Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Epistemology ===
An important goal of philosophical methods is to assist philosophers in attaining knowledge.<ref name="Dever"/> This is often understood in terms of [[evidence]].<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/><ref name="OvergaardMethodology"/> In this sense, philosophical methodology is concerned with the questions of what constitutes philosophical evidence, how much support it offers, and how to acquire it. In contrast to the empirical sciences, it is often claimed that [[empirical evidence]] is not used in justifying philosophical theories, that philosophy is less about the empirical world and more about how we think about the empirical world.<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/> In this sense, philosophy is often identified with [[conceptual analysis]], which is concerned with explaining concepts and showing their interrelations. Philosophical naturalists often reject this line of thought and hold that empirical evidence can confirm or disconfirm philosophical theories, at least indirectly.<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/>

Philosophical evidence, which may be obtained, for example, through [[intuition]]s or [[thought experiment]]s, is central for justifying basic principles and axioms.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=Jessica |title=Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence |journal=Dialectica |date=2011 |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=493–516 |doi=10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01282.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BROTEI-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pailos |first1=Federico Mathías |title=Intuition as Philosophical Evidence |journal=Essays in Philosophy |date=2012 |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=297–310 |doi=10.5840/eip201213117 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PAIIAP|hdl=11336/194769 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> These principles can then be used as premises to support further conclusions. Some approaches to philosophical methodology emphasize that these arguments have to be [[Validity (logic)|deductively valid]], i.e. that the truth of their premises ensures the truth of their conclusion.<ref name="DalyHandbook">{{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Chris |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |date=2015 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-137-34455-7 |pages=1–30 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction and Historical Overview|doi=10.1057/9781137344557_1 }}</ref> In other cases, philosophers may commit themselves to working hypotheses or norms of investigation even though they lack sufficient evidence. Such assumptions can be quite fruitful in simplifying the possibilities the philosopher needs to consider and by guiding them to ask interesting questions. But the lack of evidence makes this type of enterprise vulnerable to criticism.<ref name="Dever"/>