Editing Battle of the Plains of Abraham (section)

==Preparations==
[[Image:plains2009.jpg|thumb|left|The Battle of the Plains of Abraham]]
Through the summer siege, illness spread through the British camps. In August, Wolfe himself was bedridden, causing already low morale to slump even further among the British troops.<ref>{{Harvnb|Hibbert|1959|pp=104–107}}.</ref> With many men in camp hospitals, British fighting numbers were thinned, and Wolfe personally felt that a new attack was needed by the end of September, or Britain's opportunity would be lost.<ref>{{Harvnb|Eccles|1969|p=201}}.</ref> In addition, his frustration with Montcalm's defensive stance continued to grow. In a letter to his mother, Wolfe wrote, "The Marquis of Montcalm is at the head of a great number of bad soldiers, and I am at the head of a small number of good ones that wish for nothing so much as to fight him; but the wary old fellow avoids an action, doubtful of the behaviour of his army." Montcalm also expressed frustration over the long siege, relating that he and his troops slept clothed and booted, and his horse was always saddled in preparation for an attack.<ref>{{Harvnb|Casgrain|1905|p=157}}.</ref>

After considering and rejecting a number of plans for landings on the north shore, a decision was made in late August by Wolfe and his brigadiers to land upriver of the city. If successful, such a landing would force Montcalm to fight, as a British force on the north shore of the St. Lawrence would cut his supply lines to Montreal.<ref>{{Harvnb|Eccles|1969|p=181}}.</ref> Initial suggestions for landing sites ranged as far as {{cvt|32|km|mi}} up the St. Lawrence, which would have given the French troops one or two days to prepare for the attack.<ref>{{Harvnb|Reid|2003|p=50}}.</ref> Following the failed British assault on Montmorency, Montcalm altered his deployment, sending Bougainville and a column of approximately 1,500 regular troops, 200 cavalry, and a group of New French militia—some 3,000 men in all—upriver to [[Cap-Rouge, Quebec|Cap-Rouge]] to monitor the British ships upstream.  He further strengthened his defences of the [[Beauport, Quebec City|Beauport]] shore following the abandonment of the British camp at Montmorency, which he regarded as preparations for a descent (amphibious attack) on Beauport.  In spite of warnings from local commanders, he did not view an upstream landing as a serious possibility.<ref>{{Harvnb|Chartrand|1999|p=78}}.</ref>
[[File:Fleuve Saint-Laurent a Quebec.jpg|thumb|Anse au Foulon]]

The British, meanwhile, prepared for their risky deployment upstream.  Troops had already been aboard landing ships and drifting up and down the river for several days<ref>{{Harvnb|Hibbert|1959|p=125}}.</ref> when Wolfe on 12 September, made a final decision on the British landing site, selecting L'[[Anse-au-Foulon]].  L'Anse-au-Foulon is a cove situated west of the city, three kilometres upstream from [[Cap Diamant]].  It lies at the bottom of a {{cvt|53|m|ft|adj=on}} high cliff leading to the plateau above, and was protected by a battery of guns. It is not known why Wolfe selected Foulon, as the original landing site was to be further up the river, in a position where the British would be able to develop a foothold and strike at Bougainville's force to draw Montcalm out of Quebec and onto the plains. Brigadier-General [[George Townshend, 1st Marquess Townshend|George Townshend]] wrote that "by some intelligence the General had, he has changed his mind as to the place he intended to land".<ref>{{Harvnb|Hibbert|1959|p=121}}.</ref> In his final letter, dated {{HMS|Sutherland|1741|6}}, 8:30&nbsp;p.m. 12 September, Wolfe wrote:
{{Quote|I had the honour to inform you today that it is my duty to attack the French army. To the best of my knowledge and ability, I have fixed upon that spot where we can act with most force and are most likely to succeed. If I am mistaken I am sorry for it and must be answerable to His Majesty and the public for the consequences.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lloyd|1959|p=117}}.</ref>}}

Wolfe's plan of attack depended on secrecy and surprise.<ref name="s056">{{cite web | last1=Finnan | first1=Joseph | last2=Gray | first2=Lee P. | last3=Perry | first3=John H. | last4=Lust | first4=Brian | title=Wolfe, Montcalm, and the Principles of Joint Operations in the Quebec Campaign of 1759 | website=National Defense University Press | date=18 November 2019 | url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2019421/wolfe-montcalm-and-the-principles-of-joint-operations-in-the-quebec-campaign-of/ | access-date=26 February 2025}}</ref> His plan required that a small party of men should land by night on the north shore, climb the [[Promontory of Quebec]], seize a small road, and overpower the garrison that protected it, allowing the bulk of his army (5,000 men) to ascend the cliff by the small road and then deploy for battle on the plateau.  Even if the first landing party succeeded in their mission and the army was able to follow, such a deployment would still leave his forces inside the French line of defence with no immediate retreat but the river.  It is possible that Wolfe's decision to change the landing site was owing less to a desire for secrecy and more to his general disdain for his brigadiers (a feeling that was reciprocated); it is also possible that he was still suffering the effects of his illness and the [[opiate]]s he used as painkillers.<ref>{{Harvnb|Anderson|2000|p=353}}.</ref> Some revisionist historians believe Wolfe ordered the attack believing the advanced guard would be repulsed, and anticipated dying gallantly with his men rather than returning home in disgrace.<ref>{{Harvnb|Anderson|2000|pp=354, 789}}.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Brumwell|2006|p=269}}.</ref>