Editing Boeing 2707 (section)

===Early studies===
[[Boeing]] worked on a number of small-scale SST studies since 1952. In 1958, it established a permanent research committee, which grew to a $1 million effort by 1960 ({{Inflation|US|1000000|1960|r=-3|fmt=eq}}). The committee proposed a variety of alternative designs, all under the name Model 733.<ref>{{cite journal |journal=[[Flying (magazine)|Flying]] |date=December 1961 |page=23 |title=D Day for the SST |author=Dave Lewis}}</ref> Most of the designs featured a large [[delta wing]], but in 1959 another design was offered as an offshoot of Boeing's efforts in the [[swing-wing]] [[TFX_Program|TFX program]] (which led to the purchase of the [[General Dynamics F-111]] instead of the Boeing offering). In 1960, an internal competition was run on a baseline 150-seat aircraft for trans-Atlantic routes, and the swing-wing version won.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.unrealaircraft.com/classics/sst.php|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303170411/http://www.unrealaircraft.com/classics/sst.php|url-status=dead|title=unrealaircraft.com - unrealaircraft Resources and Information.|archivedate=March 3, 2016|website=www.unrealaircraft.com}}</ref>

Shortly after taking office, President [[John F. Kennedy]] tasked the [[Federal Aviation Administration]] with preparing a report on "national aviation goals for the period between now and 1970".{{sfnp|Edelman|2002|p=97}} The study was prompted in the wake of several accidents, which led to the belief that the industry was becoming moribund. Two projects were started, Project Beacon on new navigational systems and air traffic control, and Project Horizon on advanced civil aviation developments.

[[File:Boeing 2707 mock-up.jpg|thumb|right|Boeing 2707 mockup at the [[Hiller Aviation Museum]] ]]
Only one month later the FAA's new director, [[Najeeb Halaby]], produced the Commission on National Aviation Goals, better known as Project Horizon. Among other suggestions, the report was used as a platform to promote the SST. Halaby argued that a failure to enter this market would be a "stunning setback".{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=74}} The report was met with skepticism by most others. Kennedy had put [[Lyndon Johnson]] on the SST file, and he turned to [[Robert McNamara]] for guidance. McNamara was highly skeptical of the SST project and savaged Halaby's predictions; he was also afraid the project might be turned over to the DoD and was careful to press for further studies.{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=74}}

The basic concept behind the SST was that its fast flight would allow them to fly more trips than a subsonic aircraft, leading to higher utilization. However, it did this at the cost of greatly increased fuel use. If fuel costs were to change dramatically, SSTs would not be competitive. These problems were well understood within the industry; the [[IATA]] released a set of "design imperatives" for an SST that were essentially impossible to meet—the release was a warning to promoters of the SST within the industry.{{sfnp|Conway|2005|p=74}}