Editing Battle of Midway (section)

===Yamamoto's plan===
[[File:Midway Atoll.jpg|thumb|[[Midway Atoll]], several months before the battle. Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west.]]

Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex.<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|pp=375–379}}; {{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=110–117}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=52}}</ref> It required the careful coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|6}} and USS ''Hornet'', forming [[Task Force 16]], were the only carriers available to the [[United States Pacific Fleet|Pacific Fleet]]. During the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] one month earlier, {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|6}} had been sunk and {{USS|Yorktown|CV-5|6}} suffered so much damage that the Japanese believed she too had been lost.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=63}}</ref> However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor, ''Yorktown'' sortied and ultimately played a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=50}}</ref>

Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=53}}, derived from Japanese War History Series (''Senshi Sōsho''), Volume 43 ('Middowei Kaisen'), p. 118.</ref> To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his [[battleship]]s) would be concealed from the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral [[Chūichi Nagumo]]'s carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the American fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle.<ref name="Tully, pp. 51, 55">{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=51, 55}}</ref> This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=43–45}}, derived from ''[[Senshi Sōsho]]'', p. 196.</ref>

What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed [[JN-25]] by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm |title=Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons: A Postulate |website=combinedfleet.com |access-date=17 October 2017 |archive-date=14 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210814183126/http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm |url-status=live}}</ref> For instance, although Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two {{sclass|Kongō|battlecruiser|0}} [[fast battleship]]s, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway.<ref name="Tully, pp. 51, 55" />

The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamoto's three battleships were unable to keep pace with the carriers of the ''[[Kidō Butai]]'' (機動部隊, "Mobile Strike Force") and so could not sail in company with them. The ''Kidō Butai'' would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the USN toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the ''Kidō Butai'' would make best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with the ''Kidō Butai''. The distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave implications during the battle. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the [[scout plane]]s carried by the cruisers and carriers, and the additional anti-aircraft capability of the cruisers and the other two battleships of the ''Kongō''-class in the trailing forces, were unavailable to help Nagumo.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=55–56}}</ref>