Editing David Gauthier (section)

==Philosophy<!--'Constrained maximization', 'Constrained maximisation', and 'Contractarian ethics' redirect here-->==
Gauthier was the author of numerous articles, some of the most important of which are collected in ''Moral Dealing'', as well as several books including ''Practical Reasoning'', ''The Logic of Leviathan'', ''Morals by Agreement'', and ''Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence''.

In addition to systematic work in moral theory, Gauthier was also interested in the [[history of political philosophy]], especially [[Thomas Hobbes|Hobbes]] and [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau|Rousseau]]. He conducted work on the theory of [[Practical reasoning|practical rationality]], where he began from an attempt to understand economic rationality, rather than from [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] or [[Aristotle|Aristotelian]] antecedents.

Gauthier understood [[value theory|value]] as a matter of individuals' [[economic subjectivism|subjective]] preferences, and argued that moral constraints on straightforward utility-maximizing are [[prudence|prudentially]] justified. He argued that it is most prudent to give up straightforward maximizing and instead adopt a disposition of '''constrained maximization'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, according to which one resolves to cooperate with all similarly disposed persons (those disposed towards cooperation) and defect on the rest (straightforward maximizers), since repeated cooperation provides greater yields than repeated mutual defection from contracts (as is seen in a basic [[Prisoner's dilemma]] game). According to Gauthier's '''contractarian ethics'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->,<ref>Peter Byrne, ''The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Ethics'', Springer, 2016, p. 98</ref> moral constraints are justified because they make us all better off, in terms of our preferences (whatever they may be). A consequence is that good moral thinking is just an elevated and subtly [[game theory|strategic]] version of [[Instrumental rationality|means–end reasoning]].

In ''Morals by Agreement'', Gauthier defines translucency. An individual is translucent if their intentions can be guessed or judged by other individuals. Celeste M. Friend argues against the argument of translucency in the evolution of cooperation. First, translucency might not be realistic in human societies. This first argument was first brought by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.  Second, translucency might be the product of social interactions: one becomes often more translucent as trust is gained, and not the other way round. Finally, excessive translucency would also reveal the underlying self-interest in being translucent, therefore hindering cooperation. <ref>{{Cite journal |last=Friend |first=Celeste M. |date=2001 |title=Trust and the Presumption of Translucency |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23559039 |journal=Social Theory and Practice |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.5840/soctheorpract200127118 |jstor=23559039 |issn=0037-802X}}</ref>