Editing Pleasure (section)

== Psychology ==
Pleasure is often regarded as a bipolar construct, meaning that the two ends of the spectrum from pleasure to suffering are mutually exclusive. That is part of the circumplex model of affect.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = The circumplex model of affect: An integrative approach to affective neuroscience, cognitive development, and psychopathology|journal = Development and Psychopathology|date = 2005-09-01|issn = 1469-2198|pmc = 2367156|pmid = 16262989|pages = 715–734|volume = 17|issue = 3|doi = 10.1017/S0954579405050340|first1 = Jonathan|last1 = Posner|first2 = James A.|last2 = Russell|first3 = Bradley S.|last3 = Peterson| doi-broken-date=24 February 2025 }}</ref> Yet, some lines of research suggest that people do experience pleasure and suffering at the same time, giving rise to so-called mixed feelings.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Pleasure, displeasure, and mixed feelings: Are semantic opposites mutually exclusive?|journal = Cognition and Emotion|date = 2001-01-01|issn = 0269-9931|pages = 81–97|volume = 15|issue = 1|doi = 10.1080/02699930126097|first = Ulrich|last = Schimmack|s2cid = 144572285}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = Response latencies of pleasure and displeasure ratings: Further evidence for mixed feelings|journal = Cognition and Emotion|date = 2005-08-01|issn = 0269-9931|pages = 671–691|volume = 19|issue = 5|doi = 10.1080/02699930541000020|first = Ulrich|last = Schimmack|s2cid = 144217149}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title = How Are You Feeling? Revisiting the Quantification of Emotional Qualia|journal = Psychological Science|date = 2013-08-01|issn = 0956-7976|pmid = 23824581|pages = 1503–1511|volume = 24|issue = 8|doi = 10.1177/0956797613475456|language = en|first1 = Assaf|last1 = Kron|first2 = Ariel|last2 = Goldstein|first3 = Daniel Hyuk-Joon|last3 = Lee|first4 = Katherine|last4 = Gardhouse|first5 = Adam Keith|last5 = Anderson|s2cid = 403233}}</ref> Pleasure is considered one of the core dimensions of emotion. It can be described as the positive evaluation that forms the basis for several more elaborate evaluations such as "agreeable" or "nice". As such, pleasure is an [[Affect (psychology)|affect]] and not an [[emotion]], as it forms one component of several different emotions.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Pleasures of the Brain|last = Frijda|first = Nico F.|publisher = Oxford University Press|year = 2010|pages = 99|chapter = On the Nature and Function of Pleasure|editor-last = Kringelbach|editor-first = Morten L.|editor-last2 = Berridge|editor-first2 = Kent C.}}</ref> The clinical condition of being unable to experience pleasure from usually enjoyable activities is called [[anhedonia]]. An active aversion to obtaining pleasure is called [[hedonophobia]].

===Pleasure and belief===
The degree to which something or someone is experienced as pleasurable not only depends on its objective attributes (appearance, sound, taste, texture, etc.), but on beliefs about its history, about the circumstances of its creation, about its rarity, fame, or price, and on other non-intrinsic attributes, such as the social status or identity it conveys.  For example, a sweater that has been worn by a celebrity is more desired than an otherwise identical sweater that has not, though considerably less so if it has been washed.<ref name="bloom">Paul Bloom. ''How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like'' (2010) 280 pages. Draws on neuroscience, philosophy, child-development research, and behavioral economics in a study of our desires, attractions, and tastes.</ref>

=== Motivation and behavior ===
Pleasure-seeking ''behavior'' is a common phenomenon and may indeed dominate our conduct at times. The thesis of [[psychological hedonism]] generalizes this insight by holding that all our actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain.<ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Hedonism}}</ref><ref name="Borchert2"/> This is usually understood in combination with [[egoism]], i.e. that each person only aims at her own happiness.<ref name="Britannica"/> Our actions rely on beliefs about what causes pleasure. False beliefs may mislead us and thus our actions may fail to result in pleasure, but even failed actions are ''motivated'' by considerations of pleasure, according to ''psychological hedonism''.<ref name="Moore">{{cite web |last1=Moore |first1=Andrew |title=Hedonism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The [[paradox of hedonism]] states that pleasure-seeking behavior commonly fails also in another way. It asserts that being motivated by pleasure is self-defeating in the sense that it leads to less actual pleasure than following other motives.<ref name="Moore"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dietz |first1=Alexander |title=Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=2019 |volume=97 |issue=3 |pages=497–510 |doi=10.1080/00048402.2018.1483409 |s2cid=171459875 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DIEETP}}</ref>

[[Sigmund Freud]] formulated his [[Pleasure principle (psychology)|pleasure principle]] in order to account for the effect pleasure has on our behavior. It states that there is a strong, inborn tendency of our mental life to seek immediate gratification whenever an opportunity presents itself.<ref name="Lopez"/> This tendency is opposed by the [[reality principle]], which constitutes a learned capacity to delay immediate gratification in order to take the real consequences of our actions into account.<ref>{{cite book |last1=De Mijolla |first1=Alain |title=International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis |date=2005 |publisher=Macmillan Reference USA |chapter=pleasure/unpleasure principle}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=De Mijolla |first1=Alain |title=International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis |date=2005 |publisher=Macmillan Reference USA |chapter=reality principle}}</ref> Freud also described the ''pleasure principle'' as a [[positive feedback]] mechanism that motivates the organism to recreate the situation it has just found pleasurable, and to avoid past situations that caused [[suffering|pain]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Freud|first1=Siegmund|title=Beyond the pleasure principle|year=1950|publisher=Liveright|location=New York}}</ref>

=== Cognitive biases ===
A ''[[cognitive bias]]'' is a systematic tendency of thinking and judging in a way that deviates from a normative criterion, especially from the demands of [[rationality]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Litvak |first1=P. |last2=Lerner |first2=J. S. |title=The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |chapter=Cognitive Bias}}</ref> Cognitive biases in regard to ''pleasure'' include the ''[[peak–end rule]]'', the ''[[Daniel Kahneman#Focusing illusion|focusing illusion]]'',  the ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias''.

The ''peak–end rule'' affects how we remember the pleasantness or unpleasantness of experiences. It states that our overall impression of past events is determined for the most part not by the total pleasure and suffering it contained but by how it felt at its ''peaks'' and at its ''end''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Do |first1=Amy M. |last2=Rupert |first2=Alexander V. |last3=Wolford |first3=George |title=Evaluations of pleasurable experiences: The peak–end rule |journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review |date=1 February 2008 |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=96–98 |doi=10.3758/PBR.15.1.96 |pmid=18605486 |language=en |issn=1531-5320|doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, the memory of a painful [[colonoscopy]] is improved if the examination is extended by three minutes in which the scope is still inside but not moved anymore, resulting in a moderately uncomfortable sensation. This extended colonoscopy, despite involving more pain overall, is remembered less negatively due to the reduced pain at the end. This even increases the likelihood for the patient to return for subsequent procedures.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Redelmeier |first1=Donald A. |last2=Katz |first2=Joel |last3=Kahneman |first3=Daniel |title=Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial |journal=Pain |date=July 2003 |volume=104 |issue=1–2 |pages=187–194 |doi=10.1016/s0304-3959(03)00003-4 |pmid=12855328 |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12855328/ |issn=0304-3959|hdl=10315/7959 |s2cid=206055276 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> [[Daniel Kahneman]] explains this distortion in terms of the difference between [[Thinking, Fast and Slow#Two selves|two selves]]: the ''experiencing self'', which is aware of pleasure and pain as they are happening, and the ''remembering self'', which shows the aggregate pleasure and pain over an extended period of time. The distortions due to the ''peak–end rule'' happen on the level of the ''remembering self''. Our tendency to rely on the ''remembering self'' can often lead us to pursue courses of action that are not in our best self-interest.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |title=Thinking, Fast and Slow |date=2011 |publisher=New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KAHTFA-2 |chapter=35. Two Selves}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |last2=Singer |first2=Peter |title=The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LAZTPO-7 |page=276}}</ref>

A closely related bias is the ''focusing illusion''. The "illusion" occurs when people consider the impact of one specific factor on their overall happiness. They tend to greatly exaggerate the importance of that factor, while overlooking the numerous other factors that would in most cases have a greater impact.<ref>{{cite journal|author2-link=Daniel Kahneman |last1=Schkade |first1=David A. |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |title=Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction |journal=Psychological Science |date=6 May 2016 |volume=9 |issue=5 |pages=340–346 |doi=10.1111/1467-9280.00066 |s2cid=14091201 |url=http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/biases/9_Psychological_Science_340_(Schkade).pdf |language=en |issn=1467-9280}}</ref>

The ''nearness bias'' and the ''future bias'' are two different forms of violating the principle of ''temporal neutrality''. This principle states that the temporal location of a benefit or a harm is not important for its normative significance: a rational agent should care to the same extent about all parts of their life.<ref name="Dorsey">{{cite journal |last1=Dorsey |first1=Dale |title=A Near-Term Bias Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2019 |volume=99 |issue=2 |pages=461–477 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12496 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DORANB}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Brink |first1=David O. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPFT |chapter=Prospects for Temporal Neutrality|year=2011 }}</ref> The ''nearness bias'', also discussed under the labels "[[present bias]]" or "[[Time preference#Temporal discounting|temporal discounting]]", refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to temporal distance from the present. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be near rather than distant. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be distant rather than near.<ref name="Greene">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Sullivan |first2=Meghan |title=Against Time Bias |journal=Ethics |date=2015 |volume=125 |issue=4 |pages=947–970 |doi=10.1086/680910 |hdl=10220/40397 |s2cid=142294499 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GREATB-2|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Greene2">{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=Preston |last2=Holcombe |first2=Alex |last3=Latham |first3=Andrew James |last4=Miller |first4=Kristie |last5=Norton |first5=James |title=The Rationality of Near Bias Toward Both Future and Past Events |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |date=2021 |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=905–922 |doi=10.1007/s13164-020-00518-1 |s2cid=230797064 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GRETRO-49}}</ref><ref name="Dorsey"/> The ''future bias'' refers to our tendency to violate ''temporal neutrality'' in regards to the direction of time. On the positive side, we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in the future rather than in the past. On the negative side, we prefer painful experiences to be in the past rather than in the future.<ref name="Greene"/><ref name="Greene2"/>