Editing Tragedy of the commons (section)

==Commons dilemma==
{{anchor|The Commons Dilemma}}
The ''commons dilemma'' is a specific class of [[social dilemma]] in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the [[common good]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Druzin |first=Bryan |title=A Plan to strengthen the Paris Agreement |url=https://works.bepress.com/bryan_druzin/18/ |journal=Fordham Law Review |volume=84 |pages=19–20|year=2016 }}</ref> In academia, a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including ''resource dilemma'', ''take-some dilemma'', and ''[[common pool resource]]''.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Talloen|first1=Joachim|last2=Chapman|first2=Gretchen B.|date=2014|title=From Red Potato Chips to Greener Forests: Tackling a Common Pool Resource Dilemma with Partitions|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/e573552014-013|access-date=2021-05-24|website=PsycEXTRA Dataset|doi=10.1037/e573552014-013}}</ref>

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or [[over-harvest]] common resources in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to management of commons.<ref>{{Citation|title=The open source software movement, the commons movement and seeds: what they have in common{{snd}} biological open source and protected commons|date=2012-03-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203155257-18|work=Agrobiodiversity and the Law|pages=277–290|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203155257-18|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |isbn=978-0-203-15525-7|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>

In [[game theory]], which constructs mathematical models for individuals' behavior in strategic situations, the corresponding "game", developed by Hardin, is known as the Commonize Costs&nbsp;– Privatize Profits Game ([[CC–PP game]]).<ref>{{Citation|title=Game Theory and the Law Introduction|date=2016-04-19|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781584888444-14|work=Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior|pages=191–214|publisher=Chapman and Hall/CRC|doi=10.1201/9781584888444-14|isbn=978-0-429-13663-4|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref>

===Psychological factors===
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick (2002), in a review of the experimental research on cooperation in commons dilemmas, identify nine classes of independent variables that influence cooperation in commons dilemmas: social motives, gender, payoff structure, uncertainty, power and status, group size, communication, causes, and frames.<ref>{{Citation|last=Kopelman|first=Shirli|title=The Herdsman and the Sheep, Mouton, or Kivsa? The Influence of Group Culture on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas|date=2008|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_11|work=New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas|pages=177–188|place=Boston|publisher=Springer US|doi=10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_11|hdl=2027.42/49422|isbn=978-0-387-72595-6|access-date=2021-05-25|hdl-access=free}}</ref> They organize these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goryńska|first1=Ewa|last2=Winiewski|first2=Mikołaj|last3=Zajenkowski|first3=Marcin|date=April 2015|title=Situational factors and personality traits as determinants of college students' mood|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.12.027|journal=Personality and Individual Differences|volume=77|pages=1–6|doi=10.1016/j.paid.2014.12.027|issn=0191-8869}}</ref> Situational factors include both the task (social and decision structure) and the perception of the task.{{sfn|Kopelman| Weber|Messick|2002}}

Empirical findings support the theoretical argument that the cultural group is a critical factor that needs to be studied in the context of situational variables.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hartgen|first=David T.|date=December 1974|title=Attitudinal and situational variables influencing urban mode choice: Some empirical findings|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00167967|journal=Transportation|volume=3|issue=4|pages=377–392|doi=10.1007/bf00167967|s2cid=154764280|issn=0049-4488}}</ref><ref>Gelfand & Dyer, 2000</ref> Rather than behaving in line with economic incentives, people are likely to approach the decision to cooperate with an appropriateness framework.{{sfn|Weber|Kopelman|Messick|2004}} An expanded, four factor model of the Logic of Appropriateness,{{sfn|Kopelman|2009}}<ref name="Myers2012">{{cite journal |last1=Myers |first1=Christopher G. |last2=Kopelman |first2=Shirli |title=Cooperation between Cultures in the Commons: Implications for Cross-Cultural Interactions |journal=Academy of Management Proceedings |date=2012 |volume=2012 |issue=1 |page=11042 |doi=10.5465/AMBPP.2012.11042abstract |url=https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/AMBPP.2012.11042abstract |location=Briarcliff Manor, NY |issn=2151-6561}}</ref> suggests that the cooperation is better explained by the question: "What does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?"

===Strategic factors===
[[Strategy|Strategic]] factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often-studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence&nbsp;– first, second, third, etc.<ref>{{Citation|last=Manheim|first=Jarol B.|title=All of the People All the Time|chapter=All of the People, All the Time |date=2020-09-10|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003069768-11|pages=235–241|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781003069768-11|isbn=978-1-003-06976-8|s2cid=242175297|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> There is a clear order effect in the latter games: the harvests of those who come first&nbsp;– the leaders&nbsp;– are higher than the harvest of those coming later&nbsp;– the followers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Doebel |first=Sabine |journal=Psychological Science |type=preprint |date=2019-04-24 |title=Good things come to those who wait: Delaying gratification likely does matter for later achievement |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kbyna |access-date=2021-05-25 |doi=10.31234/osf.io/kbyna |s2cid=241276961}}</ref> The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. With sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule, whereas with simultaneous play people may adopt an equality rule.<ref>{{cite book | doi=10.1007/1-4020-0612-8_330 | chapter=First Come/First Served Rule (FCFS) | title=Encyclopedia of Production and Manufacturing Management | date=2000 | page=207 | isbn=978-0-7923-8630-8 | last1=Swamidass | first1=P. M. }}</ref> Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=December 2004|title=India's conventional build-up|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788041002|journal=Strategic Comments|volume=10|issue=10|pages=1–2|doi=10.1080/1356788041002|s2cid=219695926|issn=1356-7888}}</ref> Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover, those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=July 1956|title=Table 14. Graduates of each public and private medical college in private practice in the United States who are practicing in communities of less than 25,000 and those whose prior residence was in communities of less than 25,000, 1945 class|journal=Academic Medicine|volume=1|issue=Supplement|pages=51–53|doi=10.1097/00001888-195607001-00015|issn=1040-2446|doi-access=free}}</ref>

===Structural factors===
Hardin stated in his analysis of the tragedy of the commons that "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."{{sfn|Hardin|1968|p=1244}} One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the common.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=July 2014|title=Access Audiology Tackles Auditory Processing and Common Core|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/leader.an2.19072014.58|journal=The ASHA Leader|volume=19|issue=7|pages=58|doi=10.1044/leader.an2.19072014.58|issn=1085-9586}}</ref> Groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Clarke|first=Harry|title=Optimal Depletion when Development Makes an Unused Resource Stock More Valuable|date=March 1995|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00194.x|journal=Natural Resource Modeling|volume=9|issue=2|pages=99–119|doi=10.1111/j.1939-7445.1995.tb00194.x|bibcode=1995NRM.....9...99C |issn=0890-8575}}</ref> Groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=ZHANG|first1=Zheming|last2=JIN|first2=Shenghua|last3=WU|first3=Song|last4=ZHOU|first4=Xiang|date=2013-12-09|title=The Influence of Leader on Group Member's Cooperation in Common Resource Dilemmas|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1041.2013.00453|journal=Acta Psychologica Sinica|volume=45|issue=4|pages=453–465|doi=10.3724/sp.j.1041.2013.00453|s2cid=147561539 |issn=0439-755X}}</ref> A general aversion to autocratic [[leadership]] exists, although it may be an effective solution, possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vassileva|first=Radosveta|date=2021|title=COVID-19 in Autocratic Bulgaria: How the Anti-Corruption Protests Temporarily Limited the Abuse of Questionable Legislation|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3807883|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3807883|s2cid=233708722|issn=1556-5068}}</ref>

The provision of rewards and punishments may also be effective in preserving common resources.<ref name="Rewards and punishments">{{Citation|title=Rewards and punishments|date=2002-01-04|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203130087-12|work=Effective Classroom Management|pages=107–122|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203130087-12|isbn=978-0-203-13008-7|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation&nbsp;– for example, through installing water and electricity meters in houses.<ref name="Rewards and punishments"/> Selective rewards work, provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Van Vugt |first1=M. |title=How a Structural Solution to a Real-World Social Dilemma Failed: A Field Experiment on the First Carpool Lane in Europe |last2=Van Lange |first2=P. A. M. |last3=Meertens |first3=R. M. |last4=Joireman |first4=J. A. |year=1996 |url=http://www.professormarkvanvugt.com/images/files/HowaStructuralSolutiontoaRealWorldSocialDilemmaFailed-SocialPsychologyQuarterly-1996.pdf |journal=Social Psychology Quarterly |volume=59 |issue=4 |pages=364–374 |doi=10.2307/2787077 |jstor=2787077 |citeseerx=10.1.1.318.656 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809021751/http://www.professormarkvanvugt.com/images/files/HowaStructuralSolutiontoaRealWorldSocialDilemmaFailed-SocialPsychologyQuarterly-1996.pdf |archive-date=2017-08-09 }}</ref> The rewards do not have to be tangible. In Canada, utilities considered putting "smiley faces" on electricity bills of customers below the average consumption of that customer's neighborhood.<ref>{{Cite news |url= http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2009/06/14/9791526-sun.html |title=Put on a happy face, lower your electric bill |newspaper= Toronto Sun |date=2009-06-17 |access-date=2020-02-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090617071015/http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2009/06/14/9791526-sun.html |archive-date=2009-06-17 }}</ref>