Editing Antisthenes (section)

==Philosophy==
[[File:Antisthenes BM 1838.jpg|right|thumb|Marble bust of Antisthenes based on the same original ([[British Museum]]) ]]

===According to Diogenes Laertius===
In his ''[[Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers]]'' Diogenes Laertius lists the following as the favourite themes of Antisthenes: "He would prove that virtue can be taught; and that nobility belongs to none other than the virtuous. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of spirit. And he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of others are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue; that he will also marry in order to have children from union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved".{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 10}}

===Ethics===
Antisthenes was a pupil of Socrates, from whom he imbibed the fundamental ethical precept that [[virtue]], not [[pleasure]], is the end of existence.  Everything that the wise person does, Antisthenes said, conforms to perfect virtue,{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 11}} and pleasure is not only unnecessary, but a positive evil. He is reported to have held pain<ref>Julian, ''Oration'', 6.181b</ref> and even ill-repute ({{langx|el|ἀδοξία}}){{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 3, 7}} to be blessings, and he said, "I'd rather be mad than feel pleasure".{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 3}} However, it is probable that he did not consider all pleasure worthless, but only that which results from the gratification of sensual or artificial desires, for we find him praising the pleasures which spring "from out of one's soul,"<ref>Xenophon, ''Symposium'', iv. 41.</ref> and the enjoyments of a wisely chosen friendship.{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 12}} The supreme good he placed in a life lived according to virtue {{mdash}} virtue consisting in action, which when obtained is never lost, and exempts the wise person from error.{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 11–12, 104–105}} It is closely connected with reason, but to enable it to develop itself in action, and to be sufficient for happiness, it requires the aid of ''Socratic strength'' ({{langx|el|Σωκρατικὴ ἱσχύς}}).{{sfn|Laërtius|1925|loc=§ 11}}

===Physics===
His work on [[natural philosophy]] (the ''Physicus'') contained a theory of the nature of the [[gods]], in which he argued that there were many gods believed in by the people, but only one natural [[God]].<ref>Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', i. 13.</ref> He also said that God resembles nothing on earth, and therefore could not be understood from any representation.<ref>Clement of Alexandria, ''Stromata'', v.</ref>

===Logic===
In [[logic]], Antisthenes was troubled by the [[problem of universals]]. As a proper [[nominalist]], he held that definition and predication are either false or [[Tautology (logic)|tautological]], since we can only say that every individual is what it is, and can give no more than a description of its qualities, e.g. that silver is like tin in colour.<ref name="aristot1">Aristotle, ''Metaphysics'', 1043b24</ref> Thus, he disbelieved the Platonic system of Ideas. "A horse I can see," said Antisthenes, "but horsehood I cannot see".<ref>Simplicius, ''in Arist. Cat.'' 208, 28</ref> Definition is merely a circuitous method of stating an identity: "a tree is a vegetable growth" is logically no more than "a tree is a tree".

===Philosophy of language===
[[Image:Antisthenes Lebiedzki Rahl.jpg|right|thumb|Antisthenes, part of a fresco in the [[National and Kapodistrian University of Athens|National University of Athens]]]]
Antisthenes apparently distinguished "a general object that can be aligned with the meaning of the utterance" from "a particular object of extensional reference". This "suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference".<ref>{{cite book|last=Prince|first=Susan |title=Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary|publisher=University of Michigan Press |year=2015}} p. 20</ref>  The principal basis of this claim is a quotation in [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]]' “Comments on [[Aristotle]]'s 'Topics'” with a three-way distinction: 
# the semantic medium, {{lang|grc|δι' ὧν λέγουσι}}
# an object external to the semantic medium, {{lang|grc|περὶ οὗ λέγουσιν}}
# the direct indication of a thing, {{lang|grc|σημαίνειν … τὸ …}}}<ref>Prince 2015, pp. 518–522 (Antisthenes's literary remains: t. 153B.1).</ref>