Editing Battle of Dunkirk (section)

==Halt order==
{{See also|Battle of Arras (1940)}}
{{Quote box|quote=During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed...|author=Halder|source=in a letter of July 1957{{sfn|Shirer|1959|p=879}}|align=right|width=300px}}
{{Quote box|quote=The day's entry concludes with the remark: "The task of Army Group A can be considered to have been completed in the main"—a view which further explains Rundstedt's reluctance to employ his armoured divisions in the final clearing-up stage of this first phase of the campaign.|author=[[Lionel Ellis|Major L. F. Ellis]]{{sfn|Butler|2004|p=151}}|align=right|width=300px}}
{{Quote box|quote=Brauchitsch is angry ... The pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our armour had not been held back. The bad weather has grounded the ''Luftwaffe'' and we must now stand and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses.|author=[[Franz Halder]]|source=written in his diary on 30 May{{sfn|Shirer|1959|p=883}}|align=right|width=300px}}
{{Quote box|quote=General [[Hans Jeschonnek]] overheard Hitler explaining his halt before Dunkirk: "The Führer wants to spare the British a humiliating defeat." Hitler later explained to a close friend, "The blood of every single Englishman is too valuable to shed. Our two peoples belong together racially and traditionally. That is and always has been my aim, even if our generals can't grasp it."|author=Kilzer, Louis C.|source=Hitler's Traitor: Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich{{sfn|Kilzer|2000|p=63}}|align=right|width=300px}}

On 24 May, Hitler visited General von Rundstedt's headquarters at [[Charleville-Mézières|Charleville]]. The terrain around Dunkirk was thought unsuitable for armour. Von Rundstedt advised him the infantry should attack the British forces at Arras, where the British had proved capable of significant action, while Kleist's armour held the line west and south of Dunkirk to pounce on the Allied forces retreating before Army Group B. Hitler, who was familiar with [[Flanders]]' marshes from the [[World War I|First World War]], agreed. This order allowed the Germans to consolidate their gains and prepare for a southward advance against the remaining French forces.

{{lang|de|[[Luftwaffe]]}} commander [[Hermann Göring]] asked for the chance to destroy the forces in Dunkirk. The Allied forces' destruction was thus initially assigned to the air force while the German infantry organised in [[Army Group B]]. Von Rundstedt later called this "one of the great turning points of the war".{{sfn|Taylor|Mayer|1974|p=60}}{{sfn|Shirer|1959|p=877}}{{sfn|Atkin|1990|p=120}}

The true reason for the decision to halt the German armour on 24 May is still debated. One theory is that Von Rundstedt and Hitler agreed to conserve the armour for {{lang|de|[[Fall Rot]]}} ("Case Red"), an operation to the south. It is possible that the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}}'s closer ties than the army's to the Nazi Party contributed to Hitler's approval of Göring's request. Another theory—which few historians have given credence—is that Hitler was still trying to establish diplomatic peace with Britain before [[Operation Barbarossa]] (the invasion of the Soviet Union). Although von Rundstedt after the war stated his suspicions that Hitler wanted "to help the British", based on alleged praise of the British Empire during a visit to his headquarters, little evidence that Hitler wanted to let the Allies escape exists apart from a self-exculpatory statement by Hitler himself in 1945.{{sfn|Taylor|Mayer|1974|p=60}}{{sfn|Atkin|1990|p=120}}{{sfn|Kershaw|2008|p=27}} The historian [[Brian Bond]] wrote:

{{quote|Few historians now accept the view that Hitler's behaviour was influenced by the desire to let the British off lightly in [the] hope that they would then accept a compromise peace. True, in his political testament dated 26 February 1945 Hitler lamented that Churchill was "quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit" in which he had refrained from annihilating [the] British Expeditionary Force, at Dunkirk, but this hardly squares with the contemporary record. Directive No. 13, issued by the Supreme Headquarters on 24 May called specifically for the annihilation of the French, English and Belgian forces in the pocket, while the ''Luftwaffe'' was ordered to prevent the escape of the English forces across the channel.{{sfn|Bond|1990|pp=104–105}}}}

Whatever the reasons for Hitler's decision, the Germans confidently believed the Allied troops were doomed. American journalist [[William Shirer]] reported on 25 May, "German military circles here tonight put it flatly. They said the fate of the great Allied army bottled up in Flanders is sealed." BEF commander [[John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort|General Lord Gort]] {{Post-nominals|country=GBR|VC}}, [[commander-in-chief]] (C-in-C) of the BEF, agreed, writing to [[Anthony Eden]], "I must not conceal from you that a great part of the BEF and its equipment will inevitably be lost in the best of circumstances".{{sfn|Atkin|1990|p=120}}

Hitler did not rescind the Halt Order until the evening of 26 May. The three days thus gained gave a vital breathing space to the [[Royal Navy]] to arrange the evacuation of the British and Allied troops. About 338,000 men were rescued in about 11 days. Of these some 215,000 were British and 123,000 were French, of whom 102,250 escaped in British ships.{{sfn|Lord|1982|p=148}}