Editing Civil war (section)

== Causes ==
According to a 2017 review study of civil war research, there are three prominent explanations for civil war: '''greed-based explanations''' which center on individuals' desire to maximize their profits, '''grievance-based explanations''' which center on conflict as a response to socioeconomic or political injustice, and '''opportunity-based explanations''' which center on factors that make it easier to engage in violent mobilization.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last1=Cederman|first1=Lars-Erik|last2=Vogt|first2=Manuel|s2cid=149212588|date=2017-07-26|title=Dynamics and Logics of Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=61|issue=9|pages=0022002717721385|doi=10.1177/0022002717721385|issn=0022-0027|url=http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10040601/1/Vogt_JCR_LEC_MV.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723085655/http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10040601/1/Vogt_JCR_LEC_MV.pdf |archive-date=2018-07-23 |url-status=live}}</ref> According to the study, the most influential explanation for civil war onset is the opportunity-based explanation by James Fearon and David Laitin in their 2003 American Political Science Review article.<ref name=":2" />

=== Greed ===
Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are attracted by two opposing theories, [[greed versus grievance]]. Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by differences of ethnicity, religion or other [[social affiliation]], or do conflicts begin because it is in the economic best interests of individuals and groups to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion that economic and structural factors are more important than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil war.<ref>See, for example, {{harvnb|Hironaka|2005|pp=9–10}}, and [[Paul Collier|Collier, Paul]], Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, "The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design," in Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 13</ref>

A comprehensive study of civil war was carried out by a team from the [[World Bank]] in the early 21st century. The study framework, which came to be called the Collier–Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167 five-year increments of "no civil war" for comparison, and subjected the data set to [[regression analysis]] to see the effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to have a statistically significant effect on the chance that a civil war would occur in any given five-year period were:<ref name=cs17>Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 17</ref>

A high proportion of primary [[commodity|commodities]] in national exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A country at "peak danger", with commodities comprising 32% of [[gross domestic product]], has a 22% risk of falling into civil war in a given five-year period, while a country with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. When disaggregated, only [[petroleum]] and non-petroleum groupings showed different results: a country with relatively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is at slightly less risk, while a high level of dependence on oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war than national dependence on another primary commodity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the result of the ease by which primary commodities may be extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth; for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment manufacturing or hospitality services.<ref name=cs16>Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 16</ref>

A second source of finance is national [[diaspora]]s, which can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The study found that statistically switching the size of a country's diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a civil war.<ref name=cs16/>

Higher male secondary school enrollment, [[per capita income]] and economic growth rate all had significant effects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a male secondary school enrollment 10% above the average reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earnings forgone by rebellion, and therefore that lower forgone earnings encourage rebellion.<ref name=cs16/> Phrased another way: young males (who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebellion if they are getting an education or have a comfortable salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future.<ref>Henrik Urdal – [https://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert%20Paper.pdf A CLASH OF GENERATIONS? YOUTH BULGES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170703213240/http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/expertpapers/Urdal_Expert%20Paper.pdf |date=2017-07-03 }} – ''un.org.'' Retrieved 28 December 2012.</ref>

Low per capita income has also been proposed as a cause for grievance, prompting armed rebellion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=MacCulloch |first=Robert |date=2005 |title=Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426881 |journal=The Journal of Law & Economics |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=93–123 |doi=10.1086/426881 |jstor=10.1086/426881 |issn=0022-2186}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bartusevičius |first=Henrikas |date=2014 |title=The inequality–conflict nexus re-examined: Income, education and popular rebellions |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343313503179 |journal=[[Journal of Peace Research]] |language=en |volume=51 |issue=1 |pages=35–50 |doi=10.1177/0022343313503179 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref> However, for this to be true, one would expect [[economic inequality]] to also be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The study therefore concluded that the economic model of [[opportunity cost]] better explained the findings.<ref name=cs17/>

=== Grievance ===
Most proxies for "grievance"—the theory that civil wars begin because of issues of identity, rather than economics—were statistically insignificant, including economic equality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance, the case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, increased the risk of civil war. A country characterized by ethnic dominance has nearly twice the chance of a civil war. However, the combined effects of ethnic and religious fractionalization, i.e. the greater chance that any two randomly chosen people will be from separate ethnic or religious groups, the less chance of a civil war, were also significant and positive, as long as the country avoided ethnic dominance. The study interpreted this as stating that minority groups are more likely to rebel if they feel that they are being dominated, but that rebellions are more likely to occur the more homogeneous the population and thus more cohesive the rebels. These two factors may thus be seen as mitigating each other in many cases.<ref name="cs18">Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 18</ref>

=== Criticism of the "greed versus grievance" theory ===

David Keen, a professor at the Development Studies Institute at the London School of Economics is one of the major critics of greed vs. grievance theory, defined primarily by Paul Collier, and argues the point that a conflict, although he cannot define it, cannot be pinpointed to simply one motive.<ref name="complex">David Keen. "Complex Emergencies: David Keen Responds" African Arguments: Royal African Society.</ref> He believes that conflicts are much more complex and thus should not be analyzed through simplified methods. He disagrees with the quantitative research methods of Collier and believes a stronger emphasis should be put on personal data and human perspective of the people in conflict.

Beyond Keen, several other authors have introduced works that either disprove greed vs. grievance theory with empirical data, or dismiss its ultimate conclusion. Authors such as Cristina Bodea and Ibrahim Elbadawi, who co-wrote the entry, "Riots, coups and civil war: Revisiting the greed and grievance debate", argue that empirical data can disprove many of the proponents of greed theory and make the idea "irrelevant".<ref>Christina Bodea. "Riots, coups and civil war : revisiting the greed and grievance debate." Policy Research 1 (2007).</ref> They examine a myriad of factors and conclude that too many factors come into play with conflict, which cannot be confined to simply greed or grievance.

Anthony Vinci makes a strong argument that "fungible concept of power and the primary motivation of survival provide superior explanations of armed group motivation and, more broadly, the conduct of internal conflicts".<ref>Anthony Vinci. "Greed-Grievance Reconsidered: The Role of Power and Survival in the Motivation of Armed Groups." Civil Wars "8(1)" (2007): 35.</ref>

=== Opportunities ===
James Fearon and David Laitin find that ethnic and religious diversity does not make civil war more likely.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Fearon|first1=James D.|last2=Laitin|first2=David D.|date=2003|title=Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=97|issue=1|pages=75–90|jstor=3118222|doi=10.1017/S0003055403000534|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |citeseerx=10.1.1.453.3913|s2cid=8303905}}</ref> They instead find that factors that make it easier for rebels to recruit foot soldiers and sustain insurgencies, such as "poverty—which marks financially & bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment—political instability, rough terrain, and large populations" make civil wars more likely.<ref name=":3" />

Such research finds that civil wars happen because the state is weak; both authoritarian and democratic states can be stable if they have the financial and military capacity to put down rebellions.<ref name="Hanania">{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/civil-war-united-states-unlikely-violence/2020/10/29/3a143936-0f0f-11eb-8074-0e943a91bf08_story.html |title=Americans hate each other. But we aren't headed for civil war. |date=29 Oct 2020 |author=Richard Hanania |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |access-date=15 April 2021 |archive-date=19 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419055659/https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/civil-war-united-states-unlikely-violence/2020/10/29/3a143936-0f0f-11eb-8074-0e943a91bf08_story.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Critical Responses to Fearon and Laitin ====
Some scholars, such as [[Lars-Erik Cederman]] of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the [[Swiss Federal Institute of Technology at Zurich|Swiss Federal Institute of Technology]], have criticized the data used by Fearon and Laitin to determine ethnic and religious diversity. In his 2007 paper ''Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies'', Cederman argues that the [[List of countries ranked by ethnic and cultural diversity level|ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF)]] used by Fearon, Laitin and other political scientists is flawed.<ref name="cambridge.org">{{Cite journal |last1=Cederman |first1=Lars-Erik |last2=Girardin |first2=Luc |date=February 2007 |title=Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055407070086/type/journal_article |journal=American Political Science Review |language=en |volume=101 |issue=1 |pages=173–185 |doi=10.1017/S0003055407070086 |issn=0003-0554}}</ref> ELF, Cederman states, measures diversity on a country's population-wide level and makes no attempt to determine the number of ethnic groups in relation to what role they play in the power of the state and its military. Cederman believes it makes little sense to test hypotheses relating national ethnic diversity to civil war outbreak without any explicit reference to how many different ethnic groups actually hold power in the state. This suggests that ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages can matter, depending on the extent to which the various groups have ability and influence to mobilize on either side of a forming conflict.<ref name="cambridge.org"/> Themes explored in Cederman's later work criticizing the use of ethnic fractionalization measures as input variables to predict civil war outbreak relate to these indices not accounting for the geographical distribution of ethnic groups within countries, as this can affect their access to regional resources and commodities, which in turn can lead to conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Cederman |first1=Lars-Erik |last2=Buhaug |first2=Halvard |last3=Rød |first3=Jan Ketil |date=2009-05-27 |title=Ethno-Nationalist Dyads and Civil War |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336455 |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=53 |issue=4 |pages=496–525 |doi=10.1177/0022002709336455 |bibcode=2009JConR..53..496C |issn=0022-0027}}</ref> A third theme explored by Cederman is that ethnolinguistic fractionalization does not quantify the extent to which there is pre-existing economic inequality between ethnic groups within countries. In a 2011 article, Cederman and fellow researchers describe finding that “in highly unequal societies, both rich and poor groups fight more often than those groups whose wealth lies closer to the country average”, going against the opportunity-based explanation for civil war outbreak.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=CEDERMAN |first1=LARS-ERIK |last2=WEIDMANN |first2=NILS B. |last3=GLEDITSCH |first3=KRISTIAN SKREDE |date=2011-07-11 |title=Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000207 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=105 |issue=3 |pages=478–495 |doi=10.1017/s0003055411000207 |issn=0003-0554|hdl=20.500.11850/160115 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Michael Bleaney, Professor of International Economics at the [[University of Nottingham]], published a 2009 paper titled ''Incidence, Onset and Duration of Civil Wars: A Review of the Evidence'', which tested numerous variables for their relationship to civil war outbreak with different datasets, including that utilized by Fearon and Laitin. Bleaney concluded that neither ethnoreligious diversity, as measured by fractionalization, nor another variable, ethnic polarization, defined as the extent to which individuals in a population are distributed across different ethnic groups, were "a sufficient measure of diversity as it affects the probability of conflict."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bleaney |first=Michael |date=2009 |title=Incidence, onset and duration of civil wars: A review of the evidence |url=https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/65452/1/614243815.pdf |journal=CREDIT Research Paper |volume=09 |issue=8 |pages=29}}</ref>

=== Other causes ===

==== Bargaining problems ====
In a state torn by civil war, the contesting powers often do not have the ability to commit or the trust to believe in the other side's commitment to put an end to war.<ref>Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth". ''Handbook of Economic Growth'' 1: 385–472.</ref> When considering a peace agreement, the involved parties are aware of the high incentives to withdraw once one of them has taken an action that weakens their military, political or economical power. Commitment problems may deter a lasting peace agreement as the powers in question are aware that neither of them is able to commit to their end of the bargain in the future.<ref>Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180908093107/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 |date=2018-09-08 }}". ''International Studies Quarterly'' ''53''(3), 737–759.</ref> States are often unable to escape [[conflict trap]]s (recurring civil war conflicts) due to the lack of strong political and legal institutions that motivate bargaining, settle disputes, and enforce peace settlements.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Walter|first=Barbara F.|s2cid=154632359|date=2015-10-01|title=Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=59|issue=7|pages=1242–1272|doi=10.1177/0022002714528006|issn=0022-0027}}</ref>

==== Governance ====
Political scientist [[Barbara F. Walter]] suggests that most contemporary civil wars are actually repeats of earlier civil wars that often arise when leaders are not accountable to the public, when there is poor public participation in politics, and when there is a lack of transparency of information between the executives and the public. Walter argues that when these issues are properly reversed, they act as political and legal restraints on executive power forcing the established government to better serve the people. Additionally, these political and legal restraints create a standardized avenue to influence government and increase the commitment credibility of established peace treaties. It is the strength of a nation's institutionalization and good governance—not the presence of democracy nor the poverty level—that is the number one indicator of the chance of a repeat civil war, according to Walter.<ref name=":1" />

==== Military advantage ====
[[File:Battle of Siping01.jpg|thumb|right|[[Chinese Communist Party|Communist]] soldiers during the [[Battle of Siping]], [[Chinese Civil War]], 1946]]
High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the presence of mountainous terrain, increased the chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels, as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek sanctuary.<ref name=cs16/> Rough terrain was highlighted as one of the more important factors in a 2006 systematic review.<ref name="Hanania" />

==== Population size ====
The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population.<ref name=cs17/>

====Poverty====
There is a correlation between [[poverty]] and civil war, but the causality (which causes the other) is unclear.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-015628|doi-access=free|title=Complicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness is Not the Problem|year=2018|last1=Kleinfeld|first1=Rachel|last2=Barham|first2=Elena|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=21|pages=215–238}}</ref> Some studies have found that in regions with lower income per capita, the likelihood of civil war is greater. Economists [[Simeon Djankov]] and Marta Reynal-Querol argue that the correlation is spurious, and that lower income and heightened conflict are instead products of other phenomena.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1162/REST_a_00046|title=Poverty and Civil War: Revisiting the Evidence|year=2010|last1=Djankov|first1=Simeon|last2=Reynal-Querol|first2=Marta|s2cid=18168622|journal=Review of Economics and Statistics|volume=92|issue=4|pages=1035–1041}}</ref> In contrast, a study by Alex Braithwaite and colleagues showed systematic evidence of "a causal arrow running from poverty to conflict".<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1177/0738894214559673|title=Does poverty cause conflict? Isolating the causal origins of the conflict trap|year=2016|last1=Braithwaite|first1=Alex|last2=Dasandi|first2=Niheer|last3=Hudson|first3=David|s2cid=3460450|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=33|pages=45–66|url=http://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/files/39344118/Poverty_Conflict_CMPS_Final.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200310153415/http://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/files/39344118/Poverty_Conflict_CMPS_Final.pdf |archive-date=2020-03-10 |url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Inequality ====
While there is a supposed negative correlation between absolute [[Welfare spending|welfare levels]] and the probability of civil war outbreak, relative deprivation may actually be a more pertinent possible cause. Historically, higher inequality levels led to higher civil war probability. Since [[Colonialism|colonial rule]] or population size are known to increase civil war risk, also, one may conclude that "the discontent of the colonized, caused by the creation of borders across tribal lines and bad treatment by the colonizers"<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Baten|first1=Joerg|last2=Mumme|first2=Christina|date=2011|title=Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A global long-term study using anthropometric indicators (1816-1999)|journal=European Review of Political Economy|volume=32|pages=56–79|doi=10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.06.007}}</ref> is one important cause of civil conflicts.<ref name=":4" />

==== Time ====
The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may represent the [[depreciation]] of whatever [[Capital (economics)|capital]] the rebellion was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. The study found that the presence of a diaspora substantially reduced the positive effect of time, as the funding from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion-specific capital.<ref name=cs18/>

[[Evolutionary psychologist]] [[Satoshi Kanazawa]] has argued that an important cause of intergroup conflict may be the relative availability of women of reproductive age. He found that [[polygyny]] greatly increased the frequency of civil wars but not interstate wars.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1017/S0022381608090026 |title=Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=71 |pages=25–34 |author=Satoshi Kanazawa |year=2009|s2cid=1492307 |author-link=Satoshi Kanazawa }}</ref> Gleditsch et al. did not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polygyny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations having legal [[polygamy]] may have more civil wars. They argued that [[misogyny]] is a better explanation than polygyny. They found that increased [[women's rights]] were associated with fewer civil wars and that legal polygamy had no effect after women's rights were controlled for.<ref>{{Cite journal | last1 = Gleditsch | first1 = K. S. | last2 = Wucherpfennig | first2 = J. | last3 = Hug | first3 = S. | last4 = Reigstad | first4 = K. G. | title = Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the "First Law of Intergroup Conflict" | doi = 10.1017/S0022381610001003 | journal = The Journal of Politics | volume = 73 | pages = 265–270 | year = 2011 | url = http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/static/simonhug/polygynyandmisogyny_v1.9.pdf | citeseerx = 10.1.1.518.5482 | access-date = 2017-10-24 | archive-date = 2017-09-21 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170921234547/http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/static/simonhug/polygynyandmisogyny_v1.9.pdf | url-status = live }}</ref>

[[political science|Political scholar]] [[Elisabeth Jean Wood|Elisabeth Wood]] from [[Yale University]] offers yet another rationale for why civilians rebel and/or support civil war. Through her studies of the [[Salvadoran Civil War]], Wood finds that traditional explanations of [[greed and grievance]] are not sufficient to explain the emergence of that insurgent movement.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wood|first1=Elisabeth Jean|title=Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador|date=2003|publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press|location=Cambridge [u.a.]|isbn=9780521010504|pages=1–16|edition=Reprint.|language=en|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QBAAN3ABKmIC}}</ref> Instead, she argues that "emotional engagements" and "moral commitments" are the main reasons why thousand of civilians, most of them from poor and rural backgrounds, joined or supported the [[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front]], despite individually facing both high risks and virtually no foreseeable gains. Wood also attributes participation in the civil war to the value that insurgents assigned to changing social relations in [[El Salvador]], an experience she defines as the "pleasure of agency".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wood|first1=Elisabeth Jean|title=Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador|date=2003|publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press|location=Cambridge [u.a.]|isbn=9780521010504|pages=17–20|edition=Reprint.|language=en|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QBAAN3ABKmIC}}</ref>