Editing Neville Chamberlain (section)

==== Munich conference ====
Hitler's proposals met with resistance not only from the French and Czechoslovaks, but also from some members of Chamberlain's cabinet. With no agreement in sight, war seemed inevitable.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=318–20}} Chamberlain issued a press statement calling on Germany to abandon the threat of force in exchange for British help in obtaining the concessions it sought.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=321}} On the evening of 27 September, Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio, and after thanking those who wrote to him, stated:

{{blockquote
| How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel that has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=375–76}}
}}

On 28 September, Chamberlain called on Hitler to invite him to Germany again to seek a solution through a summit involving the British, French, Germans, and Italians.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=382}} Hitler replied favourably, and word of this response came to Chamberlain as he was winding up a speech in the House of Commons which sat in gloomy anticipation of war. Chamberlain informed the House of this in his speech.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=323}} The response was a passionate demonstration, with members cheering Chamberlain wildly. Even diplomats in the galleries applauded. Lord Dunglass later commented, "There were a lot of appeasers in Parliament that day."{{sfn|Self|2006|p=323}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R69173, Münchener Abkommen, Staatschefs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|left|alt=Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, and Italian foreign minister Count Ciano as they prepared to sign the Munich Agreement|From left to right, Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Italian foreign minister Count [[Galeazzo Ciano]] as they prepare to sign the [[Munich Agreement]]]]

On the morning of 29 September Chamberlain left [[Heston Aerodrome]] (to the east of today's [[Heathrow Airport]]) for his third and final visit to Germany.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=324}} On arrival in Munich the British delegation was taken directly to the ''[[Führerbau]]'', where Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler soon arrived. The four leaders and their translators held an informal meeting; Hitler said that he intended to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October. Mussolini distributed a proposal similar to Hitler's Bad Godesberg terms. In reality, the proposal had been drafted by German officials and transmitted to Rome the previous day. The four leaders debated the draft and Chamberlain raised the question of compensation for the Czechoslovak government and citizens, but Hitler refused to consider this.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=403–07}}

The leaders were joined by advisors after lunch, and hours were spent on long discussions of each clause of the "Italian" draft agreement. Late that evening the British and French left for their hotels, saying that they had to seek advice from their respective capitals. Meanwhile, the Germans and Italians enjoyed the feast which Hitler had intended for all the participants. During this break, Chamberlain advisor Horace Wilson met with the Czechoslovaks; he informed them of the draft agreement and asked which districts were particularly important to them.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=407–10}} The conference resumed at about 10&nbsp;pm and was mostly in the hands of a small drafting committee. At 1:30&nbsp;am the [[Munich Agreement]] was ready for signing, though the signing ceremony was delayed when Hitler discovered that the ornate inkwell on his desk was empty.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=410–11}}

Chamberlain and Daladier returned to their hotel and informed the Czechoslovaks of the agreement. The two prime ministers urged quick acceptance by the Czechoslovaks of the agreement, since the evacuation by the Czechs was to begin the following day. At 12:30&nbsp;pm the Czechoslovak government in Prague objected to the decision but agreed to its terms.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=413–14}}