Editing Bayesian probability (section)

==Objective and subjective Bayesian probabilities==
Broadly speaking, there are two interpretations of Bayesian probability. For objectivists, who interpret probability as an extension of [[logic]], ''probability'' quantifies the reasonable expectation that everyone (even a "robot") who shares the same knowledge should share in accordance with the rules of Bayesian statistics, which can be justified by [[Cox's theorem]].<ref name="ghxaib" /><ref name = "vkdmsn">{{cite book |last1=Cox |first1=Richard T. |title=The algebra of probable inference| date=1961 |publisher=Johns Hopkins Press; Oxford University Press [distributor] |location=Baltimore, MD; London, UK |isbn=9780801869822 |edition=Reprint}}</ref> For subjectivists, ''probability'' corresponds to a personal belief.<ref name="Finetti, B. 1974" /> Rationality and coherence allow for substantial variation within the constraints they pose; the constraints are justified by the [[Dutch book]] argument or by [[decision theory]] and [[de Finetti's theorem]].<ref name="Finetti, B. 1974" /> The objective and subjective variants of Bayesian probability differ mainly in their interpretation and construction of the prior probability.