Editing Battle of Dien Bien Phu (section)

=== Military situation ===
By 1953, the [[First Indochina War]] was not going well for France. A succession of commanders&nbsp;– [[Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque]], [[Jean Étienne Valluy]], [[Roger Blaizot]], [[Marcel Carpentier]], [[Jean de Lattre de Tassigny]], and [[Raoul Salan]]&nbsp;– had proven incapable of suppressing the insurrection of the [[Viet Minh]], who were fighting for independence. During their 1952–1953 campaign, the Viet Minh had overrun vast swathes of [[Laos]], Vietnam's western neighbor, advancing as far as [[Luang Prabang]] and the [[Plain of Jars]]. The French were unable to slow the advance of the Viet Minh, who fell back only after outrunning their always-tenuous supply lines. In 1953, the French had begun to strengthen their defenses in the [[Hanoi]] delta region to prepare for a series of offensives against Viet Minh [[staging area]]s in northwest Vietnam. They set up fortified towns and outposts in the area, including [[Lai Châu]] near the Chinese border to the north,{{sfn|Fall|1967|p=23}} [[Nà Sản]] to the west of Hanoi,{{sfn|Fall|1967|p=9}} and the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.{{sfn|Fall|1967|p=48}}

In May 1953, French Premier [[René Mayer]] named [[Henri Navarre]] as Salan's successor to command [[French Union]] forces in Indochina. Mayer had given Navarre a single order—to create military conditions that would lead to an "honorable political solution".<ref name="d165">{{harvnb|Davidson|1988|p=165}}</ref> According to military scholar [[Phillip Davidson]]:
<blockquote> On arrival, Navarre was shocked by what he found. There had been no long-range plan since de Lattre's departure. Everything was conducted on a day-to-day, reactive basis. Combat operations were undertaken only in response to enemy moves or threats. There was no comprehensive plan to develop the organization and build up the equipment of the Expeditionary force. Finally, Navarre, the intellectual, the cold and professional soldier, was shocked by the "school's out" attitude of [[Raoul Salan|Salan]] and his senior commanders and staff officers. They were going home, not as victors or heroes, but then, not as clear losers either. To them the important thing was that they were getting out of Indochina with their reputations frayed, but intact. They spared little thought or concern for the problems of their successors.<ref name="d165" /></blockquote>