Editing Semantics (section)

=== Others ===
[[Truth-conditional semantics]] analyzes the meaning of sentences in terms of their truth conditions. According to this view, to understand a sentence means to know what the world needs to be like for the sentence to be true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dummett|2008|pp=45–46}} | {{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}} }}</ref> Truth conditions can themselves be expressed through [[possible worlds]]. For example, the sentence "[[Hillary Clinton]] won the [[2016 American presidential election]]" is false in the actual world but there are some possible worlds in which it is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=§ 1. Reasons for Introducing Impossible Worlds}}</ref> The extension of a sentence can be interpreted as its truth value while its intension is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}}</ref> Truth-conditional semantics is closely related to [[Verificationism|verificationist theories]], which introduce the additional idea that there should be some kind of verification procedure to assess whether a sentence is true. They state that the meaning of a sentence consists in the method to verify it or in the circumstances that justify it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Morris|Preti|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p_3LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA369 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}} | {{harvnb|Lepore|2009|p=1027}} }}</ref> For instance, scientific claims often make predictions, which can be used to confirm or disconfirm them using [[observation]].<ref>{{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}}</ref> According to verificationism, sentences that can neither be verified nor falsified are meaningless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morris|Preti|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p_3LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA369 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}} }}</ref>

The [[Philosophical Investigations#Meaning as use|use theory]] states that the meaning of an expression is given by the way it is utilized. This view was first introduced by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], who understood language as a collection of [[language game]]s. The meaning of expressions depends on how they are used inside a game and the same expression may have different meanings in different games.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=23–24}} | {{harvnb|Strauven|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eYdIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 78]}} }}</ref> Some versions of this theory identify meaning directly with patterns of regular use.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.4 Regularities in Use}}</ref> Others focus on [[social norm]]s and [[Convention (norm)|conventions]] by additionally taking into account whether a certain use is considered appropriate in a given society.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.5 Social Norms}}</ref>

[[Inferential role semantics|Inferentialist semantics]], also called conceptual role semantics, holds that the meaning of an expression is given by the role it plays in the premises and conclusions of good [[inference]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.2.3 Inferentialist Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Whiting|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. A Theory of Linguistic Meaning}} | {{harvnb|Hess|2022|loc=§ Abstract, § 1 Introduction}} }}</ref> For example, one can infer from "x is a male sibling" that "x is a brother" and one can infer from "x is a brother" that "x has parents". According to inferentialist semantics, the meaning of the word ''brother'' is determined by these and all similar inferences that can be drawn.<ref>{{harvnb|Whiting|loc=§ 1a. A Theory of Linguistic Meaning}}</ref>