Editing Battle of Mogadishu (1993) (section)

=== UNOSOM and UNITAF ===
{{Main|Unified Task Force}}
In early 1992, as relief agencies initiated operations to respond to the humanitarian crisis, they encountered growing obstacles in delivering aid to the impacted affected inter-riverine region. The disintegration of Somali law enforcement paved the way for armed looters and criminals to steal food from storage sites and supply routes. Many thieves at Mogadishu's sea and airport, the main supply hub, were linked to the rebel forces of [[Ali Mahdi Muhammad|Ali Mahdi]] and [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid|Mohamed Farah Aidid]] but were effectively [[Demobilization|demobilized]] following the rout of the SNF. With militia leaders lacking funds and Barre's forces no longer presenting a unifying threat and, Aidid and Mahdi increasingly lost control over many young fighters, as did clan elders. As a result, many resorted to food theft for survival and income. In response to this deteriorating security situation, [[United Nations Operation in Somalia I|UNOSOM I]] was established in April 1992 under the leadership of [[Mohamed Sahnoun]] to help facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=41-42}} In May 1992 the first UN aid shipment arrived in Mogadishu.''{{sfn|Peterson|2000|p=44}}''

During August 1992, U.S. President [[George H. W. Bush|George H.W. Bush]] launched [[Operation Provide Relief]], deploying U.S. military transport aircraft to support the UN relief effort in Somalia.<ref name="Clancy" /> That same month, UNOSOM I head [[Mohamed Sahnoun|Mohammed Sahnoun]] secured [[Somali National Alliance]] approval for 500 peacekeepers, with further deployments requiring the groups consent. However, UN Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali|Boutros Ghali]] unilaterally announced an expansion to 3,500 troops days later, undermining the local support Sahnoun had built. Overruled by UN headquarters, he failed to delay the deployment.''<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hill |first=Stephen M. |url=https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230502963_4.pdf?pdf=core |title=United Nations Disarmament Processes in Intra-State Conflict. |date=2005 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-333-94716-6 |pages=93–94 |doi=10.1057/9780230502963_4 |oclc=885487671 |access-date=2023-03-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240522140102/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230502963_4.pdf?pdf=core |archive-date=2024-05-22 |url-status=live}}</ref>'' The large-scale intervention in late 1992 fueled nationalist opposition, bolstering Aidid's SNA, which denounced the UN's perceived colonial approach.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last1=Maynes |first1=C. William (Charles William) |url=http://archive.org/details/unitedstatesfore00char |title=U.S. Foreign policy and the United Nations system |last2=Williamson |first2=Richard S. |last3=American Assembly |date=1996 |publisher=New York : W.W. Norton |others=Internet Archive |isbn=978-0-393-03907-8 |pages=65}}</ref> By November 1992, largely owing to the mediation efforts of [[Mohamed Sahnoun]], aid was flowing through the Mogadishu port unimpeded, with theft and banditry on the routes to famine zones averaging around 20%.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=4-5}} That same month, Sahnoun was replaced by [[Ismat T. Kittani]], who took a confrontational approach, deploying UNOSOM troops into politically sensitive areas and triggering a security crisis with local factions. Kittani claimed 80% of aid shipments were looted, a figure later echoed by the UN Secretariat and the U.S. State Department to justify expanding intervention, though many top UN officials and aid workers disputed the figure.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=181}} In the view of some top UNOSOM I commanders, the scope of the famine was being exaggerated in order to justify using Somalia as an experiment,<ref name=":42">{{Cite book |last=Huband |first=Mark |title=The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War |publisher=Westview |isbn=978-0813341125 |pages=294}}</ref> as the UN Secretariat believed Somalia represented an ideal candidate for a test case of a UN operation of expanded size and mandate.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=179}}

On 9 December 1992, American troops began landing on the [[Coastline of Somalia|Somali coastline]] at [[Mogadishu]] under [[Unified Task Force|UNITAF]] (Operation Restore Hope). A total 17,800 [[United States Marine Corps|US Marines]] and 10,000 [[United States Army|US Army]] infantry were deployed.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|pp=86-89}} The [[1992 famine in Somalia|famine in Somalia]] was already concluding as the troops began landing.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=185}} The [[United States]] had various motives for military involvement in Somalia. The [[United States Armed Forces|US armed forces]] wanted to prove its capability to conduct major '[[Military operations other than war|Operations Other Than War]]', while the [[United States Department of State|US State Department]] wanted to set a precedent for humanitarian military intervention in the post-[[Cold War]] era.{{Sfn|de Waal|1997|p=179}} The United Nations' intervention, backed by [[U.S. Marines]], has been credited with helping end the famine in Somalia, though the starvation had been improving in the worst-affected areas before troops arrived<ref name=":5">{{cite web |title=A Wrong Turn In Somalia – An Ill-Conceived Copter Raid Turned Many Somalis Against U.S. Forces, 1998, Mark Bowden, The Philadelphia Inquirer |url=https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19980209&slug=2733458}}</ref>{{sfn|Drysdale|1994}} and had the effect of speeding the conclusion of the crisis by about a month.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Seybolt |first=Taylor B. |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/sipri08seybolt.pdf |title=Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure |date=2012 |publisher=Sipri, Stockholm International Peace Research Inst |isbn=978-0-19-955105-7 |edition=Repr |location=Solna, Sweden |pages=56–57}}</ref> In 1994, the Washington-based Refugee Policy Group NGO estimated that of the approximately 100,000 lives that were saved as a result of international assistance, 10,000 had been after the deployment of US troops.<ref name="Trth">{{cite book|last=Maren|first=Michael|title=The Road to Hell|year=2009|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1439188415|page=214|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c7yXjjdx53QC}}</ref>