Editing Peer pressure (section)

=== Rwandan genocide ===
The [[Rwandan genocide]] occurred in 1994, with ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities. The primary belligerents were the Hutu; however, as with most ethnic conflicts, not all Hutu wanted to kill Tutsi. A survivor, Mectilde, described the Hutu breakdown as follows: 10% helped, 30% forced, 20% reluctant, and 40% willing.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Bhavnani|first=Ravi|s2cid=146217602|date=2006-11-01|title=Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the Rwandan Genocide|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=43|issue=6|pages=651–669|doi=10.1177/0022343306069290|issn=0022-3433}}</ref> For the willing, a rewards structure was put in place. For the unwilling, a punishment system was in effect. The combination, Professor Bhavnani argues, is a behavioral norm enforced by in-group policing. Instead of the typical peer pressure associated with western high school students, the peer pressure within the Rwandan genocide, where Tutsi and Hutu have inter-married, worked under coercion. Property destruction, rape, incarceration, and death faced the Hutu who were unwilling to commit to the genocide or protected the Tutsi from violence.<ref name=":1" />

When observing a sample community of 3426 in the village of Tare during the genocide, McDoom found that neighborhoods and familial structures are important micro-spaces that helped determine if an individual would participate in violence. Physical proximity increases the likelihood of social interaction and influence. For example, starting at a set point such as the home of a "mobilizing" agent for the Hutu (any individual who planned or led an attack in the village), the proportion of convicts living in a 100m radius of a resident is almost twice as many for convicts (individuals convicted of genocide by the ''gacaca'', a local institution of transitional justice that allows villagers to adjudicate on many of the perpetrators' crimes by themselves) as for non-convicts. As the radius increases, so does the proportion decrease. This data implies that "social influence" was a major factor. Looking at neighborhoods, an individual is 4% more likely to join the genocide for every single percentage point increase in the proportion of convicted perpetrators living within a 100m radius of them. Looking at familial structures, for any individual, each percentage point increase in the proportion of genocide participants in the individual's household increased their chances of joining the violence by 21 to 25%.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McDoom|first=Omar Shahabudin|s2cid=53132227|date=2013-07-01|title=Who killed in Rwanda's genocide? Micro-space, social influence and individual participation in intergroup violence|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=50|issue=4|pages=453–467|doi=10.1177/0022343313478958|issn=0022-3433|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48251/1/McDoom_Who_killed_in%20Rwanda%27s_genocide_2013.pdf|access-date=June 3, 2020|archive-date=March 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303122017/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/48251/1/McDoom_Who_killed_in%20Rwanda%27s_genocide_2013.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

However, the complete situation is a little more nuanced. The extreme control of citizens' daily lives by the government in social affairs facilitated the rapidity of the genocide's spread and broke down the resolve of some who initially wanted to have no part in the genocide. First, prior to the genocide, Rwandans' sense of discipline was introduced and reinforced through weekly ''umuganda'' (collective work) sessions, involving praise for the regime and its leaders and a host of collective activities for the community. Respect for authority and the fear of stepping out of line were strong cultural values of pre-genocide Rwanda and so were included in these activities.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hintjens|first=Helen|year=1999|title=Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda|url=http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21553|journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies|volume=37|issue=2|pages=241–286|doi=10.1017/s0022278x99003018|pmid=21991623|hdl=1765/21553|s2cid=24370574|hdl-access=free|access-date=July 10, 2019|archive-date=February 15, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200215141513/https://repub.eur.nl/pub/21553|url-status=live}}</ref> Second, their value of social conformity only increased in the decades leading up to the genocide in both social and political manners. Peasants were told exactly when and what to farm and could be fined given any lack of compliance. These factors helped to drive the killing's fast pace.

Most importantly, there were already ethnic tensions among the groups for a variety of reasons: conflicts over land allocation (farming versus pasture) and declining prices of Rwanda's main export: coffee. These problems combined with a history of previously existing conflict. With the introduction of the Second Republic under Habyarimana, former Tutsis in power were immediately purged, and racism served as an explanation as keeping the majority Hutu in legitimate government power.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Uvin|first=Peter|author-link=Peter Uvin|date=1997-01-01|title=Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda|journal=African Studies Review|volume=40|issue=2|pages=91–115|doi=10.2307/525158 |jstor=525158|s2cid=145591352 }}</ref> As a result, when the war came, the Hutu were already introduced to the concept of racism against their very own peers.

The division in Rwanda was reinforced for hundreds of years. King Kigeli IV, a Tutsi, centralized Rwandan power in the 1800s, just as Belgian colonization was taking place. The Belgian furthered the message of distinct races, allowing Tutsi men to remain the leaders in the society.<ref name=":22" />