Editing Arcesilaus (section)

==Philosophy==
{{main|Academic Skepticism}}
{{Pyrrhonism sidebar}}Arcesilaus committed nothing to writing. His opinions were imperfectly known to his contemporaries, and can now only be gathered from the statements of later writers. This makes his philosophy difficult to evaluate and partly inconsistent. This led scholars to see his skepticism in several ways. Some see his philosophy as completely negative or destructive of all philosophical views. Others regard him as taking the position that nothing can be known on the basis of his philosophical arguments. Others claimed he held no positive views on any philosophical topic, including the possibility of knowledge.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arcesilaus/ |title=Arcesilaus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |publisher=Plato.stanford.edu |date=2005-01-14 |access-date=31 March 2016}}</ref>

Arcesilaus' contemporary, [[Aristo of Chios]], described Arcesilaus as being: "[[Plato]] the head of him, [[Pyrrho]] the tail, midway [[Diodorus Cronus|Diodorus]]"<ref>{{cite LotEP|chapter=Arcesilaus|§=35}}; and Sextus Empiricus, ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism''.</ref> meaning that Arcesilaus presented himself as a [[Platonism|Platonist]], the substance of what he taught was the dialectics of Diodorus, but his actual philosophy was that of [[Pyrrhonism]].<ref>"Arcesilaus ... does indeed seem to me to share the Pyrrhonean arguments, so that his Way is almost the same as ours.... he made use of the dialectic of Diodorus, but he was an outwardly Platonist." Sextus Empiricus, ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism'' Book I, Chapter 33.</ref> [[Eusebius]], probably quoting [[Aristocles of Messene]], reported that Arcesilaus studied in Pyrrho's school and adhered, except in name, to Pyrrhonism.<ref>[[Eusebius]], ''[[Praeparatio Evangelica]]'' Chapter VI</ref> [[Numenius of Apamea]] said "Arcesilaus accompanied [[Pyrrho]]. He remained Pyrrhonist in his rejection of everything, except in name. At least the Pyrrhonists Mnaseas,  Philomelos and [[Timon of Phlius|Timon]] call him a Pyrrhonist, just as they were themselves, because he too rejected the true, the false, and the persuasive."<ref>Numenius, fr. 25.64–71</ref>  [[Sextus Empiricus]] said that Arcesilaus' philosophy appeared essentially the same as Pyrrhonism, but granted that this might have been superficial.<ref>Sextus Empiricus, ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism'', Book 1, Chapter 33, Section 232</ref>

On the one hand, Arcesilaus professed to be no innovator, but a reviver of the [[dogma]]-free dialectic that had characterized the academy under Plato.<ref>David Sedley, in ''Doubt and Dogmatism'' Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 11</ref> Thus he is said to have restored the doctrines of [[Plato]] in an uncorrupted form. On the other hand, according to [[Cicero]],<ref>Cicero, ''Academica'', i. 12</ref> he summed up his opinions in the formula, "that he knew nothing, not even his own ignorance." There are two ways of reconciling the difficulty: either we may suppose him to have thrown out such aphorisms as an exercise for his pupils, as [[Sextus Empiricus]],<ref>Sextus Empiricus, ''Pyrrh. Hypotyp.'' i. 234</ref> who calls him a "skeptic", would have us believe; or he may have really doubted the esoteric meaning of Plato, and have supposed himself to have been stripping his works of the figments of the [[Dogmatists]], while he was in fact taking from them all certain principles.<ref>Cicero, ''De Oratore'', iii. 18.</ref>

Cicero attributes the following argument to Arcesilaus:

(i) it is rash and shameful to assent to something false or unknown, but since
(ii) nothing can be known (and obviously we shouldn't do what is rash and shameful),
(iii) we should suspend judgment about everything<ref>Cicero ''Academica'' ''Varro'', 44–45</ref>

[[Zeno of Citium]] and the other [[Stoics]] were the chief opponents of Arcesilaus. He attacked their [[dogma]] of [[Katalepsis|katalêptikê phantasia]] (i.e., a convincing conception) as understood to be a mean between ''[[episteme]]'' (knowledge) and ''[[doxa]]'' (opinion). He argued that this mean could not exist. It involved a contradiction in terms, as the very idea of ''[[phantasiai|phantasia]]'' implied the possibility of false as well as true conceptions of the same object. As such, it was merely the interpolation of a name.<ref>Cicero, ''Academica'', ii. 24.</ref>