Editing Apollo 7 (section)

==Preparation==

According to Cunningham, Schirra originally had limited interest in making a third spaceflight, beginning to focus on his post-NASA career. Flying the first mission after the fire changed things: "Wally Schirra was being pictured as the man chosen to rescue the manned space program. And that was a task worthy of Wally's interest."{{sfn|Cunningham 2003|pp=115–116}} Eisele noted, "coming on the heels of the fire, we knew the fate and future of the entire manned space program—not to mention our own skins—was riding on the success or failure of Apollo{{spaces}}7."{{sfn|Eisele 2017|p=38}}

Given the circumstances of the fire, the crew initially had little confidence in the staff at [[North American Aviation]]'s plant at [[Downey, California]], who built the Apollo command modules, and they were determined to follow their craft every step of the way through construction and testing. This interfered with training, but the simulators of the CM were not yet ready, and they knew it would be a long time until they launched. They spent long periods at Downey. Simulators were constructed at Houston's [[Johnson Space Center|Manned Spacecraft Center]] and at KSC in Florida. Once these were available for use, the crew had difficulty finding enough time to do everything, even with the help of the backup and support crews; the crew often worked 12 or 14 hours per day. After the CM was completed and shipped to KSC, the focus of the crew's training shifted to Florida, though they went to Houston for planning and technical meetings. Rather than return to their Houston homes for the weekend, they often had to remain at KSC in order to participate in training or spacecraft testing.{{sfn|Eisele 2017|pp=35–39}} According to former astronaut [[Tom Jones (astronaut)|Tom Jones]] in a 2018 article, Schirra, "with indisputable evidence of the risks his crew would be taking, now had immense leverage with management at NASA and North American, and he used it. In conference rooms or on the spacecraft assembly line, Schirra got his way."<ref name = "fight" />
[[File:Apollo 7 crew during water egress training.jpg|thumb|left|The crew during water egress training]]

The Apollo 7 crew spent five hours in training for every hour they could expect to remain aboard if the mission went its full eleven days. In addition, they attended technical briefings and pilots' meetings, and studied on their own. They undertook launch pad evacuation training, water egress training to exit the vehicle after splashdown, and learned to use firefighting equipment. They trained on the [[Apollo Guidance Computer]] at [[MIT]]. Each crew member spent 160 hours in CM simulations, in some of which Mission Control in Houston participated live.{{sfn|Press Kit|pp=55–57}} The "plugs out" test—the test that had killed the Apollo{{spaces}}1 crew—was conducted with the prime crew in the spacecraft, but with the hatch open.{{sfn|Press Kit|pp=37, 41}} One reason the Apollo{{spaces}}1 crew had died was because it was impossible to open the inward-opening hatch before the fire raced through the cabin; this was changed for Apollo{{spaces}}7.{{sfn|Orloff & Harland 2006|pp=110–115}}

Command modules similar to that used on Apollo{{spaces}}7 were subjected to tests in the run-up to the mission. A three-astronaut crew ([[Joseph P. Kerwin]], [[Vance D. Brand]] and [[Joe H. Engle]]) was inside a CM that was placed in a vacuum chamber at the Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston for eight days in June 1968 to test spacecraft systems. Another crew ([[James Lovell]], [[Stuart Roosa]] and [[Charles M. Duke]]) spent 48 hours at sea aboard a CM lowered into the Gulf of Mexico from a naval vessel in April 1968, to test how systems would respond to seawater. Further tests were conducted the following month in a tank at Houston. Fires were set aboard a [[boilerplate (spaceflight)|boilerplate]] CM using various atmospheric compositions and pressures. The results led to the decision to use 60 percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen within the CM at launch, which would be replaced with a lower pressure of pure oxygen within four hours, as providing adequate fire protection. Other boilerplate spacecraft were subjected to drops to test parachutes, and to simulate the likely damage if a CM came down on land. All results were satisfactory.{{sfn|Press Kit|pp=70–75}}

During the run-up to the mission, the Soviets sent uncrewed probes [[Zond&nbsp;4]] and [[Zond&nbsp;5]] (Zond 5 carried two tortoises<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2018/09/18/zond-5-soviet-tortises-around-the-moon/|title=The First Earthlings Around the Moon Were Two Soviet Tortoises|last=Betz|first=Eric|date=18 September 2018|work=[[Discover (magazine)|Discover]]|access-date=14 July 2019|archive-date=September 28, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190928192410/http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2018/09/18/zond-5-soviet-tortises-around-the-moon/|url-status=dead}}</ref>) around the Moon, seeming to foreshadow a circumlunar crewed mission. NASA's [[Apollo Lunar Module|Lunar Module]] (LM) was suffering delays, and Apollo Program Spacecraft Manager [[George Low]] proposed that if Apollo{{spaces}}7 was a success, that [[Apollo&nbsp;8]] go to lunar orbit without a LM. The acceptance of Low's proposal raised the stakes for Apollo{{spaces}}7.<ref name = "fight" />{{sfn|Chaikin 1995|p=76}} According to Stafford, Schirra "clearly felt the full weight of the program riding on a successful mission and as a result became more openly critical and more sarcastic."{{sfn|Stafford 2002|p=616}}

Throughout the Mercury and Gemini programs, [[McDonnell Aircraft]] engineer [[Guenter Wendt]] led the spacecraft launch pad teams, with ultimate responsibility for condition of the spacecraft at launch. He earned the astronauts' respect and admiration, including Schirra's.<ref name="Guenter Wendt Obit">{{cite web |url=http://www.collectspace.com/news/news-050310a.html |title=Guenter Wendt, 86, 'Pad Leader' for NASA's moon missions, dies |last=Pearlman |first=Robert Z. |author-link=Robert Pearlman |date=May 3, 2010 |website=[[collectSPACE]] |publisher=Robert Pearlman |access-date=June 12, 2014}}</ref> However, the spacecraft contractor had changed from McDonnell (Mercury and Gemini) to North American (Apollo), so Wendt was not the pad leader for Apollo{{spaces}}1.<ref name="FirstOnTheMoon">[[#Farmer & Hamblin 1970|Farmer & Hamblin 1970]], pp. 51–54</ref> So adamant was Schirra in his desire to have Wendt back as pad leader for his Apollo flight, that he got his boss Slayton to persuade North American management to hire Wendt away from McDonnell, and Schirra personally lobbied North American's launch operations manager to change Wendt's shift from midnight to day so he could be pad leader for Apollo{{spaces}}7. Wendt remained as pad leader for the entire Apollo program.<ref name="FirstOnTheMoon" /> When he departed the spacecraft area as the pad was evacuated prior to launch, after Cunningham said, "I think Guenter's going", Eisele responded "Yes, I think Guenter went."{{efn|A pun on his last name, Wendt (pronounced "went")}}<ref name = "launch">{{cite web|work=Apollo 7 Flight Journal|url=https://history.nasa.gov/afj/ap07fj/a7_01_launch_ascent.html|title=Day 1, part 1: Launch and ascent to Earth orbit|date=April 2, 2018|access-date=October 12, 2020}}</ref><ref name = "separation">{{cite web|work=Apollo 7 Flight Journal|url=https://history.nasa.gov/afj/ap07fj/a7_03_s-ivb-safing.html|title=Day 1, part 3: S-IVB takeover demonstration, separation, and first phasing maneuver|date=April 2, 2018|access-date=October 12, 2020}}</ref>{{sfn|French & Burgess 2007|p=913}}{{sfn|Schirra 1988|p=200}}