Editing Darwin's Dangerous Idea (section)

==Synopsis==

===Part I: Starting in the Middle===
"Starting in the Middle", Part I of ''Darwin's Dangerous Idea'', gets its name from a quote by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]: "Analyze theory-building how we will, we all must start in the middle. Our conceptual firsts are middle-sized, middle-distance objects, and our introduction to them and to everything comes midway in the cultural evolution of the race."

The first chapter "Tell Me Why" is named after a song.

{{Blockquote|text=
Tell me why the stars do shine,<br>
Tell me why the ivy twines, <br>
Tell me why the sky's so blue.<br>
Then I will tell you just why I love you.

Because God made the stars to shine,<br>
Because God made the ivy twine,<br>
Because God made the sky so blue.<br>
Because God made you, that's why I love you.}}

Before [[Charles Darwin]], and still today, a majority of people see [[God]] as the [[ultimate cause]] of all design, or the ultimate answer to 'why<!-- this should have an article too... -->?' questions. [[John Locke]] argued for the primacy of [[mind]] before [[matter]],<ref>{{cite book |title=[[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]] |last=Locke |first=John |author-link=John Locke |year=1690 |location=London }}</ref> and [[David Hume]], while exposing problems with Locke's view,<ref>{{cite book |title=[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]] |last=Hume |first=David |author-link=David Hume |year=1779 |location=London }}</ref> could not see any alternative.

[[Image:Cranes from Encyclopédie.jpg|thumb|''Darwin's Dangerous Idea'' makes extensive use of [[crane (machine)|crane]]s as an analogy.]]
Darwin provided just such an alternative: [[evolution]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[On the Origin of Species]] |last=Darwin |first=Charles |author-link=Charles Darwin |year=1859 |publisher=John Murray |location=London }}</ref> Besides providing [[evidence of common descent]], he introduced a [[mechanism (philosophy)|mechanism]] to explain it: [[natural selection]]. According to Dennett, natural selection is a mindless, mechanical and [[algorithm]]ic process—Darwin's dangerous idea. The third chapter introduces the concept of "skyhooks" and "cranes" (see below). He suggests that resistance to [[Darwinism]] is based on a desire for skyhooks, which do not really exist. According to Dennett, good [[reductionism|reductionists]] explain apparent [[design]] without skyhooks; [[greedy reductionism|greedy reductionists]] try to explain it without cranes.

Chapter 4 looks at the tree of life, such as how it can be visualized and some crucial events in life's history. The next chapter concerns the possible<!--  we should have an article on this, no? --> and the actual, using the 'Library of [[Gregor Mendel|Mendel]]' (the space of all [[logical possibility|logically possible]] [[genome]]s) as a conceptual aid.

In the last chapter of part I, Dennett treats human [[social artifact|artifacts]] and [[culture]] as a branch of a unified Design Space. [[Common descent|Descent]] or [[homology (anthropology)|homology]] can be detected by shared design features that would be unlikely to appear independently. However, there are also "Forced Moves" or "Good Tricks" that will be discovered repeatedly, either by natural selection (see [[convergent evolution]]) or human investigation.

===Part II: Darwinian Thinking in Biology===
[[Image:Origin of Species illustration cropped.png|thumb|left|Tree diagram in ''[[On the Origin of Species|Origin]]'']]
The first chapter of part II, "Darwinian Thinking in Biology", asserts that [[origin of life|life originated]] without any skyhooks, and the orderly world we know is the result of a blind and undirected shuffle through chaos.

The eighth chapter's message is conveyed by its title, "Biology is Engineering"; [[biology]] is the study of design, [[function (biology)|function]], construction and operation. However, there are some important differences between biology and [[engineering]]. Related to the engineering concept of optimization, the next chapter deals with [[adaptationism]], which Dennett endorses, calling [[Stephen Jay Gould|Gould]] and [[Richard Lewontin|Lewontin]]'s "refutation" of it<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gould |first=Stephen Jay |author-link=Stephen Jay Gould |author2=Richard Lewontin |author2-link=Richard Lewontin |year=1979 |title=The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme |journal=[[Proceedings of the Royal Society|Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B]] |volume=205 |issue=1161 |pages=581–598 |url=http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/03_Areas/evolution/perspectives/Gould_Lewontin_1979.shtml |doi=10.1098/rspb.1979.0086 |pmid=42062 |bibcode=1979RSPSB.205..581G |s2cid=2129408 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426061028/http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/03_Areas/evolution/perspectives/Gould_Lewontin_1979.shtml |archive-date=2009-04-26 |url-status=dead }}</ref> an illusion. Dennett thinks adaptationism is, in fact, the best way of uncovering constraints<!-- pretty sure we should have an article on constraints too -->.

The tenth chapter, entitled "[[Bully for Brontosaurus]]", is an extended [[critique]] of [[Stephen Jay Gould]], who Dennett feels has created a distorted view of evolution with his [[popular science|popular]] writings; his "self-styled revolutions" against adaptationism, [[gradualism]] and other orthodox Darwinism all being false alarms. The final chapter of part II dismisses [[directed mutation]], the [[inheritance of acquired traits]] and [[Pierre Teilhard de Chardin|Teilhard]]'s "[[Omega Point]]", and insists that other controversies and hypotheses  (like the [[unit of selection]] and [[Panspermia]]) have no dire consequences for orthodox Darwinism.

===Part III: Mind, Meaning, Mathematics and Morality===
[[Image:Leviathan.jpg|thumb|The frontispiece to Thomas Hobbes' ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'', which appears at the beginning of chapter 16 "On the Origin of Morality".]]
"Mind, Meaning, Mathematics and Morality" is the name of Part III, which begins with a quote from Nietzsche.<ref>{{cite book |title=[[Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality]] |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |author-link=Friedrich Nietzsche |year=1881 }} Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982].</ref> Chapter 12, "The Cranes of Culture", discusses [[cultural evolution]]. It asserts that the [[meme]] has a role to play in our understanding of culture, and that it allows [[human]]s, alone among [[animal]]s, to "transcend" our [[gene-centered view of evolution|selfish genes]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[The Selfish Gene]] |last=Dawkins |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Dawkins |year=1976 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford }}</ref> "Losing Our Minds to Darwin" follows, a chapter about the evolution of brains, minds and [[language]]. Dennett criticizes [[Noam Chomsky]]'s perceived resistance to the [[evolution of language]], its modeling by [[artificial intelligence]], and [[reverse engineering]].

The evolution of meaning<!-- to what can I link? maybe [[Meaning (philosophy of language)]]? --> is then discussed, and Dennett uses a series of [[thought experiment]]s to persuade the reader that meaning is the product of meaningless, algorithmic processes.

[[Image:Racknitz - The Turk 3.jpg|thumb|left|[[Wolfgang von Kempelen|Von Kempelen]]'s chess automaton, discussed in chapter 15.]]
Chapter 15 asserts that [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems|Gödel's Theorem]] does not make certain sorts of [[artificial intelligence]] impossible. Dennett extends his criticism to [[Roger Penrose]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[The Emperor's New Mind]] |last=Penrose |first=Roger |author-link=Roger Penrose |year=1989 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford }}</ref> The subject then moves on to the [[evolution of morality|origin and evolution of morality]], beginning with [[Thomas Hobbes]]<ref>{{cite book |title=[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]] |last=Hobbes |first=Thomas |author-link=Thomas Hobbes |year=1651 |publisher=Crooke |location=London }}</ref> (who Dennett calls "the first [[sociobiology|sociobiologist]]") and [[Friedrich Nietzsche]].<ref>{{cite book |title=[[On the Genealogy of Morals]] |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |author-link=Friedrich Nietzsche |year=1887 }} Translated by [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] [New York: Vintage, 1967].</ref> He concludes that only an evolutionary analysis of [[ethics]] makes sense, though he cautions against some varieties of 'greedy ethical reductionism'. Before moving to the next chapter, he discusses some [[sociobiology]] controversies.

The penultimate chapter, entitled "Redesigning Morality", begins by asking if ethics can be 'naturalized'. Dennett does not believe there is much hope of discovering an algorithm for doing the right thing, but expresses optimism in our ability to design and redesign our approach to moral problems. In "The Future of an Idea", the book's last chapter, Dennett praises [[biodiversity]], including [[cultural diversity]]. In closing, he uses ''[[Beauty and the Beast]]'' as an analogy; although Darwin's idea may seem dangerous, it is actually quite beautiful.