Editing Belief (section)

=== Representationalism ===
Representationalism characterizes beliefs in terms of [[mental representation]]s. Representations are usually defined as objects with [[semantic properties]]{{mdash}}like having content, referring to something, or being true or false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel">{{cite web |last1=Schwitzgebel |first1=Eric |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019 |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt">{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 April 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806134216/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Beliefs form a special class of mental representations since they do not involve sensory qualities in order to represent something, unlike perceptions or episodic memories.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Belief |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=12 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112065913/https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |url-status=live }}</ref> Because of this, it seems natural to construe beliefs as attitudes towards propositions, which also constitute non-sensory representations, i.e. as [[propositional attitudes]]. As [[mental attitude]]s, beliefs are characterized by both their content and their mode.<ref name="Borchert"/> The content of an attitude is what this attitude is directed at: its object. Propositional attitudes are directed at propositions.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind – Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=19 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200719083018/https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Propositional-attitudes |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=2 April 2021 |language=en |archive-date=4 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304193042/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Pitt"/> Beliefs are usually distinguished from other propositional attitudes, like desires, by their mode or the way in which they are directed at propositions. The mode of beliefs has a mind-to-world [[direction of fit]]: beliefs try to represent the world as it is; they do not, unlike desires, involve an intention to change it.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Borchert"/> For example, if Rahul believes that it will be sunny today, then he has a mental attitude towards the proposition "It will be sunny today" which affirms that this proposition is true. This is different from Sofía's desire that it will be sunny today, despite the fact that both Rahul and Sofía have attitudes toward the same proposition. The mind-to-world direction of fit of beliefs is sometimes expressed by saying that beliefs aim at truth.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fassio |first1=Davide |title=Aim of Belief |url=https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=11 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211210202/https://iep.utm.edu/beli-aim/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This aim is also reflected in the tendency to [[Belief revision|revise one's belief]] upon receiving new evidence that an existing belief is false.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> Upon hearing a forecast of bad weather, Rahul is likely to change his mental attitude but Sofía is not.

There are different ways of conceiving how mental representations are realized in the mind. One form of this is the ''[[language of thought hypothesis]]'', which claims that mental representations have a language-like structure, sometimes referred to as "mentalese".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Matthew |title=Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 March 2021 |archive-date=28 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210228211147/https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter= |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116111145/https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |url-status=live }}</ref> Just like regular language, this involves simple elements that are combined in various ways according to syntactic rules to form more complex elements that act as bearers of meaning.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> On this conception, holding a belief would involve storing such a complex element in one's mind. Different beliefs are separated from each other in that they correspond to different elements stored in the mind. A more holistic alternative to the "language of thought hypothesis" is the ''map-conception'', which uses an analogy of maps to elucidate the nature of beliefs.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> According to this view, the belief system of a mind should be conceived of not as a set of many individual sentences but as a map encoding the information contained in these sentences.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/><ref name="Craig"/> For example, the fact that Brussels is halfway between Paris and Amsterdam can be expressed both linguistically as a sentence and in a map through its internal geometrical relations.