Editing Precautionary principle (section)

=== The precautionary dilemma ===
The most commonly pressed objection to the precautionary principle ties together two of the above objections into the form of a dilemma.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Steel|first=Daniel|date=2013|title=The Precautionary Principle and the Dilemma Objection|journal=Ethics, Policy and Environment: A Journal of Philosophy and Geography|volume=16|issue=3|pages=321–340|doi=10.1080/21550085.2013.844570|s2cid=56089605}}</ref><ref name="Sunstein" /><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Sunstein|first=Cass|date=2005|title=The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for Decision Making|journal=The Economists' Voice|volume=2|issue=2|page=8|doi=10.2202/1553-3832.1079|s2cid=52241337|url=https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/1/29998410/1/PrecautionaryPrinciple.pdf}}</ref> This maintains that, of the two available interpretations of the principle, neither are plausible: weak formulations (which hold that precaution in the face of uncertain harms is permissible) are trivial, while strong formulations (which hold that precaution in the face of uncertain harms is ''required'') are incoherent.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name="Sunstein" /> On the first horn of the dilemma [[Cass Sunstein]] states:{{blockquote|The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle state a truism—uncontroversial in principle and necessary in practice only to combat public confusion or the self-interested claims of private groups demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no rational society requires.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=Laws of fear|last=Sunstein|first=Cass|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2005|location=Cambridge}}</ref>{{rp|24}}}} If all that the (weak) principle states is that it is permissible to act in a precautionary manner where there is a possible risk of harm, then it constitutes a trivial truism and thus fails to be useful.

If we formulate the principle in the stronger sense however, it looks like it rules out ''all'' courses of action, including the precautionary measures it is intended to advocate. This is because, if we stipulate that precaution is ''required'' in the face of uncertain harms, and precautionary measures also carry a risk of harm, the precautionary principle can both demand and prohibit action at the same time. The risk of a policy resulting in catastrophic harm is always ''possible''. For example: prohibiting [[genetically modified crops]] risks significantly reduced food production; placing a moratorium on nuclear power risks an over-reliance on coal that could lead to more air pollution; implementing extreme measures to slow global warming risks impoverishment and bad health outcomes for some people.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /> The strong version of the precautionary principle, in that "[i]t bans the very steps that it requires",<ref name=":3" />{{rp|26}} thus fails to be coherent. As Sunstein states, it is not protective, it is "paralyzing".<ref name=":3" />{{rp|34}}