Editing National Security Act of 1947 (section)

=== The Thomas Plan ===
In January 1946, Senator [[Elbert D. Thomas]] formed a subcommittee within the Senate Military Affairs Committee to draft unification legislation. The subcommittee included Vice Admiral [[Arthur W. Radford|Arthur Radford]] and Major General [[Lauris Norstad]] as advisors from the Department of the Navy and the War Department. On April 9th, the subcommittee introduced the bill, S. 2044. Its key points were the following:<ref name="USMCDU4447">{{cite book |last1=Keiser |first1=Gordon |title=The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947 |date=1982 |publisher=National Defense University Press |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-0898758047 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA121927.pdf}}</ref>

*Replacing the Navy and War Departments with a single "Department of Common Defense" led by a civilian secretary with one undersecretary and four assistant secretaries.
*Creating an independent air force under the new department.
*Creating a "Joint Staff of the Armed Forces" made up of the three service chiefs plus a chief of staff to submit recommendations and non-concurrences once a year to the president through the secretary of defense.
*Creating a "Council of Common Defense" based on Eberstadt's concept for a National Security Council.
*Creating a National Security Resources Board.
*Creating a Central Intelligence Agency.

==== JCS 1478 ====
On March 15th and 16th, Army Air Corps Commanding General Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote two papers regarding unification JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, that dealt with Army objectives for postwar unification. Marked "TOP SECRET", the two papers were blunt in their statement of their intent to marginalize the Marine Corps. The Eisenhower-Spaatz proposal's key points were the following:<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

*Limit Marine Corps units to the size of regiments and below, and cap the total size of the Marine Corps at 50,000-60,000.
*Bar the Marine Corps from wartime expansion, eliminating the need for the Marine Corps Reserve.
*Limit Marine Corps missions to guarding naval ships and shore establishments.
*Limit Marines to participating "only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested."
*Bar the Marine Corps from engaging in operations that required combined arms since this would duplicate the functions of the Army and Air Force.

The papers were forwarded to the chief of naval operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, for his thoughts. There the papers came to the attention of Merritt Edson, the Marine Corps liaison to the chief of naval operations. Edson alerted the commandant of the Marine Corps and the members of the Marine Corps Board, most of whom, particularly Merrill Twining, believed that the only purpose of the papers' high classification was to conceal the Army's goals from Congress.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

Nimitz replied on March 30th, and included responses by the Commandant and by the head of Naval Aviation, both of whom were strongly against the proposals.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== Lobbying and Gag Order ====
Following the bill's introduction, the Department of the Navy openly opposed it.

In a press conference on April 11th, Truman said he had not authorized Navy officers to speak against unification, only to offer their honest opinions. He demanded that members of both the War Department and Department of the Navy "get in line" behind the official White House policy. When questioned about Army lobbying tactics, Truman claimed ignorance, but stated he was opposed to all congressional lobbying by the two departments.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On April 30th, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee began hearings to consider S. 2044.

==== The Bended Knee Speech ====
On May 6th, Commandant of the Marine Corps Alexander Vandegrift testified. His testimony noted that on multiple occasions there had been efforts to marginalize and disband the Marine Corps, all of which had been ended by congressional oversight. He noted Marine Corps successes such as the prediction of the course of the Pacific War by Pete Ellis, and a history of extreme frugality that did not characterize other services. Finally, he denounced the War Department plan as a transparent attempt to quietly marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by removing its congressional protection.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== Defeat ====
On May 7th, Clark Clifford, Truman's lead for unification legislation, told General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of War Stuart Symington that the Thomas Bill could not pass in its current form, and that the Naval Affairs Committee hearings were causing it to lose more support every day. He also admitted he had been swayed by some of the Navy's objections, especially regarding the role of the chief of staff. Clifford recommended that Truman meet with the secretaries of War and the Navy and their advisors to clarify points of agreement and disagreement and find a way forward.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On May 13th, Truman held the meeting, and demanded that Patterson and Forrestal find a way to break the impasse by the end of the month due to the urgency of passing unification legislation. He also said that he had accepted the Navy's arguments against the chief of staff. Finally, he told his chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, to silence criticism of unification by naval officers.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wolk |first1=Herman |title=Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947 |date=1984 |publisher=Office of Air Force History |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-1508659587 |url=https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329803/-1/-1/0/planning_and_organizing_the_postwar_af.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180424071613/https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329803/-1/-1/0/planning_and_organizing_the_postwar_af.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=April 24, 2018 |access-date=29 July 2024}}</ref>

May 31st Patterson and Forrestal reported to him that of the twelve points in S. 2044 they agreed on eight and disagreed on four. The points of agreement were as follows:<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

*That there should not be a single military Chief of Staff
*The creation of a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff
*The creation of a Council of Common Defense
*The creation of a Central Intelligence Agency
*The creation of a National Security Resources Board
*The creation of an agency for joint military education and training
*The creation of an agency for joint research
*The creation of an agency for procurement and supply.

The remaining points of disagreement were the following:

*Whether or not to reorganize into a single Department of Defense
*Whether or not to establish a separate Air Force
*The status of Army and Navy aviation
*The status of the Marine Corps

The period of rival Military Affairs Committee and Naval Affairs Committee hearings came to an end for good on August 2nd, when Truman signed the [[Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946]]. It combined the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate, and would go into effect for the 80th United States Congress.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

Additionally, in August, Thomas suggested to Truman that he use an executive order to execute some unification changes, for example by creating a Council of Common Defense led by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Thomas believed that forcing the military to operate under unification for several months might convince all involved, particularly Congress, that unification legislation was feasible.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Unification of the Armed Forces |journal=CQ Almanac |date=1947 |url=http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal46-1410852}}</ref>