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Battle of Chosin Reservoir
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==Prelude== ===Location, terrain and weather=== Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula.{{sfn|Russ|1999|p=65}} The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name [[Changjin]], and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.{{sfn|Tucker et al.|2000|p=108}} The battle's main focus was around the {{convert|78|mi|km|adj=mid|-long}} road that connects [[Hungnam]] and Chosin Reservoir,{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=32}} which served as the only retreat route for the UN forces.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=29}} Through these roads, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni,{{efn|name=Sinhung-ni|The town of Sinhung-ni referred to in this article should not be confused with another identically named town located at south of Yudami-ni on the west side of Chosin Reservoir. See {{harvnb|Appleman|1990|pp=30, 32, 221, 376}}.}} located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri (now Changjin-ŭp) ({{Coord|40.3838|N|127.249|E|region:KP-08|display=inline}}). From there, the road passes through Koto-ri ({{Coord|40.284|N|127.3|E|region:KP-08|display=inline}}) and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=28–31}} The area around the Chosin Reservoir was sparsely populated.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=25}} The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=24}} The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass ({{Coord|40.3938|N|127.161|E|region:KP-08|display=inline}}), overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was poor, and in some places it was reduced to a one-lane gravel trail.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=28–31}} On 14 November 1950, a cold front from [[Siberia]] descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged, according to estimates, to as low as {{convert|-36|°F|°C}}.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=xi}} The cold weather created considerable danger of [[frostbite]] casualties and was accompanied by frozen ground, icy roads, and weapon malfunctions. Medical supplies froze; morphine syrettes had to be defrosted in a medic's mouth before they could be injected; blood plasma was frozen and useless on the battlefield. Even cutting off clothing to deal with a wound risked gangrene and frostbite. Batteries used for the Jeeps and radios did not function properly in the temperature and quickly ran down.{{sfn|Duncan|2013|p=190}} The lubrication in the guns gelled and rendered them useless in battle. Likewise, the springs on the firing pins would not strike hard enough to fire the round, or would jam.{{sfn|Tilstra|2014|p=192}} ===Forces and strategies=== {{Further|Battle of Chosin Reservoir order of battle}} [[File:Chosin-Battle.png|thumb|alt=A map showing force emplacements around a lake|A map of the battle{{efn|name=Sinhung-ni}}]] {{multiple image|total_width=300 |footer=Major General [[Edward Almond]] (seated), commander of the US X Corps, and Major General [[Oliver P. Smith]], commander of the US [[1st Marine Division]]. |width1=348|height1=298|image1=Edward Almond.jpg|alt1=A photo of Caucasian man sitting at a desk |width2=1600|height2=2000|image2=Oliver_P._Smith.jpg|alt2=A headshot of a Caucasian man }} Although the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan as part of Almond's US X Corps, Almond and Major General [[Oliver P. Smith]] of the 1st Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other that dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchon,{{sfn|Hammel|1994|p=214}} when Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even though he had never been involved in one.{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 428]}} Smith believed there were large numbers of Chinese forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher headquarters in [[Tokyo]] said otherwise,{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 428}} but Almond felt Smith was overly cautious.{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 434}} The mutual distrust between the commanders caused Smith to slow the 1st Marine Division's advance towards the Chosin Reservoir in violation of Almond's instructions.{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 429}} Smith established supply points and airfields along the way at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|pp= 433–4}} As the US X Corps was pushing towards the reservoir, the Chinese formulated their strategy, based on their experiences in the [[Chinese Civil War]].{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=52}} Working from the assumption that only a light UN presence would be at the reservoir, the Chinese 9th Corps was first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri.{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=52}} Believing the bulk of the US X Corps would move to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Corps would then block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam.{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=52}} The 9th Corps initially committed eight{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=66}} divisions for the battle,{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=436}} with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=52}} The flaw in the Chinese plan was a lack of accurate intelligence about the UN forces.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=296}} Even though the US X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the slow Marine advance allowed the bulk of the US 1st Marine Division, including the [[5th Marine Regiment (United States)|5th]], [[7th Marine Regiment (United States)|7th]] and [[11th Marine Regiment (United States)|11th Marines]], to be concentrated at Yudami-ni.{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|p= 435}}{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=42}} Furthermore, the strategically important Hagaru-ri, where a [[Douglas C-47 Skytrain|C-47]]-capable airfield was under construction and a supply dump,{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=158–162}} was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the [[1st Marine Regiment (United States)|1st]] and 7th Marines.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=158–159}} Only [[Task Force Faith|Regimental Combat Team 31]] (RCT-31), an understrength and hastily formed regimental combat team of the US 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank of the reservoir.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=75}} Those units later took the brunt of the Chinese assaults. As for the UN forces, the 1st Marine Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the battle,{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=24, 37}} and it was further reinforced by the British Royal Marines unit [[41 Commando|41 (Independent) Commando]] and the equivalent of two regiments from the 3rd and 7th Army Infantry Divisions.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=24}} The UN forces had a combined strength of about 30,000 men during the course of the battle.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=24}} The UN forces at Chosin were also supported by one of the greatest concentrations of air power during the Korean War,{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=250}} since the [[1st Marine Air Wing|1st Marine Aircraft Wing]] stationed at [[Yonpo Airfield]] and five aircraft carriers from the US Navy's [[Task Force 77 (U.S. Navy)|Task Force 77]] were able to launch 230 [[sortie]]s daily to provide [[close air support]] during the battle,{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=250}} while the US Air Force [[Pacific_Air_Forces#Far_East_Air_Forces|Far East Combat Cargo Command]] in Japan reached the capacity of airdropping 250 tons of supplies per day to resupply the trapped UN forces.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=182}} Although the 9th Corps was one of China's elite formations, composed of veterans and former [[Prisoner of war|POWs]] from the [[Huaihai Campaign]],{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=52}} several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle. Initially the 9th Corps was intended to be outfitted in [[Manchuria]] during November, but Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea before that could happen.{{sfn|Millett|2010|p=338}} As a result, the 9th Corps had almost no winter clothing for the harsh Korean winter.{{sfn|Shrader|1995|p=174}} Similarly, poor [[Military logistics|logistics]] forced the 9th Corps to abandon heavy artillery,{{sfn|Xue & Li Part One|2000}}{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=36}} while working with little food and ammunition.{{sfn|Shrader|1995|p=174}} The food shortage forced the 9th Corps to initially station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir in reserve,{{sfn|Zhang|1995|p=117}} and starvation and exposure weakened the Chinese units, since foraging was not an option in the sparsely populated area.{{sfn|Shrader|1995|p=174}} By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops had died from the cold than from combat and air raids.{{sfn|Spurr|1988|p=270}} Chinese strength is usually estimated at 120,000 troops for the battle.{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=259}}{{sfn|Hammel|1994|p=9}} Before arriving in Korea, the 9th Corps was also reinforced. Each of its three corps had four divisions instead of the regular three; thus it had 12 divisions, with 10,000 men per division.{{sfn|Appleman|1992|p=768}} Infantry from two formerly "liberated" (surrendered) Nationalist divisions were absorbed{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=23}} to bring each infantry company up to strength. Some companies had approximately 150 men,{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=53}} while others were reinforced with more than 200 men.{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=15}} However, attrition due to UN air raids, poor logistics and cold weather had also taken a toll on the way to the battlefield. On the day 9th Corps entered Korea, for example, frostbite inflicted 700 casualties, while most of its transport vehicles were destroyed by UN air raids.{{sfn|Xue & Li Part One|2000}} During the course of the battle, Chinese prisoners of war reported that most of the 9th Corps’ divisions had become under strength, numbering about 6,500 to 7,000 men per division.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=17}} These factors, plus uncertainties over the Chinese order of battle in [[Western world|Western]] sources,{{efn|"The third uncommitted division of the IX Army Group was the [[94th Division (People's Republic of China)|90th, of the 27th Army]]. It may have been had in reserve somewhere in the Chosin area but never committed, or if elements of it were committed, they were never identified." See {{harvnb|Appleman|1987|p=353}}}} led some historians to revise Chinese numbers down to as low as 60,000 during the course of battle.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=24}} Eventually, all 12 Chinese divisions of the 9th Corps were deployed, although the [[78th Division (People's Republic of China)|78th]] and the [[88th Division (People's Republic of China)|88th Divisions]] of the PVA [[26th Army (People's Republic of China)|26th Army]] did not make contact with UN forces during the course of the battle.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|p=353}} Eight divisions of the PVA 20th and [[27th Army (People's Republic of China)|27th Armies]] served as the main attacking force.{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=66}} Four divisions of the PVA 26th Army initially were held back in reserve, and deployed after 20th and 27th Armies had exhausted all their available strength.{{sfn|Ye|2007|p=203}}
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