s 1961 book ''[[The Origins of the Second World War]]'' challenged Churchill's viewpoint and argued that Hitler had no master-plan for conquering the world. Instead he was an ordinary statesman –-an opportunistic leader seizing whatever chances he had for expansionism. The fact that a world war started over Poland in 1939 was due to diplomatic miscalculation by all the countries concerned, instead of being a case of German aggression.  British historians such as D.C. Watt, Paul Kennedy, George Peden and David Dilks argued that appeasement was not an aberration, and that it was an old British tradition which in this case flowed from numerous structural, economic and military factors. Historians such as [[Christopher Thorne (historian)|Christopher Thorne]] and [[Harry Hinsley]] abandoned the previous focus on individual leaders to discuss the broader societal influences such as public opinion and narrower ones like intelligence on diplomatic relations. In recent years the debates regarding the 1930s have continued, but new approaches are in use, such as an analysis in terms of Britain's national identity.<ref>Patrick Finney, "The romance of decline: The historiography of appeasement and British national identity." ''Electronic Journal of International History'' 1 (2000) [http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3385/1/Journal_of_International_History_2000-06_Finney.pdf Online].</ref><ref>Donald C. Watt, "The historiography of appeasement." in [[Alan Sked]] and Chris Cook, eds. ''Crisis and controversy: Essays in honour of AJP Taylor'' (1976) pp 100+.</ref>

===French approaches===
A group of [[French historians]] centered around [[Pierre Renouvin]] (1893–1974) and his ''protégés'' [[Jean-Baptiste Duroselle]] and {{ill|Maurice Baumont|fr|v=sup}} started a new type of international history in the 1950s that included taking into account what Renouvin called ''{{lang|fr|forces profondes}}'' (profound forces) such as the influence of domestic politics on French foreign policy.  However, Renouvin and his followers still followed the concept of ''{{lang|fr|la décadence}}'' with Renouvin arguing that French society under the [[French Third Republic|Third Republic]] was “sorely lacking in initiative and dynamism” and Baumont arguing that French politicians had allowed "personal interests" to override "any sense of the general interest".  In 1979, Duroselle's book ''La Décadence'' offered a total condemnation of the entire Third Republic as weak, cowardly and degenerate.<ref>Peter Jackson,  “Post-War Politics and the Historiography of French Strategy and Diplomacy Before the Second World War" ''History Compass'', Volume 4/5, 2006 pp 870-95</ref><ref>S. W. Helprin, ''Some Twentieth-Century Historians'' (1961) pp 143-70</ref>

===Fischer debate on World War One===
At the same time, in 1961 when the German historian [[Fritz Fischer (historian)|Fritz Fischer]] published ''Griff nach der Weltmacht'', which established that Germany had caused the First World War led to the fierce "Fischer Controversy" that tore apart the West German historical profession.<ref name="ReferenceA">Matusumoto, Saho "Diplomatic History" pages 314-316 from ''The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing'' page 315.</ref> One result of Fischer's book was the rise in the ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' (Primacy of Domestic Politics) approach.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> As a result of the rise of the ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' school, diplomatic historians increasing started to pay attention to domestic politics.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> In the 1970s, the conservative German historian [[Andreas Hillgruber]], together with his close associate [[Klaus Hildebrand]], was involved in a very acrimonious debate with the leftish German historian [[Hans-Ulrich Wehler]] over the merits of the ''Primat der Aussenpolitik'' ("primacy of foreign politics") and ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' ("primacy of domestic politics") schools.<ref>[[Kershaw, Ian]] ''The Nazi Dictatorship'', London, Arnold, 2000, pp. 9-11.</ref> Hillgruber and Hildebrand made a case for the traditional ''Primat der Aussenpolitik'' approach to diplomatic history with the stress on examining the records of the relevant foreign ministry and studies of the foreign policy decision-making elite.<ref>Kershaw, Ian ''The Nazi Dictatorship'', London, Arnold, 2000, pp. 9-10.</ref> Wehler, who favored the ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' approach, for his part contended that diplomatic history should be treated as a sub-branch of [[social history]], calling for theoretically based research,  and argued that the real focus should be on the study of the society in question.<ref name="Kershaw">Kershaw (2000), pp. 9-10.</ref> Moreover, under the influence of the ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' approach, diplomatic historians in the 1960s, 70s and 80s start to borrow models from the social sciences.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

===Mason–Overy debate on internal pressures inside Nazi Germany===
A notable example of the ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' approach was the claim by the British [[Marxist historian]] [[Timothy Mason (historian)|Timothy Mason]] who claimed that the launch of World War II in 1939 was best understood as a “barbaric variant of social imperialism”.<ref>Kaillis, Aristotle ''Fascist Ideology'', London: Routledge, 2000  page 7</ref> Mason argued that “Nazi Germany was always bent ''at some time'' upon a major war of expansion”.<ref name="Kaillis, Aristotle page 165">Kaillis, Aristotle ''Fascist Ideology'', London: Routledge, 2000  page 165</ref> However, Mason argued that the timing of such a war was determined by domestic political pressures, especially as relating to a failing economy, and had nothing to do with what Hitler wanted.<ref name="Kaillis, Aristotle page 165"/> In Mason's view in the period between 1936 and 1941, it was the state of the German economy, and not Hitler's "will" or "intentions" that was the most important determinate on German decision-making on foreign policy.<ref name="Kershaw, Ian' page 88">Kershaw, Ian'' The Nazi Dictatorship'' London : Arnold 2000 page 88.</ref> Mason argued that the Nazi leaders were deeply haunted by the [[German Revolution of 1918–19|November Revolution]] of 1918, and was most unwilling to see any fall in working class living standards out of the fear that it might provoke another November Revolution.<ref name="Kershaw, Ian' page 88"/> According to Mason, by 1939, the “overheating” of the German economy caused by rearmament, the failure of various rearmament plans produced by the shortages of skilled workers, industrial unrest caused by the breakdown of German social policies, and the sharp drop in living standards for the German working class forced Hitler into going to war at a time and place not of his choosing.<ref>Kaillis, Aristotle ''Fascist Ideology'', London: Routledge, 2000  pages 165-166</ref> Mason contended that when faced with the deep socio-economic crisis the Nazi leadership had decided to embark upon a ruthless “smash and grab” foreign policy of seizing territory in Eastern Europe which could be pitilessly plundered to support living standards in Germany.<ref>Kaillis, Aristotle ''Fascist Ideology'', London: Routledge, 2000  page 166</ref> Mason's theory of a "Flight into war" being imposed on Hitler generated much controversy, and in the 1980s he conducted a series of debates with economic historian [[Richard Overy]] over this matter.  Overy maintained the decision to attack [[Poland]] was not caused by structural economic problems, but rather was the result of Hitler wanting a localized war at that particular time in history. For Overy, a major problem with the Mason thesis was that it rested on the assumption that in a way unrecorded by the records, that information was passed on to Hitler about the ''Reich''{{'s}} economic problems.<ref name="Mason, Tim page 102">Mason, Tim & Overy, R.J. “Debate: Germany, `domestic crisis’ and the war in 1939” from ''The Origins of The Second World War'' edited by Patrick Finney, Edward Arnold: London, United Kingdom, 1997 page 102</ref> Overy argued that there was a major difference between economic pressures inducted by the problems of the [[Four Year Plan]], and economic motives to seize raw materials, industry and foreign reserve of neighboring states as a way of accelerating the Four Year Plan.<ref>Overy, Richard “Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis’ and War in 1939” from ''The Third Reich'' edited by Christian Leitz,  Blackwell: Oxford, 1999 pages 117-118</ref> Moreover, Overy asserted that the repressive capacity of the German state as a way of dealing with domestic unhappiness was somewhat downplayed by Mason.<ref name="Mason, Tim page 102"/>

===Japanese-American relations===
In addition, because World War II was a global war, diplomatic historians start to focus on [[Japanese-American relations]] to understand why Japan had attacked the United States in 1941.  This in turn led diplomatic historians to start to abandon the previous Euro-centric approach in favor of a more global approach.<ref>Saho Matusumoto, "Diplomatic History" in Kelly Boyd, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing'' (1999) pp 314-165</ref>  A sign of the changing times was the rise to prominence of such diplomatic historians such as the Japanese historian Chihiro Hosoya, the British historian [[Ian Nish]], and the American historian [[Akira Iriye]], which was the first time that Asian specialists became noted diplomatic historians.

===Vietnam war and revisionism===
The [[Cold War]] and [[decolonization#Cold War|decolonization]] greatly added the tendency to a more global diplomatic history. The [[Vietnam War]] led to the rise of a revisionist school in the United States, which led many American historians such as [[Gabriel Kolko]] and [[William Appleman Williams]] to reject traditional diplomatic history in favor of a ''Primat der Innenpolitik'' approach that saw a widespread examination of the influence of American domestic politics together with various social, economic and cultural forces on foreign-policy making. In general, the American Cold War revisionists tended to focus on American foreign policy decision-making with respect to the genesis of the Cold War in the 1940s and on how the United States became involved in Vietnam in the 1960s. Starting in the 1960s, a ferocious debate has taken place within Cold War historiography between the advocates of the “orthodox” school which saw the Cold War as a case of Soviet aggression such as [[Vojtech Mastny (historian)|Vojtech Mastny]] against the proponents of the “revisionist” school which saw the Cold War as a case of American aggression. Latterly, a third school known as "neo-orthodox" whose most prominent member is the American historian [[John Lewis Gaddis]] has emerged, which holds through the United States borne some responsibility for the Cold War, the lion's share of the responsibility goes to the Soviet Union.

===Recent trends===
In Europe diplomatic history fell out of favor in the late Cold War era. Since the collapse of communism in 1989–91, however, there has been a renaissance, led especially by historians of the early modern era, in the history of diplomacy. The new approach differs from previous perspectives by the wholesale incorporation of perspectives from political science, sociology, the history of mentalities, and cultural history.

In the U.S. since the 1980s, the discipline of diplomatic history has become more relevant to and better integrated with the mainstream of the academic history profession. It has taken the lead in internationalization of American historical studies. Since it explores the interaction of domestic and international forces, the field has become increasingly important for its study of culture and identity and the exploration of political ideologies as applied to foreign affairs. There have been major influences from other new approaches such as [[Orientalism]] and [[globalism]], as well as gender and racial history.<ref>Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” ''[[Journal of American History]]'' (March 2009), v 95#4 pp 1053-73</ref> The history of human rights has become important as well.<ref>Micheline R. Ishay, ''The history of human rights: From ancient times to the globalization era'' (2008) [https://edocs.uis.edu/Departments/LIS/Course_Pages/LIS411/readings/Ishay_Human_Rights_Enlightenment.pdf excerpt].</ref>  Despite all these innovations, however, the core endeavor of diplomatic history remains the study of the state interacting with other states, which is also a key to its broadening appeal, since considerations of America's superpower status is essential to understanding the world internationally.

In the early 1980s, historian [[Jeffrey Kimball (historian)|Jeffrey Kimball]] surveyed the ideological preferences of 109 active diplomatic historians in the United States as well as 54 active military historians. He reports that:
:Of historians in the field of diplomatic history, 7% are Socialist, 19% are Other, 53% are Liberal, 11% are None and 10% Conservative. Of military historians, 0% are Socialist, 8% are Other, 35% are Liberal, 18% are None and 40% are  Conservative.<ref>Jeffrey Kimball, "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U. S. Wars," ''The History Teacher''  (May, 1984) 17#3 pp. 355-384 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/493146.pdf in JSTOR]</ref>