Editing Asymmetric warfare (section)

==Strategic basis==
In most [[conventional warfare]], the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type, and the outcome can be predicted by the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, for example, better [[command and control]] of theirs (c2). There are times when this is the case, and conventional forces are not easily compared, making it difficult for opposing sides to engage. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the [[French Army]] and the maritime forces of the [[United Kingdom]]'s [[Royal Navy]] during the [[French Revolutionary Wars|French Revolutionary]] and [[Napoleonic Wars]]. In the words of Admiral [[John Jervis, 1st Earl of St Vincent|Jervis]] during the [[Campaigns of 1801 in the French Revolutionary Wars|campaigns of 1801]], "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea",<ref>{{Cite book|last=Andidora|first=Ronald|title=Iron Admirals: Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|year=2000|isbn=978-0-313-31266-3|url=https://archive.org/details/ironadmiralsnava00andi|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/ironadmiralsnava00andi/page/3 3]|access-date=2016-03-19}}</ref> and a confrontation that [[Napoleon Bonaparte]] described as that between the elephant and the whale.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Nicolson|first=Adam|title=Men of Honor: Trafalgar and the making of the English Hero|publisher=HarperCollins|year=2005|isbn=978-0-00-719209-0|page=73}}</ref>