Editing 2000 Camp David Summit (section)

==Negotiations==
[[File:President Bill Clinton with Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel and Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority.jpg|thumb|Israeli prime minister [[Ehud Barak]] and Palestinian leader [[Yasser Arafat]] shake hands at the [[White House]] in Washington.]]
The negotiations were based on an all-or-nothing approach, such that "nothing was considered agreed and binding until everything was agreed." The proposals were, for the most part, verbal. As no agreement was reached and there is no official written record of the proposals, some ambiguity remains over details of the positions of the parties on specific issues.<ref name="Pressman_visions">Jeremy Pressman, ''International Security'', vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf ''"Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?"'']. On [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/322/visions_in_collision.html] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722061359/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/322/visions_in_collision.html|date=22 July 2011}}. See pp. 7, 15-19</ref>

The talks ultimately failed to reach agreement on the final status issues:

* Territory
** Territorial contiguity
* [[Jerusalem]] and the [[Temple Mount]]
* [[Refugee]]s and [[Palestinian right of return]]
* Security arrangements
* [[Israeli settlements|Settlements]]

===Territory===
The Palestinian negotiators indicated they wanted full Palestinian sovereignty over the entire [[West Bank]] and the [[Gaza Strip]], although they would consider a one-to-one land swap with Israel. Their historic position was that Palestinians had already made a territorial compromise with Israel by accepting Israel's right to 78% of "historic Palestine", and accepting their state on the remaining 22% of such land. This consensus was expressed by [[Faisal Husseini]] when he remarked: "There can be no compromise on the compromise".<ref>Oren Yiftachel, [https://books.google.com/books?id=VD082HtsKRsC&pg=PA75 ''Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine,''] University of Pennsylvania Press 1006 p.75.</ref> They maintained that [[Resolution 242]] calls for full Israeli withdrawal from these territories, which were captured in the [[Six-Day War]], as part of a final peace settlement. In the 1993 [[Oslo Accords]] the Palestinian negotiators accepted the [[Green Line (Israel)|Green Line]] borders (1949 armistice lines) for the West Bank but the Israelis rejected this proposal and disputed the Palestinian interpretation of Resolution 242. Israel wanted to annex the numerous settlement blocks on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, and were concerned that a complete return to the 1967 borders was dangerous to Israel's security. The Palestinian and Israeli definition of the [[West Bank]] differs by approximately 5% land area as the Israeli definition does not include [[East Jerusalem]] (71&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup>), the territorial waters of the [[Dead Sea]] (195&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup>) and the area known as No Man's Land (50&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup> near [[Latrun]]).<ref name=Pressman_visions/>

Based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, Barak offered to form a [[Palestinian state]] initially on 73% of the West Bank (that is, 27% less than the Green Line borders) and 100% of the Gaza Strip. In 10–25 years, the Palestinian state would expand to a maximum of 92% of the West Bank (91 percent of the West Bank and 1 percent from a land swap).<ref name=Pressman_visions/><ref>{{cite book |first=Efraim |last=Karsh |author-link=Efraim Karsh |title=Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest |publisher=Grove Press |year=2003 |page=168}}</ref> From the Palestinian perspective this equated to an offer of a Palestinian state on a maximum of 86% of the West Bank.<ref name=Pressman_visions/>

According to [[Robert Wright (journalist)|Robert Wright]], Israel would only keep the settlements with large populations. Wright states that all others would be dismantled, with the exception of [[Kiryat Arba]] (adjacent to the holy city of [[Hebron]]), which would be an Israeli [[enclave]] inside the Palestinian state, and would be linked to Israel by a bypass road. The West Bank would be split in the middle by an Israeli-controlled road from Jerusalem to the [[Dead Sea]], with free passage for Palestinians, although Israel reserved the right to close the road to passage in case of emergency. In return, Israel would allow the Palestinians to use a highway in the Negev to connect the West Bank with Gaza. Wright states that in the Israeli proposal, the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be linked by an elevated highway and an elevated railroad running through the [[Negev]], ensuring safe and free passage for Palestinians. These would be under the sovereignty of Israel, and Israel reserved the right to close them to passage in case of emergency.<ref name="Slate Article">{{cite news|last=Wright|first=Robert|title=Was Arafat the Problem?|url=http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_earthling/2002/04/wasarafat_the_problem.single.html|access-date=27 December 2011|newspaper=Slate|date=18 April 2002}}</ref>

Israel would retain around 9% in the West Bank in exchange for 1% of land within the Green Line. The land that would be conceded included symbolic and cultural territories such as the [[Qibli Mosque|Al-Aqsa Mosque]], whereas the Israeli land conceded was unspecified. Additional to territorial concessions, Palestinian airspace would be controlled by Israel under Barak's offer.<ref name="Slate Article"/><ref name=tragedy_errors_p3>Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/aug/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/?page=3 ''Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors''] (part 4). New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001.</ref> The Palestinians rejected the Halutza Sand region (78&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup>) alongside the Gaza Strip as part of the land swap on the basis that it was of inferior quality to that which they would have to give up in the West Bank.<ref name=Pressman_visions/>

=== Territorial contiguity ===
In the proposed Palestinian state, Gaza Strip would be discontinuous from the West Bank. The degree to which the West Bank itself would be dis-contiguous is disputed. [[Noam Chomsky]] writes that the West Bank would have been divided into three cantons and Palestinian East Jerusalem would have constituted the fourth canton; all 4 cantons would be separated from one another by Israeli territory.<ref>{{cite news|author=[[Noam Chomsky]]|title= The solution is the problem|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/11/usa.comment}}</ref> Other sources also said that the proposed West Bank would be divided into three cantons.<ref>{{cite web|title=Failed compromise at Camp David|author=Feisal Husseini|date=December 2000 |publisher=[[Le Monde Diplomatique]]|url=https://mondediplo.com/2000/12/12campdavid}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The United States and the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process|author=[[Stephen Zunes]]|date=December 2001 |url=https://mepc.org/journal/united-states-and-breakdown-israeli-palestinian-peace-process}}</ref><ref name=seekingmandela/> By contrast, [[Ehud Barak]] said the West Bank would only be divided by a wedge of Israeli territory stretching from Maale Adumim to the Jordan River, but would otherwise be continuous.<ref>{{cite news|title= Arafat didn't negotiate – he just kept saying no|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/23/israel3}}</ref>

The Palestinians reacted strongly negatively to the proposed cantonization of the West Bank into three blocs, which the Palestinian delegation likened to South African [[Bantustan]]s, a loaded word that was disputed by the Israeli and American negotiators.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=HVTpUHEcfncC&pg=PA1993-IA4 Decoding the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians, Charles River Editors], Chapter 17</ref> Settlement blocs, bypassed roads and annexed lands would create barriers between [[Nablus]] and [[Jenin]] with [[Ramallah]]. The Ramallah bloc would in turn be divided from [[Bethlehem]] and [[Hebron]]. A separate and smaller bloc would contain [[Jericho]]. Further, the border between West Bank and Jordan would additionally be under Israeli control. The Palestinian Authority would receive pockets of East Jerusalem which would be surrounded entirely by annexed lands in the West Bank.<ref>{{cite web|title=Camp David Projection, July 2000|url=http://www.passia.org/publications/bookmaps/page2.htm#_ednref5|publisher=Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs|access-date=27 December 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120111230312/http://www.passia.org/publications/bookmaps/page2.htm#_ednref5|archive-date=11 January 2012}}</ref>

===East Jerusalem===
One of the most significant obstacles to an agreement was the final status of [[Jerusalem]], especially the status of [[Temple Mount]], known to Muslims as [[Al-Aqsa]] or ''Haram al-Sharif.'' Clinton and Barak insisted that the entire area be placed under Israeli sovereignty, while Palestinians could have "custodianship". Arafat insisted on Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram. As this deadlock could not be resolved, the summit ended.<ref name=":4" />

Leaders were ill-prepared for the central role the Jerusalem issue in general and the [[Temple Mount]] dispute in particular would play in the negotiations.<ref name="waronsacredgrounds.org">Hassner, Ron E. War on Sacred Grounds. 2009. Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. pp. 78–88. [https://archive.today/20130416041615/http://www.waronsacredgrounds.org/ www.waronsacredgrounds.org]</ref> Barak instructed his delegates to treat the dispute as "the central issue that will decide the destiny of the negotiations", whereas Arafat admonished his delegation to "not budge on this one thing:  the Haram (the Temple Mount or [[Al-Aqsa mosque]]) is more precious to me than everything else."<ref>Hassner, Ron E. War on Sacred Grounds. 2009. Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. p.80 [https://archive.today/20130416041615/http://www.waronsacredgrounds.org/ www.waronsacredgrounds.org]</ref> At the opening of Camp David, Barak warned the Americans he could not accept giving the Palestinians more than a purely symbolic sovereignty over any part of East Jerusalem.<ref name="tragedy_errors_p3" />

The Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over East Jerusalem and its holy sites, in particular, the [[Qibli Mosque|Al-Aqsa Mosque]] and the [[Dome of the Rock]], which are located on the [[Temple Mount]] (Haram al-Sharif), a site holy in both Islam and Judaism, and the dismantling of all Israeli neighborhoods built over the Green Line. The Palestinian position, according to [[Mahmoud Abbas]], at that time Arafat's chief negotiator, was that: "All of East Jerusalem should be returned to Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish Quarter and Western Wall should be placed under Israeli authority, not Israeli sovereignty. An open city and cooperation on municipal services."<ref name=Abbas-090900>[https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/172D1A3302DC903B85256E37005BD90F ''Abu Mazen's speech at the meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council''] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140908061418/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/172D1A3302DC903B85256E37005BD90F |date=8 September 2014 }}, 9 September 2000</ref>

Israel proposed that the Palestinians be granted "custodianship," though not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), with Israel retaining control over the [[Western Wall]], a remnant of the ancient wall that surrounded the Temple Mount, the most sacred site in Judaism outside of the Temple Mount itself. Israeli negotiators also proposed that the Palestinians be granted administration of, but not sovereignty over, the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the [[Old City of Jerusalem|Old City]], with the Jewish and Armenian Quarters remaining in Israeli hands.<ref name=Abbas-090900/><ref name=Barak-interview_Morris>{{cite magazine| url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/jun/13/camp-david-and-after-an-exchange-1-an-interview-wi/| title=Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)| first=Benny| last=Morris| date=13 June 2002| magazine=The New York Review of Books| volume=49| issue=10 }}</ref><ref name=JVL_division>Jewish Virtual Library, July 2000, [https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/jerdivide.html ''The proposed division of Jerusalem'']. Accessed 2013-06-21.  [https://web.archive.org/web/20121008225733/http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/jerdivide.html Archived] 2013-07-02.</ref> Palestinians would be granted administrative control over all Islamic and Christian holy sites, and would be allowed to raise the Palestinian flag over them. A passage linking northern Jerusalem to Islamic and Christian holy sites would be annexed by the Palestinian state. The Israeli team proposed annexing to Israeli Jerusalem [[Israeli settlement|settlement]]s within the West Bank beyond the Green Line, such as [[Ma'ale Adumim]], [[Givat Ze'ev]], and [[Gush Etzion]]. Israel proposed that the Palestinians merge certain outer Arab villages and small cities that had been annexed to Jerusalem just after 1967 (such as [[Abu Dis]], [[al-Eizariya]], [['Anata]], [[A-Ram]], and eastern [[Sawahre]]) to create the city of Al-Quds, which would serve as the capital of Palestine.<ref name=JVL_division/> The historically important Arab neighborhoods such as [[Sheikh Jarrah]], [[Silwan]] and [[At-Tur (Mount of Olives)|at-Tur]] would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Palestinians would only have civilian autonomy. The Palestinians would exercise civil and administrative autonomy in the outer Arab neighborhoods. Israeli neighborhoods within East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty.<ref name=Pressman_visions/><ref name=Barak-interview_Morris/> The holy places in the Old City would enjoy independent religious administration.<ref name=FMEP_Principles>Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), [http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-10/no.-5/principles-of-camp-davids-american-plan ''Principles of Camp David's "American Plan"'']. Settlement Report, Vol. 10 No. 5, September–October 2000. Accessed 2013-07-06.  [https://archive.today/20130705144946/http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-10/no.-5/principles-of-camp-davids-american-plan Archived] 2013-07-11.</ref> In total, Israel demanded that Palestine's territory in East Jerusalem be reduced to eight sections including six small enclaves according to Palestine's delegation to the summit.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/12/HUSSEINI/14528|title=Le compromis manqué de Camp David|date=1 December 2000}}</ref>
 
Palestinians objected to the lack of sovereignty and to the right of Israel to keep Jewish neighborhoods that it built over the Green Line in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians claimed block the contiguity of the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

===Refugees and the right of return===
{{Main|1948 Palestinian exodus|Palestinian right of return}}
Due to the first Arab-Israeli war, a significant number of Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes inside what is now Israel. These [[Palestinian refugee|refugees]] numbered approximately 711,000 to 725,000 at the time. Today, they and their descendants number about four million, comprising about half the [[Palestinian people]]. Since that time, the Palestinians have demanded full implementation of the right of return, meaning that each refugee would be granted the option of returning to his or her home, with property restored, and receive compensation. Israelis asserted that allowing a right of return to Israel proper, rather than to the newly created Palestinian state, would mean an influx of Palestinians that would fundamentally alter the demographics of Israel, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character and its existence as a whole.

At Camp David, the Palestinians maintained their traditional demand that the right of return be implemented. They demanded that Israel recognize the right of all refugees who so wished to settle in Israel, but to address Israel's demographic concerns, they promised that the right of return would be implemented via a mechanism agreed upon by both sides, which would try to channel a majority of refugees away from the option of returning to Israel.<ref>Gilead Sher (2006), p. 102</ref> According to U.S. Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]], some of the Palestinian negotiators were willing to privately discuss a limit on the number of refugees who would be allowed to return to Israel.<ref>Madeleine Albright (2003), p. 618</ref> Palestinians who chose to return to Israel would do so gradually, with Israel absorbing 150,000 refugees every year.

The Israeli negotiators denied that Israel was responsible for the refugee problem, and were concerned that any right of return would pose a threat to Israel's Jewish character. In the Israeli proposal, a maximum of 100,000 refugees would be allowed to return to Israel on the basis of humanitarian considerations or family reunification. All other people classified as Palestinian refugees would be settled in their present place of inhabitance, the Palestinian state, or third-party countries. Israel would help fund their resettlement and absorption. An international fund of $30 billion would be set up, which Israel would help contribute to, along with other countries, that would register claims for compensation of property lost by Palestinian refugees and make payments within the limits of its resources.<ref>Gilead Sher (2006), p. 101 and pp. 247–249.</ref>

===Israeli control over a future Palestinian state===
The Israeli negotiators proposed that Israel be allowed to set up radar stations inside the Palestinian state, and be allowed to use its airspace. Israel also wanted the right to deploy troops on Palestinian territory in the event of an emergency, and the stationing of an international force in the Jordan Valley. Palestinian authorities would maintain control of border crossings under temporary Israeli observation. Israel would maintain a permanent security presence along 15% of the Palestinian-Jordanian border.<ref name=rossmap>[https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/rossmap2.html "Actual Proposal Offered At Camp David"]. Map from Dennis Ross book, ''The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace.'' NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.</ref> Israel also demanded that the Palestinian state be demilitarized with the exception of its paramilitary security forces, that it would not make alliances without Israeli approval or allow the introduction of foreign forces west of the Jordan River, and that it dismantle terrorist groups.<ref>Gilead Sher (2006), pp. 110–111</ref> One of Israel's strongest demands was that Arafat declare the conflict over, and make no further demands. Israel also wanted water resources in the West Bank to be shared by both sides and remain under Israeli management.