Editing Austro-Prussian War (section)

==Causes==
{{see also|Austria-Prussia rivalry|Concert of Europe}}
For several centuries, [[Central Europe]] was split into a few large- or medium-sized states and [[Kleinstaaterei|hundreds of tiny entities]], which while ostensibly being within the [[Holy Roman Empire]] ruled by the [[Holy Roman Emperor]], operated in a largely independent fashion. When an existing Emperor died, seven secular and ecclesiastical princes, each of whom ruled at least one of the states, would elect a new Emperor. Over time the Empire became smaller and by 1789 came to consist of primarily German peoples (aside from Bohemia, Moravia, the southern Netherlands and Slovenia). Aside from five years (1740–1745), the [[house of Habsburg|Habsburg family]], whose domain was [[Austria]], controlled the Emperorship from 1440 to 1806, although it became increasingly ceremonial only as Austria found itself at war at certain times with other states within the Empire, such as [[Prussia]], which in fact defeated Austria during the [[War of Austrian Succession]] to seize the province of Silesia in 1742. While Austria was traditionally considered the leader of the German states, [[Prussia]] became increasingly powerful and by the late 18th century was ranked as one of the [[great power]]s of Europe. [[Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor|Francis II]]'s abolition of the office of Holy Roman Emperor in 1806 also deprived him of his imperial authority over most of German-speaking Europe, though little true authority remained by that time; he did, however, retain firm control of an extensive multi-ethnic empire (most of it outside the previous boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire). After 1815, the [[States of the German Confederation|German states]] were once again reorganized into a loose confederation: the [[German Confederation]], under Austrian leadership.{{sfn|Wawro|2003|p=16}} Prussia had been contesting Austria's supremacy in Germany since at least 1850, when a war between the two powers had nearly erupted over Berlin's leadership of the [[Erfurt Union]], though at that time Prussia had [[Punctation of Olmütz|backed down]].

=== Nationalism ===
[[File:Austro-prussian-war-1866.png|thumb|upright=1.8|Map depicting deployment and advance of Austrian (red) and Prussian (green) troops and their allies {{In lang|ru}}]]
[[File:Battle of Koniggratz.png|thumb|upright=1.2|Depiction of [[Prussia]]n and [[Austrian Empire|Austrian]] troop movements and maneuvers during the Battle of Königgrätz {{In lang|de}}]]
[[File:Main-Karte-160710 - Mainarmee.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|Movements of the Prussian Army near the Main river {{In lang|de}}]]
At the time of the war, there was no strong national consciousness in Germany.<ref name="marcel">Stoetzler, Marcel (2003) ''Liberalism, nationalism and anti-semitism in the 'Berlin anti-semitism dispute' of 1879/1880''. PhD thesis, Middlesex University. p. 47</ref> Michael Hughes notes that in regards to Germany, "nationalism was a minority movement, deeply divided and with only a marginal impact on German political life".<ref name="hughes_106">{{Cite book |last=Hughes |first=Michael |title=Nationalism and society, Germany 1800–1945 |date=1988 |publisher=Hodder Arnold |isbn=0713165227 |location=London |page=106}}</ref> German newspapers were almost exclusively concerned with local affairs or their respective state governments, and the individual German states cultivated loyalty towards themselves. While rivalry with France was an important element of German nationalist myth-making, many Germans cooperated with France during the Napoleonic Era, and those who resisted France did not do so out of nationalist sentiment.{{Sfn|Breuilly|1996|pages=24–25}} According to [[John Breuilly]], any sense of a common German identity "was weakly developed and confined to particular groups" and "there was very little demand, certainly at popular level, for unification".{{Sfn|Breuilly|1996|pages=10, 24}} The liberal-nationalist concept of a united Germany had also become unpopular following the fall of the [[Frankfurt Parliament]] in 1849.<ref name="ashton_183">{{Cite book |last=Ashton |first=Bodie A. |title=The Kingdom of Württemberg and the Making of Germany, 1815–1871 |date=2017 |publisher=Bloomsbury 3PL |isbn=978-1350000070 |page=183}}</ref> One of the strongest social forces in Germany at the time was religion, which provided Germans with common confessional values and identities that transcended national boundaries. This led to a strong confessional rivalry between the southern Catholic and northern Protestant states. Breuilly remarks that the confessional rivalry was so strong that "a Hamburg Lutheran had more in common with a Swedish Lutheran than with an Austrian Catholic".{{Sfn|Breuilly|1996|pages=24–25}} The minor nations of Germany valued their independence and believed that their ability to remain sovereign depended on Austro-Prussian dualism, with neither side allowed to become too powerful. Confessional division also played an important role in German dualism, and there was a strong pressure in Catholic states to support Austria.{{Sfn|Breuilly|1996|page=72}} In the absence of nationalist sentiment, a united German state could only be created through external force.<ref name="marcel"/> Bismarck recognised this, remarking in 1862 that a united German state could not be forged through "speeches and majority decisions" but only through "blood and iron".<ref name="hoyer_47">{{Cite book |last=Hoyer |first=Katja |author-link=Katja Hoyer |title=Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire 1871–1918 |date=2021 |publisher=[[The History Press]] |isbn=978-0750996228 |location=Cheltenham |page=47}}</ref>

=== Bismarck's plot ===
There are many interpretations of [[Otto von Bismarck]]'s behaviour before the Austrian-Prussian war, which concentrate mainly on the fact that he had a master plan that resulted in this war, the North German Confederation and the unification of Germany. Bismarck maintained that he orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the Franco-Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany.{{Sfn|Taylor|1955|page=3}}

On 22 February 1866, [[Alajos Károlyi|Count Károlyi]], Austrian ambassador in [[Berlin]], sent a dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, [[Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, Prince Dietrichstein von Nicolsburg|Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly]]. He explained to him that Prussian public opinion had become extremely sensitive about the Duchies issue and that he had no doubt that "this artificial exaggeration of the danger by public opinion formed an essential part of the calculations and actions of Count Bismarck [who considered] the annexation of the Duchies ... a matter of life and death for his political existence [and wished] to make it appear such for Prussia too."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Brooks |first=Stephen |title=Nineteenth Century Europe |date=1992 |publisher=Macmillan Press |pages=39–40}}</ref>

Possible evidence can be found in Bismarck's orchestration of the Austrian alliance during the [[Second Schleswig War]] against Denmark, which can be seen as his diplomatic "masterstroke". Taylor also believes that the alliance was a "test for Austria rather than a trap" and that the goal was not war with Austria, contradicting what Bismarck later gave in his memoirs as his main reason for establishing the alliance. It was in the Prussian interest to gain an alliance with Austria to defeat Denmark and settle the [[history of Schleswig-Holstein|issue]] of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The alliance can be regarded as an aid to Prussian expansion, rather than a provocation of war against Austria. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian [[expansionism|expansionist]], rather than a German nationalist, who sought the unification of Germany. It was at the [[Gastein Convention]] that the Austrian alliance was set up to lure Austria into war.<ref name="Pflanze1963">{{Cite book |last=Pflanze |first=Otto |author-link=Otto Pflanze |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ollxA6i_aK8C |title=Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871 |date=1963 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=0-691-00765-9}}</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}

Florence gave a good chance to Bismarck as it wanted to annex the remainder of [[Francis Joseph I|Emperor Francis Joseph]]'s [[Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia]]. The timing of the [[Italo-Prussian alliance|Italo-Prussian Alliance]] of 8 April 1866 was perfect, because all other European powers were either bound by relations that forbade them from entering the conflict opposed to Berlin, or had domestic problems that had priority. Obvious reasons why none of the great powers of Europe was about to intervene are listed below:

'''Russia''': Saint Petersburg was unlikely to enter on the side of Vienna, due to ill will over Francis Joseph's support for the Anglo-French alliance during the [[Crimean War]] despite the [[house of Romanov]]'s aid to him against the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1848|Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849]]. Moreover, Prussia had stood by Russia during the [[January Uprising]] in Poland, signing the [[Alvensleben Convention]] of February 1863 with the Empire, whereas Austria had not.<ref name="kitchen">{{Cite web |last=Kitchen |first=Martin |author-link=Martin Kitchen |title=A History of Modern Germany 1800–2000 |url=https://ens9004-mza.infd.edu.ar/sitio/upload/14-%20KITCHEN,%20M.%20-%20LIBRO%20-%20A%20History%20of%20Modern%20Germany_1.pdf |access-date=24 April 2019 |publisher=[[Blackwell Publishing|Blackwell]]}}{{Dead link|date=September 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes}}</ref>

'''France''': Paris was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, because Bismarck had visited Emperor [[Napoleon III]] in [[Biarritz]] and they allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-Prussian war. The details of the negotiation are unknown but many historians think Bismarck was guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war.

'''Britain''': London focused on its own affairs in [[splendid isolation]] and had no stake economically or politically in a war between the Central European powers, thus, was not going to intervene.
 
This meant that Austria would be fighting both Italy and Prussia, without any non-German allies of its own. Bismarck was aware of an available numerical superiority but still "he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he gave a favourable account of the international situation".<ref name="feuchtwanger">{{Cite book |last=Feuchtwanger |first=Edgar |author-link=Edgar Feuchtwanger |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B7NEAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA125 |title=Bismarck: A Political History |date=2014 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1317684329 |page=125}}</ref>

=== Military factors ===
[[File:Chlum, Všestary 2022-04 14.jpg|thumb|The memorial to the ''Battery of the dead'' in Chlum (modern [[Czech Republic]]) commemorates some of the heaviest fighting during the Battle of Königgrätz.]]
Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages of the Prussian army against the Austrian Empire. Taylor wrote that Bismarck was reluctant to pursue war as it "deprived him of control and left the decisions to the generals whose ability he distrusted". (The two most important personalities within the Prussian army were the War Minister [[Albrecht von Roon|Albrecht Graf von Roon]] and Chief of the General Staff [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Helmuth Graf von Moltke]].) Taylor suggested that Bismarck was hoping to force Austrian leaders into concessions in Germany, rather than provoke war. The truth may be more complicated than simply that Bismarck, who famously said that "politics is the art of the possible", initially sought war with Austria or was initially against the idea of going to war with Austria.

==== Rival military systems ====
In 1862, von Roon had implemented several army reforms that ensured that all Prussian citizens were liable to conscription. Before this date, the size of the army had been fixed by earlier laws that had not taken population growth into account, making conscription inequitable and unpopular for this reason. While some Prussian men remained in the army or the reserves until they were forty years old, about one man in three (or even more in some regions where the population had expanded greatly as a result of industrialisation) was assigned minimal service in the {{lang|de|[[Landwehr]]}}, the home guard.{{Sfn|McElwee|1974|page=60}}

Introducing universal conscription for three years increased the size of the active duty army and provided Prussia with a reserve army equal in size to that which Moltke deployed against Austria. Had France under Napoleon III attempted to intervene against the Prussians, they could have faced him with equal or superior numbers of troops.{{Sfn|McElwee|1974|pages=63–64}}

Prussian conscript service was one of continuous training and drill, in contrast to the Austrian army where some commanders routinely dismissed infantry conscripts to their homes on permanent leave soon after their induction into the army, retaining only a cadre of long-term soldiers for formal parades and routine duties.{{Sfn|McElwee|1974|page=52}} Austrian conscripts had to be trained almost from scratch when they were recalled to their units on the outbreak of war. The Prussian army was thus better trained and disciplined than their enemy's one, particularly in the infantry. While the Habsburg Empire's cavalry and artillery were as well trained as their Prussian counterparts, with Austria possessing two elite divisions of heavy cavalry, weapons and tactics had advanced since the [[Napoleonic Wars]] and cavalry charges had been rendered obsolete.{{Citation needed|date=August 2018}}

==== Speed of mobilization ====
[[File:1866 prinz-friedrich-karl-bei-koeniggraetz 1b-640x428.jpg|thumb|250px|Prussian [[Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia (1828–1885)|Prince Friedrich Karl]] is cheered on by his troops.]]
The Prussian army was locally based, organized in {{lang|de|Kreise}} (military districts, lit.: circles), each containing a Korps headquarters and its component units. Most reservists lived close to their regimental depots and could be swiftly mobilized. Austrian policy was to ensure that units were stationed far from home to prevent them from taking part in separatist revolts. Conscripts on leave or reservists recalled to their units during mobilization faced a journey that might take weeks before they could report to their units, making the Austrian mobilization much slower than that of the Prussian Army.

==== Speed of concentration ====
The railway system of Prussia was more extensively developed than that within Austria. Railways made it possible to supply larger numbers of troops than hitherto and allowed the rapid movement of troops within friendly territory. The more efficient Prussian rail network allowed the Prussian army to concentrate more rapidly than their enemy. Moltke, reviewing his plans to Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days. ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men."<ref name="Wolmar">{{Cite book |last=Wolmar |first=Christian |title=Blood, Iron and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World |date=2010 |page=96}}</ref> Moltke had also said earlier, "Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the war that we must have."

The Austrian army under [[Ludwig von Benedek]] in [[Bohemia]] (the present-day [[Czech Republic]]) might previously have been expected to enjoy the advantage of the "central position", by being able to concentrate on successive attacking armies strung out along the frontier, but the quicker Prussian concentration nullified this advantage. By the time the Austrians were fully assembled, they would be unable to concentrate against one Prussian army without having the other two instantly attack their flank and rear, threatening their lines of communication.

==== Armaments and tactics ====
[[File:Zündnadelgewehr m-1841 - Preussen - Armémuseum.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|The Prussian [[Dreyse needle gun]]]]
Prussian infantry were equipped with the [[Dreyse needle gun]], a bolt-action rifle which could be fired faster than the [[muzzleloader|muzzle-loading]] [[Lorenz rifle]]s of the Austrian army. In the [[Second Italian War of Independence|Franco-Austrian War]] of 1859, French troops took advantage of poorly trained enemies who did not readjust their gunsights as they got closer{{snd}}thus firing too high at close range. By rapidly closing the range, French troops came to close quarters with an advantage over the enemy's infantry. After the war, the Austrians adopted the same methods, which they termed the {{lang|de|Stoßtaktik}} ("shock tactics"). Although they had some warnings of the Prussian weapon, they ignored these and retained {{lang|de|Stoßtaktik}}.

The Austrians were equipped with breech-loading rifled cannon, which was superior to the Prussian muzzle loading smooth bore cannon. Their artillery used a unique rifling system invented by [[Wilhelm Lenk von Wolfsberg]] called the Lenk system. The Prussians, however, by this point had replaced up to 60% of their smooth bore artillery with the technologically superior [[C64 (field gun)]], which had been in production since 1859. However, due to tactical reluctance on the part of Prussian high command to utilise relatively unfamiliar technology, and doctrinal stagnation in the Artillery Corps, the modern [[Krupp]] guns were either sent to reserve units or used in tandem and to the same effect as their smooth bore counterparts, something that massively throttled their effectiveness in the war, and many of the guns that saw combat were the old smooth bore muzzle loaders. The Austrians too, while having standardised the Lenk system of rifling in their cannon, did not use their artillery to full effect. They specifically targeted the Prussian artillery with their own batteries, limiting their impact on the battlefield in regards to Prussian infantry. One notable exception is the use of Austrian artillery to good effect against infantry at [[Battle of Königgrätz]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Loch |first=Thorsten |last2=Kesselring |first2=Agilolf |date=31 August 2023 |title=Through Artillery from Thrust to Fire: How Prussian Military Thinking Anticipated Emergent Warfare in 1870 |journal=[[War in History]] |language=en |volume=31 |issue=2 |pages=128–147 |doi=10.1177/09683445231193878 |issn=0968-3445 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

The Generals of the Prussian army realized that, in order to stay ahead of their Austrian enemies, they needed to explore new military tactics. They sent officers to travel across the Atlantic Ocean to go and observe the American Civil War. These officers met with high ranking commanders and recorded both Union and Confederate tactics. They wrote about troop movements, artillery positioning, and new methods of attack that worked well for the Americans. These officers then travelled back to Prussia and briefed their generals about these observations. Some officers, such as [[Justus Scheibert]], published their adventures in America for the public to enjoy.

=== Economic factors ===
[[File:Batalha sadowa 1866.jpg|thumb|250px|The Battle of Königgrätz]]
In 1866, the Prussian economy was rapidly growing, partly as a result of the German customs union, the {{lang|de|[[Zollverein]]}}, which gave Prussia an advantage in the war. Prussia could equip its armies with [[breech-loading rifles]] and later with new [[Krupp]] breech-loading [[artillery]] but the Austrian economy was suffering from the effects of the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1848]] and the [[Second Italian War of Independence]], so the state was heavily in debt. Historian [[Christopher Clark]] wrote that there is little to suggest that Prussia had an overwhelming economic and industrial advantage over Austria and wrote that a larger portion of the Prussian population was engaged in agriculture than in the Austrian population and that Austrian industry could produce the most sophisticated weapons in the war (rifled artillery). The Austro-Prussian War ended quickly and was fought mainly with existing weapons and munitions, which reduced the influence of economic and industrial power relative to politics and military culture.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Clark |first=Christopher |author-link=Christopher Clark |title=Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia |date=2008 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]]}}{{page needed|date=August 2020}}</ref>