Editing Treaty of Versailles (section)

==Reactions==
===Britain===
[[File:Evening News placard Versailles Treaty signed June 28 1919.jpg|thumb|A British news placard announcing the signing of the peace treaty|upright|alt=An off white poster with bold black letters.]]

The delegates of the Commonwealth and British Government had mixed thoughts on the treaty, with some seeing the French policy as being greedy and vindictive.{{sfn|Lovin|1997|pp=9, 96}}{{sfn|Stevenson|1998|p=10}} Lloyd George and his private secretary [[Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian|Philip Kerr]] believed in the treaty, although they also felt that the French would keep Europe in a constant state of turmoil by attempting to enforce the treaty.{{sfn|Lovin|1997|pp=9, 96}} Delegate [[Harold Nicolson]] wrote "are we making a good peace?", while General [[Jan Smuts]] (a member of the [[Union of South Africa|South African]] delegation) wrote to Lloyd-George, before the signing, that the treaty was unstable and declared "Are we in our sober senses or suffering from shellshock? What has become of Wilson's 14 points?" He wanted the Germans not be made to sign at the "point of the bayonet".{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=26}}{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=26}}
Smuts issued a statement condemning the treaty and regretting that the promises of "a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty". Lord [[Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood|Robert Cecil]] said that many within the [[Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office|Foreign Office]] were disappointed by the treaty.{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=26}} The treaty received widespread approval from the general public. [[Bernadotte Everly Schmitt|Bernadotte Schmitt]] wrote that the "average Englishman ... thought Germany got only what it deserved" as a result of the treaty,{{sfn|Schmitt|1960|p=104}} but public opinion changed as German complaints mounted.{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=22}}

Former wartime British Prime Minister [[H. H. Asquith]] and the [[Independent Liberal Party (UK, 1918)|Independent Liberal]] opposition in the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|British Parliament]] after the [[1918 United Kingdom general election|1918 general election]] believed the treaty was too punitive. Asquith campaigned against it while running for another [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] seat in the [[1920 Paisley by-election]].{{sfn|Campbell|2010|p=181}}

Prime Minister [[Ramsay MacDonald]], following the German [[Remilitarization of the Rhineland|re-militarisation of the Rhineland]] in 1936, stated that he was "pleased" that the treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".{{sfn|Stevenson|1998|p=10}}

==== Status of British Dominions ====
The Treaty of Versailles was an important step in the status of the [[Dominion|British Dominions]] under [[international law]]. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa had each made significant contributions to the British war effort, but as separate countries, rather than as British colonies. India also made a substantial troop contribution, although under direct British control, unlike the Dominions. The four Dominions and India all signed the Treaty separately from Britain,<ref name="Signatures and Protocol" group=n. /> a clear recognition by the international community that the Dominions were no longer British colonies. "Their status defied exact analysis by both international and constitutional lawyers, but it was clear that they were no longer regarded simply as colonies of Britain."{{sfn|Scott|1944|pp=34–49}} By signing the Treaty individually, the four Dominions and India also were [[Member states of the League of Nations#10 January 1920: founding members|founding members of the League of Nations]] in their own right, rather than simply as part of the British Empire.

===France===
The signing of the treaty was met with roars of approval, singing, and dancing from a crowd outside the Palace of Versailles. In Paris proper, people rejoiced at the official end of the war,{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=75}} the return of [[Alsace]] and [[Lorraine]] to France, and that Germany had agreed to pay reparations.{{sfn|Sontag|1971|p=22}}

While France ratified the treaty and was active in the League, the jubilant mood soon gave way to a political backlash for Clemenceau. The [[Politics of France#The Right|French Right]] saw the treaty as being too lenient and saw it as failing to achieve all of France's demands. [[Politics of France#The Left|Left]]-wing politicians attacked the treaty and Clemenceau for being too harsh (the latter turning into a ritual condemnation of the treaty, for politicians remarking on French foreign affairs, as late as August 1939). [[Marshal of France|Marshal]] [[Ferdinand Foch]] stated "this (treaty) is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."; a criticism over the failure to annex the Rhineland and for compromising French security for the benefit of the United States and Britain.{{sfn|Tucker|Roberts|2005|p=426}}{{sfn|Schmitt|1960|p=104}}{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=22}}{{sfn|Sontag|1971|p=22}}{{sfn|Tucker|1999|p=191}}{{sfn|Ripsman|2004|p=110}}{{sfn|Henig|1995|p=52}} When Clemenceau stood for election as [[President of France]] in January 1920, he was defeated.{{sfn|Henig|1995|p=52}}

===Italy===
Reaction in the [[Kingdom of Italy]] to the treaty was extremely negative. The country had suffered high casualties, yet failed to achieve most of its major war goals, notably gaining control of the [[Dalmatian coast]] and [[Fiume]]. President Wilson rejected Italy's claims on the basis of "national self-determination." For their part, Britain and France—who had been forced in the war's latter stages to divert their own troops to the Italian front to stave off collapse—were disinclined to support Italy's position at the peace conference. Differences in negotiating strategy between Premier [[Vittorio Orlando]] and Foreign Minister [[Sidney Sonnino]] further undermined Italy's position at the conference. A furious Vittorio Orlando suffered a nervous collapse and at one point walked out of the conference (though he later returned). He lost his position as prime minister just a week before the treaty was scheduled to be signed, effectively ending his active political career. Anger and dismay over the treaty's provisions helped pave the way for the establishment of [[Benito Mussolini]]'s [[Fascist Italy (1922–1943)|Fascist dictatorship]] three years later.

===Portugal===
[[Portugal in World War I|Portugal]] entered the war on the Allied side in 1916 primarily to ensure the security of its [[Portuguese Empire|African colonies]], which were threatened with seizure by both Britain and Germany. To this extent, she succeeded in her war aims. The treaty recognized Portuguese sovereignty over these areas and awarded her small portions of Germany's bordering overseas colonies, including the [[Kionga Triangle]]. Otherwise, Portugal gained little at the peace conference. Her promised share of German reparations never materialized, and a seat she coveted on the executive council of the new [[League of Nations]] went instead to [[Spain]]—which had remained neutral in the war. In the end, Portugal ratified the treaty, but got little out of the war, which cost more than 8,000 [[Portuguese Armed Forces]] troops and as many as 100,000 of her African colonial subjects their lives.{{sfn|de Meneses|n.d.}}

===United States===
[[File:Refusing to give the lady a seat - Rollin Kirby Trim.jpg|thumb|upright|Senators [[William Edgar Borah|Borah]], [[Henry Cabot Lodge|Lodge]] and [[Hiram Johnson|Johnson]] refuse Lady Peace a seat, referring to efforts by Republican isolationists to block ratification of the Treaty of Versailles establishing the [[League of Nations]].]]

After the Versailles conference, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson claimed that "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!"{{efn-lr|President Woodrow Wilson speaking on the League of Nations to a luncheon audience in Portland OR. 66th Cong., 1st sess. Senate Documents: Addresses of President Wilson (May–November 1919), vol. 11, no. 120, p. 206.}} However, Wilson had refused to bring any leading members of the Republican party, led by [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], into the talks. The Republicans controlled the [[United States Senate]] after the election of 1918, and were outraged by Wilson's refusal to discuss the war with them. The senators were divided into multiple positions on the Versailles question. It proved possible to build a majority coalition, but impossible to build a two-thirds coalition that was needed to pass a treaty.{{sfn|Bailey|1945}}

A discontent bloc of 12–18 "[[Irreconcilables]]", mostly Republicans but also representatives of the Irish and German Democrats, fiercely opposed the treaty. One bloc of Democrats strongly supported the Versailles Treaty, even with reservations added by Lodge. A second group of Democrats supported the treaty but followed Wilson in opposing any amendments or reservations. The largest bloc, led by Senator Lodge,{{sfn|Widenor|1980}} comprised a majority of the Republicans. They wanted a treaty with "reservations", especially on Article 10, so that the League of Nations could not draw the US into war without the consent of the US Congress.{{sfn|Stone|1973}} All of the Irreconcilables were bitter enemies of President Wilson, and he launched a nationwide speaking tour in the summer of 1919 to refute them. But Wilson collapsed midway with a serious stroke that effectively ruined his leadership skills.{{sfn|Cooper|2011|loc=ch 22–23}}

The closest the treaty came to passage was on 19 November 1919, as Lodge and his Republicans formed a coalition with the pro-treaty Democrats, and were close to a two-thirds majority for a Treaty with reservations, but Wilson rejected this compromise and enough Democrats followed his lead to end the chances of ratification permanently. Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and the [[German Americans]] were intensely opposed to the treaty, saying it favored the British.{{sfn|Duff|1968|pp=582–598}}

After Wilson's presidency, his successor Republican President [[Warren G. Harding]] continued American opposition to the formation of the League of Nations. Congress subsequently passed the [[Knox–Porter Resolution]] bringing a formal end to hostilities between the United States and the [[Central Powers]]. It was signed into law by President Harding on 2 July 1921.{{sfn|Wimer|Wimer|1967|pp=13–24}}{{sfn|''The New York Times''|1921}} Soon after, the [[U.S.–German Peace Treaty (1921)|US–German Peace Treaty of 1921]] was signed in Berlin on 25 August 1921. Article 1 of this treaty obliged the German government to grant to the U.S. government all rights and privileges that were enjoyed by the other Allies that had ratified the Versailles treaty. Two similar treaties were signed with [[U.S.–Austrian Peace Treaty (1921)|Austria]] and [[U.S.–Hungarian Peace Treaty (1921)|Hungary]] on 24 and 29 August 1921, in Vienna and Budapest respectively.

====Edward House's views====
Wilson's former friend [[Edward Mandell House]], present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919:

<blockquote>I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris.{{sfn|Schiff|1996}}</blockquote>

===China===
Many in China felt betrayed as the German [[Concession (territory)|territory]] in China was handed to Japan. [[Wellington Koo]] refused to sign the treaty and the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was the only nation that did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony. The sense of betrayal led to great demonstrations in China such as the [[May Fourth Movement|May 4th movement]]. There was immense dissatisfaction with [[Duan Qirui]]'s government, which had secretly negotiated with the Japanese in order to secure loans to fund their military campaigns against the south. On 12 June 1919, the Chinese cabinet was forced to resign and the government instructed its delegation at Versailles not to sign the treaty.{{sfn|Dreyer|2015|p=60}}{{sfn|EB: May Fourth Movement}} As a result, relations with the [[Western world]] deteriorated.{{sfn|Arnander|Wood|2016}}

===Germany===
{{See also|Stab-in-the-back legend}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R01213, Versailles, deutsche Verhandlungdelegation.jpg|thumb|German delegates in Versailles: Professor [[Walther Schücking]], {{lang|de|Reichspostminister}} Johannes Giesberts, Justice Minister [[Otto Landsberg]], Foreign Minister [[Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau]], Prussian State President Robert Leinert, and financial advisor [[Carl Melchior]]]]

On 29 April, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister [[Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau]] arrived in Versailles. On 7 May, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "[[War Guilt Clause]]", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We can sense the full force of hatred that confronts us here.&nbsp;... You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie."{{efn-lr|"wir kennen die Wucht des Hasses, die uns hier entgegentritt&nbsp;...  Es wird von uns verlangt, daß wir uns als die allein Schuldigen am Kriege bekennen; ein solches Bekenntnis wäre in meinem Munde eine Lüge." {{harv|Weimarer Republik|n.d.}}}}
Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour", soon afterwards withdrawing from the proceedings of the peace conference.{{sfn|Woods|2019|p=18}}

Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty. The so-called "[[War Guilt Clause]]" that they saw as blaming Germany for starting the war was seen as an insult to the nation's honour. The clauses calling on the Germans to hand over alleged war criminals also caused deep offence, as many of those accused were seen as heroes, and also because the Allies were seen as applying one-sided justice.{{sfn|De Zayas|1989|p=5}}{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=281}} They referred to the treaty as "the ''[[Diktat]]''" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.{{sfn|Château de Versailles|2016}} Germany's first democratically elected head of government, [[Philipp Scheidemann]], resigned rather than sign the treaty. In an emotional and polemical address to the [[Weimar National Assembly]] on 12 May 1919, he called the treaty a "horrific and murderous witch's hammer",{{sfn|Probst|2019}} and exclaimed: {{blockquote|Which hand would not shrivel, that shackled itself and us in such a way?{{sfn|W-R: "shrivelled hand" speech}}{{sfn|Probst|2019}}}} At the end of his speech, Scheidemann stated that, in the government's opinion, the treaty was unacceptable.{{sfn|W-R: "shrivelled hand" speech}}

[[File:Mass demonstration in front of the Reichstag against the Treaty of Versailles.jpg|thumb|left|Demonstration against the treaty in front of the [[Reichstag building|''Reichstag'']]]]
After Scheidemann's resignation, a new coalition government was formed under [[Gustav Bauer]]. [[President of Germany (1919–1945)|President]] [[Friedrich Ebert]] knew that Germany was in an impossible situation. Although he shared his countrymen's disgust with the treaty, he was sober enough to consider the possibility that the government would not be in a position to reject it. He believed that if Germany refused to sign the treaty, the Allies would invade Germany from the west—and there was no guarantee that the army would be able to make a stand in the event of an invasion. With this in mind, he asked [[Field Marshal (Germany)|Field Marshal]] [[Paul von Hindenburg]] if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies resumed the war. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff, [[Wilhelm Groener]]—concluded the army could not resume the war even on a limited scale. But rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener inform the government that the army would be in an untenable position in the event of renewed hostilities.{{sfn|Pinson|1964|pp=397 ff}}

Upon receiving Hindenburg's answer, the Bauer government recommended signing the treaty with the proviso that the "war-guilt" clause and the articles that required the extradition of war criminals and of the former Emperor be excluded. After the Allies refused anything other than full acceptance of the treaty, the National Assembly voted in favour of signing it by 237 to 138, with five abstentions (there were 421 delegates in total). The result was wired to Clemenceau just hours before the deadline. The Bauer government included the following statement with the acceptance:{{sfn|Hirschfeld|Krumeich|2013|pp=288–289}}<blockquote>The honour of the German people will not be affected by an act of violence. After the appalling suffering of the last four years, the German people lack any means to defend it externally. Therefore, yielding to overwhelming force and without abandoning its view of the outrageous injustice of the peace terms, the Government of the German Republic declares that it is prepared to accept and sign the peace terms imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.</blockquote>

Foreign minister [[Hermann Müller (politician, born 1876)|Hermann Müller]] and colonial minister [[Johannes Bell]] travelled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on 9 July by a vote of 209 to 116.{{sfn|Pinson|1964|pp=397 ff}}

===Japan===
[[File:Medal issued by Japan commemorating the Treaty of Versailles, struck 1919.jpg|thumb|right|Medal issued by the Japanese authorities in 1919, commemorating the Treaty of Versailles. '''Obv''': Flags of the five allies of World War&nbsp;I. '''Rev''': Peace standing in Oriental attire with the [[Palace of Versailles]] in the background]]

The disenfranchised and often colonized "non-white" world held high expectations that a new order would open up an unheralded opportunity to have a principle of racial equality recognized by the leading global powers.{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}} [[Diplomatic history of Japan|Japanese diplomacy]] had bitter memories of the rhetoric of the [[Yellow Peril]], and the arrogance, underwritten by the assumptions about a [[White Man's Burden]], memories aggravated by the rise of [[racial discrimination]] against their business men, severe immigration restrictions on Asiatics, and court judgments hostile to Japanese interests, which characterized Western states' treatment of their nationals.{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}} Japan's delegation, among whose plenipotentiaries figured [[Makino Nobuaki|Baron Makino]] and Ambassador [[Chinda Sutemi]], was led by its [[Genrō|elder statesman]] [[Saionji Kinmochi]].

Versailles represented a chance to overturn this imposed inferiority, whose tensions were strengthened particularly in [[Japan–United States relations|Japan's relationship with the United States]] during WW1.{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}} Confidence in their growing industrial strength, and conquest of [[Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory|Germany's Far East possessions]], together with their proven fidelity to the [[Allies of World War I|Entente]] would, it was thought, allow them finally to take their rightful place among the victorious Great Powers.{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}} They solicited support especially from the American delegation to obtain recognition for the principle of [[racial equality]] at the League of Nations Commission. Their proposals to this end were consistently rebuffed by British, French, American and Australian diplomats, who were all sensitive to their respective countries' internal pressures. Wilson himself was an enactor of [[Racial segregation in the United States|segregationist policies]] in the United States, Clemenceau openly ridiculed them, [[Arthur Balfour]] considered Africans inferior to Europeans – equality was only true of people within particular nations – while [[Billy Hughes|William Hughes]], adopting a "slap the Jap" attitude, was a vocal defender of a [[White Australia policy]].{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}}

Japan's attempt, buttressed by the Chinese emissary [[Wellington Koo]] among others, to incorporate a [[Racial Equality Proposal]] in the treaty, had broad support, but was effectively declined when it was rejected by the United States, Great Britain and Australia,{{sfn|Lauren|1978|pp=257–278}} despite a powerfully persuasive speech delivered by Makino.{{efn-lr|"The whole purpose of the league", began Makino, was "to regulate the conduct of nations and peoples toward one another, according to a higher moral standard than has reigned in the past, and to administer justice throughout the world." In this regard, the wrongs of racial discrimination have been, and continue to be, the source of "profound resentment on the part of large numbers of the human race", directly affecting their rights and their pride. Many nations fought in the recent war to create a new international order, he said, and the hopes of their nationals now have risen to new heights with victory. Given the objectives of the league, the wrongs of the past, and the aspirations of the future, stated Makino, the leaders of the world gathered in Paris should openly declare their support for at least "the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals" {{harv|Lauren|1978|p=270}}.}}

Japan itself both prior to and during WW1 had embarked on a vigorous expansion of continental colonialism, whose aims were justified in terms of uniting [[Asian people|Asians]], such as [[Koreans]] and [[Chinese people|Chinese]], who were seen as belonging to the same race and culture as the Japanese ({{lang|ja-Latn|dōbun dōshǖ}}: {{lang|ja|同文同種}}), though it was geared to subordinating them to Japan's interests in a [[paternalistic]] manner. Aspiring to be accepted as a world actor with similar status to the traditional Western powers, Japan envisaged an Asian [[Monroe Doctrine]], where Japan's proper sphere of geostrategic interests in Asia would be recognized. Some years earlier, Japan secured both British and French support for its claims to inherit rights that Germany had exercised both in China and in the [[Pacific Ocean]] north of the [[Equator]]. American policy experts, unaware of these secret agreements, nonetheless suggested that Japan had adopted a [[Prussia]]n model that would imperil China's own search for autonomy, and these considerations influenced Wilson.{{sfn|Kawamura|1997|pp=507–511}}

Nonetheless Japan emerged from the Treaty with territorial gains, including the [[Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory]] and all the territories of [[German New Guinea]] north of the Equator, forming the [[South Seas Mandate]].