Editing Chinese historiography (section)

==Key organizing concepts==

===Dynastic cycle===
{{main|Dynastic cycle|Mandate of Heaven}}

Like the [[Three-age system#The Metallic Ages of Hesiod|three ages]] of the Greek poet [[Hesiod]], the oldest Chinese historiography viewed mankind as living in a fallen age of depravity, cut off from the virtues of the past, as [[Confucius]] and his disciples revered the [[sage king]]s [[Emperor Yao]] and [[Emperor Shun]].

Unlike Hesiod's system, however, the [[Duke of Zhou]]'s idea of the [[Mandate of Heaven]] as a rationale for dethroning the supposedly divine [[Zi (surname)|Zi]] clan led subsequent historians to see man's fall as a [[dynastic cycle|cyclical pattern]]. In this view, a new dynasty is founded by a morally upright founder, but his successors cannot help but become increasingly corrupt and dissolute. This immorality removes the dynasty's divine favor and is manifested by natural disasters (particularly [[Yellow River|floods]]), rebellions, and foreign invasions. Eventually, the dynasty becomes weak enough to be replaced by a new one, whose founder is able to [[rectification of names|rectify]] many of society's problems and begin the cycle anew. Over time, many people felt a full correction was not possible, and that the [[golden age]] of Yao and Shun could not be attained.

This [[teleology|teleological]] theory implies that there can be only one rightful sovereign [[all under heaven|under heaven]] at a time. Thus, despite the fact that Chinese history has had many lengthy and contentious periods of disunity, a great effort was made by official historians to establish a legitimate precursor whose fall allowed a new dynasty to acquire its mandate. Similarly, regardless of the particular merits of individual emperors, founders would be portrayed in more laudatory terms, and the last ruler of a dynasty would always be castigated as depraved and unworthy – even when that was not the case. Such a narrative was employed after the fall of the empire by those compiling the [[History of the Qing dynasty|history of the Qing]], and by those who justified the attempted restorations of the imperial system by [[Yuan Shikai]] and [[Zhang Xun (Qing loyalist)|Zhang Xun]].

===Multi-ethnic history===
Traditional Chinese historiography includes states ruled by other peoples (Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans etc.) in the dynastic history of China proper, ignoring their own historical traditions and considering them parts of China. Two historiographic traditions: of unity in East Asia as a historical norm for this region, and of dynasties successively reigning on the Son of Heaven's throne allowed Chinese elites describing historical process in China in simplified categories providing the basis for the concept of modern "unitary China" within the borders of the former Qing Empire, which was also ruled by Chinese emperors. However, deeper analysis reveals that, in fact, there was not a succession of dynasties ruled the same unitary China, but there were different states in certain regions of East Asia, some of which have been termed by later historiographers as the Empire ruled by the Son of the Heaven.<ref>{{ cite book |chapter-url=https://www.academia.edu/106958764 |last1=Dmitriev|first1= S.V.|last2= Kuzmin|first2= S.L. |date=2023 |chapter=Two Chinese historical myths: the concept of “unity” and the question of “dynasties”|title= Game of Thrones in the East: Political Myth and Reality|place=Moscow|publisher= Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences|pages= 83–96}}</ref>

As early as the 1930s, the American scholar [[Owen Lattimore]] argued that China was the product of the interaction of farming and pastoral societies, rather than simply the expansion of the [[Han Chinese|Han people]]. Lattimore did not accept the more extreme [[Sino-Babylonianism|Sino-Babylonian]] theories that the essential elements of early [[Science and technology in China|Chinese technology]] and [[Religion in China|religion]] had come from [[Western Asia]], but he was among the scholars to argue against the assumption they had all been indigenous.{{sfnb|Cotton|1989| p = passim}}

Both the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] and the [[China|People's Republic of China]] hold the view that Chinese history should include all the [[Ethnic groups in Chinese history|ethnic groups]] of the lands held by the Qing dynasty during its [[High Qing era|territorial peak]], with these ethnicities forming part of the ''[[Zhonghua minzu]]'' (Chinese nation). This view is in contrast with [[Han chauvinism]] promoted by the Qing-era [[Tongmenghui]]. This expanded view encompasses internal and external tributary lands, as well as [[Conquest dynasty|conquest dynasties]] in the history of a China seen as a coherent multi-ethnic nation since time immemorial, incorporating and accepting the contributions and cultures of non-Han ethnicities.

The acceptance of this view by ethnic minorities sometimes depends on their views on present-day issues. The [[14th Dalai Lama]], long insistent on Tibet's history being separate from that of China, conceded in 2005 that Tibet "is a part of" China's "[[Five thousand years of Chinese civilization|5,000-year history]]" as part of a new proposal for Tibetan autonomy.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Tibet-part-of-China-Dalai-Lama-agrees/2005/03/14/1110649129309.html |title=Tibet part of China, Dalai Lama agrees |first=Hamish |last=McDonald |date=2005-03-15 |access-date=2010-11-05 |work=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]]}}</ref> [[Korean nationalism|Korean nationalists]] have virulently reacted against China's application to [[UNESCO]] for recognition of the [[Goguryeo tombs]] in Chinese territory. The absolute independence of [[Goguryeo]] is a central aspect of Korean identity, because, according to Korean legend, Goguryeo was independent of China and Japan, compared to subordinate states such as the [[Joseon|Joseon dynasty]] and the [[Korean Empire]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gries |first1=Peter Hays |title=The Koguryo controversy, national identity, and Sino-Korean relations today |journal=East Asia |date=December 2005 |volume=22 |issue=4 |pages=3–17 |doi=10.1007/s12140-005-0001-y }}</ref> The legacy of [[Genghis Khan]] has been contested between China, Mongolia, and Russia, all three states having significant numbers of ethnic [[Mongol]]s within their borders and holding territory that was conquered by the Khan.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111109.shtml |title=The Search for Genghis Khan: Genghis Khan's Legacy Being Reappraised in China, Russia |date=2009-08-10 |access-date=2010-11-05 |publisher=EurasiaNet |first=Joshua |last=Kucera |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317190623/http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav111109.shtml |archive-date=2011-03-17 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The [[Jin dynasty (266–420)|Jin dynasty]] tradition of a new dynasty composing the official history for its preceding dynasty/dynasties has been seen to foster an ethnically inclusive interpretation of Chinese history. The compilation of official histories usually involved monumental intellectual labor. The [[Yuan dynasty|Yuan]] and Qing dynasties, ruled by the [[Mongols]] and [[Manchu people|Manchus]], faithfully carried out this practice, composing the official Chinese-language histories of the Han-ruled [[Song dynasty|Song]] and [[Ming dynasty|Ming]] dynasties, respectively.

Recent Western scholars have reacted against the ethnically inclusive narrative in traditional and [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP)-sponsored history, by writing [[Historical revisionism|revisionist histories]] of China such as the [[New Qing History]] that feature, according to James A. Millward, "a degree of 'partisanship' for the indigenous underdogs of frontier history". Scholarly interest in writing about Chinese minorities from non-Chinese perspectives is growing.<ref>{{cite book|title=Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain|chapter=New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier|author=Millward, James A.|editor1-first=Gail|editor1-last=Hershatter|editor1-link=Gail Hershatter|publisher=[[Stanford University Press]]|year=1996|pages=121–122}}</ref> So too is the rejection of a unified cultural narrative in early China. Historians engaging with archaeological progress find increasingly demonstrated a rich amalgam of diverse cultures in regions the received literature positions as homogeneous.<ref>{{citation | editor-last =Loewe |editor-first=Michael | editor2-last =Shaughnessy |editor2-first = Edward L |year=1999 |title=The Cambridge History of Ancient China: from the origins of civilization to 221 BC |publisher= Cambridge University Press
| ref= {{harvid|Cambridge History of Ancient China|1999}}
| chapter= Western Zhou Archaeology
| last = Rawson | first = Jessica 
| pages=352–449
 |isbn = 9780521470308 }}</ref>{{rp|449}}

===Marxism===
{{Main|Marxist historiography}}
Most Chinese history that is published in the People's Republic of China is based on a [[Marxist historiography|Marxist interpretation of history]]. These theories were first applied in the 1920s by Chinese scholars such as [[Guo Moruo]], and became orthodoxy in academic study after 1949. The Marxist view of history is that history is governed by universal laws and that according to these laws, a society moves through a series of stages, with the transition between stages being driven by class struggle.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dirlik |first1=Arif |title=The universalisation of a concept: 'feudalism' to 'feudalism' in Chinese Marxist historiography |journal=The Journal of Peasant Studies |date=January 1985 |volume=12 |issue=2–3 |pages=197–227 |doi=10.1080/03066158508438268 }}</ref> These stages are:
* [[Slavery|Slave society]]
* [[Feudalism|Feudal society]]
* [[Capitalist society]]
* [[Socialism|Socialist society]]
* The world [[communist society]]

The official historical view within the People's Republic of China associates each of these stages with a particular era in Chinese history.
* Slave society – [[Xia dynasty|Xia]] to [[Zhou dynasty|Zhou]]
* Feudal society (decentralized) – [[Qin dynasty|Qin]] to [[Sui dynasty|Sui]]
* Feudal society (bureaucratic) – [[Tang dynasty|Tang]] to the [[First Opium War]]
* Feudal society (semi-colonial) – First Opium War to end of [[Qing dynasty]]
* Semi-feudal and Semi-capitalist society – [[History of the Republic of China|Republican era]]
* Socialist society – [[People's Republic of China|PRC]] 1949 to present

Because of the strength of the CCP and the importance of the Marxist interpretation of history in legitimizing its rule, it was for many years difficult for historians within the PRC to actively argue in favor of non-Marxist and anti-Marxist interpretations of history. However, this political restriction is less confining than it may first appear in that the Marxist historical framework is surprisingly flexible, and it is a rather simple matter to modify an alternative historical theory to use language that at least does not challenge the Marxist interpretation of history.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Feuerwerker |first1=Albert |title=China's History in Marxian Dress |journal=The American Historical Review |date=1961 |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=323–353 |doi=10.2307/1844030 |jstor=1844030 }}</ref>

Partly because of the interest of [[Mao Zedong]], historians in the 1950s took a special interest in the role of [[list of rebellions in China|peasant rebellions]] in Chinese history and compiled documentary histories to examine them.<ref>James P. Harrison. ''The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions; a Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History''. New York: Atheneum, 1969.{{pn|date=May 2024}}</ref>

There are several problems associated with imposing Marx's European-based framework on Chinese history. First, slavery existed throughout China's history but never as the primary form of labor. While the Zhou and earlier dynasties may be labeled as [[feudalism|feudal]], later dynasties were much more centralized than how Marx analyzed their European counterparts as being. To account for the discrepancy, Chinese Marxists invented the term<!--pov?--> "bureaucratic feudalism". The placement of the Tang as the beginning of the bureaucratic phase rests largely on the replacement of [[nine-rank system|patronage networks]] with the [[imperial examination]]. Some [[World systems theory|world-systems analysts]], such as [[Janet Abu-Lughod]], claim that analysis of [[Kondratiev waves]] shows that capitalism first arose in Song dynasty China, although widespread trade was subsequently disrupted and then curtailed.

The Japanese scholar [[Tanigawa Michio]], writing in the 1970s and 1980s, set out to revise the generally Marxist views of China prevalent in [[Post-occupation Japan|post-war Japan]]. Tanigawa writes that historians in Japan fell into two schools. One held that China followed the set European pattern which Marxists thought to be universal; that is, from ancient slavery to medieval feudalism to modern capitalism; while another group argued that "[[Chinese culture|Chinese society]] was extraordinarily saturated with stagnancy, as compared to the West" and assumed that China existed in a "qualitatively different historical world from [[Western world|Western society]]". That is, there is an argument between those who see "unilinear, monistic world history" and those who conceive of a "two-tracked or multi-tracked world history". Tanigawa reviewed the applications of these theories in Japanese writings about Chinese history and then tested them by analyzing the [[Six Dynasties]] 220–589 CE period, which Marxist historians saw as feudal. His conclusion was that China did not have feudalism in the sense that Marxists use, that Chinese military governments did not lead to a European-style military aristocracy. The period established social and political patterns which shaped China's history from that point on.{{sfnb|Tanigawa|1985| p = [http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1k4003vg&chunk.id=d0e823&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e815&brand=ucpress 3]}}

There was a gradual relaxation of Marxist interpretation after the [[Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong|death of Mao Zedong]] in 1976,<ref>{{cite journal|author-link1=Kwang-Ching Liu |last=Liu |first=Kwang-Ching |title=World View and Peasant Rebellion: Reflections on Post-Mao Historiography |date=February 1981 |journal=[[The Journal of Asian Studies]] |volume=40 |pages=295–326 |number=2 |doi=10.2307/2054866 |jstor=2054866 |s2cid=146288705 }}</ref> which was accelerated after the [[Tiananmen Square protest of 1989|Tian'anmen Square protest]] and [[Revolutions of 1989|other revolutions]] in 1989, which damaged Marxism's ideological legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese academics.

===Modernization===
This view of Chinese history sees Chinese society as a traditional society needing to become modern, usually with the implicit assumption of Western society as the model.<ref>A prominent example is Gilbert Rozman, ed., ''The Modernization of China'' (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1981), in which a series of essays analyzes "The Legacy of the Past" and "The Transformation."</ref> Such a view was common amongst European and American historians during the 19th and early 20th centuries, but is now criticized for being a [[Eurocentrism|Eurocentric]] viewpoint, since such a view permits an implicit justification for breaking the society from its static past and bringing it into the modern world under European direction.<ref>Ch. 2 "Moving Beyond 'Tradition' and 'Modernity,'" Paul Cohen, ''Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past'' (Columbia University Press, 1984; 2010)</ref>

By the mid-20th century, it was increasingly clear to historians that the notion of "changeless China" was untenable. A new concept, popularized by [[John King Fairbank|John Fairbank]], was the notion of "change within tradition", which argued that China did change in the pre-modern period but that this change existed within certain cultural traditions. This notion has also been subject to the criticism that to say "China has not changed fundamentally" is [[Tautology (logic)|tautological]], since it requires that one look for things that have not changed and then arbitrarily define those as fundamental.

Nonetheless, studies seeing China's interaction with Europe as the driving force behind its recent history are still common. Such studies may consider the [[First Opium War]] as the starting point for China's modern period. Examples include the works of [[Hosea Ballou Morse|H.B. Morse]], who wrote chronicles of China's international relations such as ''Trade and Relations of the Chinese Empire''.{{sfn|Cohen|1984|p=102}} The Chinese convention is to use the word ''jindai'' ("modern") to refer to a timeframe for modernity which begins with the Opium wars and continues through the [[May Fourth Movement|May Fourth]] period.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Cai |first1=Xiang |url= |title=Revolution and its narratives : China's socialist literary and cultural imaginaries (1949–1966) |last2=蔡翔 |date=2016 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |others=Rebecca E. Karl, Xueping Zhong, 钟雪萍 |isbn=978-0-8223-7461-9 |location=Durham |pages=235 |oclc=932368688}}</ref>

In the 1950s, several of Fairbank's students argued that [[Confucianism]] was incompatible with [[modernity]]. [[Joseph Levenson]] and [[Mary C. Wright]], and [[Albert Feuerwerker]] argued in effect that traditional Chinese values were a barrier to modernity and would have to be abandoned before China could make progress.{{sfn|Cohen|1984|pp=79–80}} Wright concluded, "The failure of the [[Tongzhi Restoration|T'ung-chih [''Tongzhi''] Restoration]] demonstrated with a rare clarity that even in the most favorable circumstances there is no way in which an effective modern state can be grafted onto a Confucian society. Yet in the decades that followed, the political ideas that had been tested and, for all their grandeur, found wanting, were never given a decent burial."<ref>Mary Clabaugh Wright. ''The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874.'' (Stanford,: Stanford University Press, 1957), 300–12.</ref>

In a different view of modernization, the Japanese historian [[Naito Torajiro]] argued that China reached modernity during its [[Mid-Imperial China|mid-Imperial period]], centuries before Europe. He believed that the reform of the [[scholar-bureaucrat|civil service]] into a meritocratic system and the disappearance of the ancient [[Chinese nobility]] from the bureaucracy constituted a modern society. The problem associated with this approach is the subjective meaning of modernity. The Chinese nobility had been in decline since the Qin dynasty, and while the exams were largely meritocratic, performance required time and resources that meant examinees were still typically from the [[Chinese gentry|gentry]]. Moreover, expertise in the [[Confucian classics]] did not guarantee competent bureaucrats when it came to managing public works or preparing a budget. Confucian hostility to commerce placed merchants at the bottom of the [[four occupations]], itself an archaism maintained by devotion to classic texts. The social goal continued to be to invest in land and enter the gentry, ideas more like those of the [[physiocrats]] than those of [[Adam Smith]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fogel |first1=Joshua A. |title=Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934) |date=1984 |publisher=Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University |isbn=978-0-674-68790-5 }}{{pn|date=May 2024}}</ref>

===Hydraulic despotism===
{{Main|Hydraulic empire}}
With ideas derived from Marx and [[Max Weber]], [[Karl August Wittfogel]] argued that [[bureaucracy]] arose to manage [[Irrigation|irrigation systems]]. Despotism was needed to force the people into building [[canal]]s, [[Dyke (embankment)|dikes]], and [[waterway]]s to increase [[agriculture]]. [[Yu the Great]], one of China's legendary founders, is known for his control of the floods of the [[Yellow River]]. The [[hydraulic empire]] produces wealth from its stability; while dynasties may change, the structure remains intact until destroyed by modern powers. In Europe abundant rainfall meant less dependence on irrigation. In the Orient natural conditions were such that the bulk of the land could not be cultivated without large-scale irrigation works. As only a centralized administration could organize the building and maintenance of large-scale systems of irrigation, the need for such systems made [[bureaucratic despotism]] inevitable in Oriental lands.<ref name="Andreski1985">{{cite book|author=Stanislav Andreski|title=The Use of Comparative Sociology|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7eW0hwZ3eZMC&pg=PA165|access-date=16 September 2013|year=1985|publisher=University of California Press|page=165|id=GGKEY:Y0TY2LKP809}}</ref>

When Wittfogel published his ''[[Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power]]'', critics pointed out that water management was given the high status China accorded to officials concerned with taxes, rituals, or fighting off bandits. The theory also has a strong [[oriental studies|orientalist]] bent, regarding all Asian states as generally the same while finding reasons for European polities not fitting the pattern.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mote |first1=F. W. |title=The Growth of Chinese despotism: A critique of Wittfogel's theory of Oriental Despotism as applied to China |journal=Oriens Extremus |date=1961 |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=1–41 |jstor=43382295 }}</ref>

While Wittfogel's theories were not popular among Marxist historians in China, the economist [[Ji Chaoding|Chi Ch'ao-ting]] used them in his influential 1936 book, ''[[Ji Chaoding#Key Economic Areas in Chinese History|Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, as Revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water-Control]]''. The book identified key areas of grain production which, when controlled by a strong political power, permitted that power to dominate the rest of the country and enforce periods of stability.<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael|last= Dillon|title= Dictionary of Chinese History|isbn = 9781135166748|publisher = Routledge |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e-BkAgAAQBAJ&dq=Key+economic+areas+in+Chinese+history&pg=PA102 |page= 102|date = 2013}}</ref>

===Convergence===
Convergence theory, including [[Hu Shih]] and [[Ray Huang]]'s involution theory, holds that the past 150 years have been a period in which Chinese and Western civilization have been in the process of converging into a world civilization. Such a view is heavily influenced by modernization theory but, in China's case, it is also strongly influenced by indigenous sources such as the notion of ''Shijie Datong'' or "Great Unity". It has tended to be less popular among more recent historians, as postmodern Western historians discount overarching narratives, and nationalist Chinese historians feel similar about narratives failing to account for some special or unique characteristics of Chinese culture.<ref>{{cite book|author=Arif Dirlik|title=Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aaMwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA271|year=1993|publisher=University of California Press|page=271|isbn=9780520082649}}</ref>

===Anti-imperialism===
{{Main|Decolonization of knowledge}}
Closely related are colonial and [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] narratives. These often merge or are part of Marxist critiques from within China or the former Soviet Union, or are postmodern critiques such as [[Edward Said]]'s ''[[Orientalism (book)|Orientalism]]'', which fault traditional scholarship for trying to fit West, South, and East Asia's histories into European categories unsuited to them. With regard to China particularly, [[Jiang Tingfu|T.F. Tsiang]] and [[John King Fairbank|John Fairbank]] used newly opened archives in the 1930s to write modern history from a Chinese point of view. Fairbank and [[Deng Siyu|Teng Ssu-yu]] then edited the influential volume ''[[China's Response to the West]]'' (1953). This approach was attacked for ascribing the change in China to outside forces. In the 1980s, [[Paul Cohen (historian)|Paul Cohen]], a student of Fairbank's, issued a call for a more "China-Centered history of China".<ref>Paul Cohen, ''Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past'' (New York, London:: Columbia University Press,  1984), Ch 1 "The Problem with 'China's Response to the West,'pp. 1–56, and Ch 4, "Toward a China-Centered History of China," pp. 149–198.</ref>

===Republican===
The schools of thought on the [[Xinhai Revolution|1911 Revolution]] have evolved from the early years of the Republic. The Marxist view saw the events of 1911 as a [[bourgeois revolution]].<ref>Winston Hsieh, ''Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 : A Critical Survey and a Selected Bibliography'' (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975)</ref> In the 1920s, the [[Kuomintang|Nationalist Party]] issued a theory of three political stages based on [[Sun Yatsen]]'s writings:
* Military unification – 1923 to 1928 ([[Northern Expedition (1926–1927)|Northern Expedition]])
* Political tutelage – 1928 to 1947
* [[Constitution of the Republic of China|Constitutional democracy]] – 1947 onward

The most obvious criticism is the near-identical nature of "political tutelage" and of a "constitutional democracy" consisting only of the one-party rule until the 1990s. Against this, [[Chen Shui-bian]] proposed his own [[Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China|four-stage theory]].

===Postmodernism===
Postmodern interpretations of Chinese history tend to reject narrative history and instead focus on a small subset of Chinese history, particularly the daily lives of ordinary people in particular locations or settings.

===Long-term political economy===
Zooming out from the dynastic cycle but maintaining focus on power dynamics, the following general periodization, based on the most powerful groups and the ways that power is used, has been proposed for Chinese history:<ref>{{ cite journal
| last =Miller | first = Alice Lyman
| title =Some Things We Used to Know about China's Past and Present (But Now, Not So Much)
| journal=The Journal of American-East Asian Relations
| volume=16 | number=1/2
| year =2009 | pages = 41–68
| jstor= 23613239
| publisher= Brill
| doi = 10.1163/187656109793645724
}}</ref>{{rp|45}}
* The aristocratic settlement state (to {{circa}} 550 BCE)
* Centralization of power with military revolution ({{circa}} 550 BCE – {{circa}} 25 CE)
* Landowning families competing for central power and integrating the South ({{circa}} 25 – {{circa}} 755)
* Imperial examination scholar-officials and commercialization ({{circa}} 755 – {{circa}} 1550)
* Commercial interests with global convergence (since {{circa}} 1550)