Editing Battle of Kursk (section)

=== German plans and preparation ===
[[File:Kursk-1943-Plan-GE.svg|thumb|left|German plan of attack]]

The heavy losses sustained by Germany since the opening of [[Operation Barbarossa]] had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=43}} Units were in total 470,000 men understrength.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=374}} For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of the advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=262}} On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=184}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}}

On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=354}} As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade [[Günther von Kluge]], commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused, believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}} Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 were postponed.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=13}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=178, 186}}

On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for the Kursk offensive operation, codenamed ''Zitadelle'' ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by [[Kurt Zeitzler]], the [[Oberkommando des Heeres|OKH]] Chief of Staff.{{sfn|Citino|2012|p=121}} For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=25}} Some military historians have described the operation using the term [[blitzkrieg]] (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.{{efn |name=Blitzkrieg 
|Some that consider Operation Citadel as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such are: Lloyd Clark,{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}} Roger Moorhouse,{{sfn|Moorhouse|2011|p=342}} David Glantz,{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}} [[Jonathan House]],{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}} Hedley Paul Willmott.{{sfn|Willmott|1990|p=300}} Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack".{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=137}} In the informal setting of the International Conference on World War II at [[The National WWII Museum]] in 2013, [[Robert M. Citino]] used the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks".{{sfn|Citino|2013}} In ''The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943'' (2012), Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of ''Bewegungskrieg'', (literally: "war of movement", or [[maneuver warfare]]), culminating in a ''Kesselschlacht'' (literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of [[encirclement]]).{{sfn|Citino|2012}} Historians Steven Newton{{Sfn|Newton|2002}} and Dieter Brand{{Sfn|Brand|2003}} do not use 'blitzkrieg' in their characterization of the operation.}}

Operation Citadel called for a [[Pincer movement|double envelopment]], directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders of five armies and seal off the salient.{{sfn|Nipe|1998}} Army Group Centre would provide General [[Walter Model]]'s [[9th Army (Wehrmacht)|9th Army]] to form the northern pincer. It would cut through the northern face of the salient, driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail line from Soviet attack.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=13}} Army Group South would commit the 4th Panzer Army, under [[Hermann Hoth]], and [[Army Detachment Kempf]], under [[Werner Kempf]], to pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would drive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=194, 196}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}} Manstein's main attack was to be delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS Panzer Corps under [[Paul Hausser]]. The [[XLVIII Panzer Corps (Germany)|XLVIII Panzer Corps]], commanded by [[Otto von Knobelsdorff]], would advance on the left while Army Detachment ''Kempf'' would advance on the right.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=197}} The [[2nd Army (Wehrmacht)|2nd Army]], under the command of [[Walter Weiß|Walter Weiss]], would contain the western portion of the salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}}

On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed the Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=79}} He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}} Though in mid-April, Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}

Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to [[Munich]] for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=49}} A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await the arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=49}} Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|pp=49–50}} [[Albert Speer]], the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding the armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General [[Heinz Guderian]] argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless".{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=50}} The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=50}} Three days later, [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|OKW]], Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June.{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=192}}

[[File:091220 guderian.jpg|thumb|left|Guderian being transported to the Eastern Front, 1943]]

Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade the panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack – surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain.{{efn | Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of attack ([[blitzkrieg#Schwerpunkt|''schwerpunkt'']]) and deep penetration. In ''[[Achtung – Panzer!]]'' he listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these, surprise was by far the most important.{{sfn|Guderian|1937|p=205}} }} In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for the pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,
{{blockquote|
Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?
}}

Hitler replied, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone."{{sfn|Guderian|1952|p=308}}{{efn| Writing after the war, in his autobiography ''[[Panzer Leader (book)|Panzer Leader]]'', "I urged him earnestly to give up the plan of attack. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains."{{sfn|Guderian|1952|p=308}} }}

Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalise German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: principally the [[Panther tank]], but also the [[Elefant|Ferdinand]] [[tank destroyer]] and greater numbers of the [[Tiger I|Tiger]] heavy tank.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=12}} He postponed the operation in order to await their arrival.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}} Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow for more equipment to reach the front.

With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, [[Alfred Jodl]], the Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}<ref>[https://archive.today/20130630034148/http://www.vy75.dial.pipex.com/news.htm "Kursk Press releases July 1943"]. Dial Pixpex News. Retrieved 2 June 2013</ref> Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time to 20 June.{{efn|name=Microfilm}} Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with the delays,{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=83}} but he still supported the offensive.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}} On 17–18 June, following a discussion in which the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler further postponed the operation until 3 July{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}} then, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the launch date of the offensive.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=170}}{{sfn|Mulligan|1987|p=329}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=223}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-022-2925-17, Russland, motorisierte Truppen.jpg|thumb|A [[Raupenschlepper Ost]], designed in response to the poor roads of Russia, moves [[materiel]] up shortly before the Kursk offensive.]]
A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=132}} All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 [[Panzer division|panzer]] divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However, the force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=25}} By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and [[assault gun]]s (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 [[artillery|guns]] and [[mortar (weapon)|mortars]].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}}{{efn|name="1 July 1943"}} The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than 70% of Germany's military force on the Eastern Front.<ref name=":2" />