Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

==Arguments for dualism==
[[File:Descartes-reflex.JPG|thumb|right|Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a pore in the ventricle (F) allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of the leg, causing the foot to withdraw.]]

===The subjective argument===
An important fact is that minds perceive intra-mental states differently from sensory phenomena,<ref>{{cite journal|last=Prinz|first=Wolfgang|title=Why don't we perceive our brain states?|journal=European Journal of Cognitive Psychology|date=January 1992|volume=4|issue=1|doi=10.1080/09541449208406240 |pages=1–20}}<!--|access-date=19 November 2012--></ref> and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having seemingly disparate properties. The subjective argument holds that these properties are irreconcilable under a physical mind.

Mental events have a certain ''subjective'' quality to them, whereas physical ones seem not to. So, for example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like.<ref name="Nag">[[Thomas Nagel|Nagel, Thomas]]. 1986. ''[[The View from Nowhere]]''. New York: Oxford University Press.</ref> Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events ''[[qualia]].'' There is something ''that it's like'' to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are ''qualia'' involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical.<ref name="Hart" />

[[Thomas Nagel]] first characterized the problem of qualia for physicalistic monism in his article, "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?]]". Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-person, scientific perspective about a bat's sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to ''be'' a bat. However, others argue that ''qualia'' are consequent of the same neurological processes that engender the bat's mind, and will be fully understood as the [[neural correlates of consciousness|science]] develops.<ref>{{cite book|last=Dennett|first=Daniel C.|title=Consciousness Explained|year=1991|publisher=Little, Brown and Co|isbn=978-0-316-18065-8|url=https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn}}</ref>

[[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]] formulated his well-known ''[[knowledge argument]]'' based upon similar considerations. In this [[thought experiment]], known as [[Mary's room]], he asks us to consider a neuroscientist, Mary, who was born, and has lived all of her life, in a black and white room with a black and white television and computer monitor where she collects all the scientific data she possibly can on the nature of colours. Jackson asserts that as soon as Mary leaves the room, she will come to have new knowledge which she did not possess before: the knowledge of the experience of colours (i.e., what they are like). Although Mary knows everything there is to know about colours from an objective, third-person perspective, she has never known, according to Jackson, what it was like to see red, orange, or green. If Mary really learns something new, it must be knowledge of something non-physical, since she already knew everything about the physical aspects of colour.<ref>Jackson, Frank. 1977. ''Perception: A Representative Theory''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>

However, Jackson later rejected his argument and embraced [[physicalism]].<ref>{{cite book|last=O'Hear|first=Anthony|title=Mind and Illusion, in "Minds and Persons"|year=2003|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=251}}</ref> He notes that Mary obtains knowledge not of color, but of a new intramental state, ''seeing color''.<ref name="Jackson 2003 251" /> Also, he notes that Mary might say "wow," and as a mental state affecting the physical, this clashed with his former view of [[epiphenomenalism]]. [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Lewis]]' response to this argument, now known as the ''ability'' argument, is that what Mary really came to know was simply the ability to recognize and identify color sensations to which she had previously not been exposed.<ref>Lewis, David. [1988] 1999. "What Experience Teaches." pp. 262–290 in ''Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology'', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref> [[Daniel Dennett]] and others also provide [[Mary's room#Objections|arguments against this notion]].

===The zombie argument===
{{Main|Philosophical zombie}}
{{See also|Chinese room|Knowledge argument}}

The [[p-zombie|zombie argument]] is based on a [[thought experiment]] proposed by [[David Chalmers]] over the issue of [[qualia]] or the [[hard problem of consciousness]]. The basic idea is that one can imagine, and, therefore, conceive the existence of, an apparently functioning human being/body without any conscious states being associated with it.

Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a human being must be true of the zombie. None of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described scientifically via physics whether it is conscious or not. The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living things seem to require a level of consciousness. However (unconscious?) robots built to simulate humans may become the first real p-zombies. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.<ref>{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Conscious Mind |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1997 |isbn=978-0-19-511789-9}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Character of Consciousness|publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-19-531110-5}}</ref>

Others such as Dennett have [[Philosophical zombie#Criticism|argued]] that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,<ref>{{cite journal |author=Dennett, Daniel |title=The unimagined preposterousness of zombies |year=1995 |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2 |pages=322–326}}</ref> or unlikely,<ref>{{cite book |author=Dennett, Daniel |title=Consciousness Explained |publisher=Little, Brown and Co. |year=1991 |page=[https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn/page/95 95] |isbn=978-0-316-18065-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn/page/95 }}</ref> concept. In particular, nothing proves that an entity (e.g., a computer or robot) which would perfectly mimic human beings, and especially perfectly mimic expressions of feelings (like joy, fear, anger, ...), would not indeed experience them, thus having similar states of consciousness to what a real human would have. It is argued that under [[physicalism]], one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's.

[[Avshalom Elitzur]] has described himself as a "reluctant dualist". One argument Elitzur makes in favor of dualism is an argument from bafflement. According to Elitzur, a conscious being can conceive of a P-zombie version of his/herself. However, a P-zombie cannot conceive of a version of itself that lacks corresponding qualia.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Elitzur |first1=Avshalom |date=2009 |title=Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist's confession |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/ELICMA |journal=Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness |volume= |issue= |pages= |doi= |access-date=24 January 2025}}</ref>

===Special sciences argument===
[[Howard Robinson]] argues that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are "special sciences" that are irreducible to physics. These allegedly irreducible subjects, which contain irreducible predicates, differ from hard sciences in that they are interest-relative. Here, interest-relative fields depend on the existence of minds that can have interested perspectives.<ref name="Rob" /> Psychology is one such science; it completely depends on and presupposes the existence of the mind.

Physics is the general analysis of [[nature]], conducted to understand how the [[universe]] behaves. On the other hand, the study of [[meteorology|meteorological]] weather patterns or [[Behavioral science|human behavior]] is only of interest to humans themselves. The point is that having a perspective on the world is a psychological state. Therefore, the special sciences presuppose the existence of minds which can have these states. If one is to avoid ontological dualism, then the mind that ''has'' a perspective must be part of the physical reality to which it ''applies'' its perspective. If this is the case, then to perceive the physical world as psychological, the mind must have a perspective on the physical. This, in turn, presupposes the existence of mind.<ref name="Rob" />

However, [[cognitive science]]<ref>{{cite book|last=Pylyshyn|first=Zenon W.|title=Computation and Cognition|year=1986|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262660587|page=259}}</ref> and psychology<ref>{{cite journal|last=Schwarz|first=Jeffrey M.|author2=Stapp, Henry P.|author3=Beauregard, Mario|date=June 2005|title=Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction|journal=Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences|volume=360|issue=1458|pages=1309–1327|doi=10.1098/rstb.2004.1598|jstor=30041344|pmc=1569494|pmid=16147524}}<!--|access-date=20 November 2012--></ref> do not require the mind to be irreducible, and operate on the assumption that it has physical basis. In fact, it is common in science to presuppose a complex system;<ref name=chemistry>{{cite book|last=Brown|title=Chemistry|year=2003|publisher=Prentice Hall|location=NJ|isbn=978-0-13-066997-1|pages=2–3}}</ref> while fields such as [[chemistry]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Various|date=December 1994|title=Accurate First Principles Calculation of Molecular Charge Distributions and Solvation Energies from Ab Initio Quantum Mechanics and Continuum Dielectric Theory|journal=J. Am. Chem. Soc.|volume=116|issue=26|pages=11875–11882|doi=10.1021/ja00105a030|s2cid=10518482}}<!--|access-date=20 November 2012--></ref> [[biology]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ma|first=Buyong|author2=Nussinov, Ruth|title=From computational quantum chemistry to computational biology: experiments and computations are (full) partners|journal=Phys. Biol.|date=November 2004|volume=1|issue=4|pages=23–6|doi=10.1088/1478-3967/1/4/P01 |pmid=16204832|bibcode=2004PhBio...1P..23M|s2cid=24333007 |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1235734}}<!--|access-date=20 November 2012--></ref> or geology<ref>{{cite journal|last=Various|date=April 2010|title=Quantum Monte Carlo computations of phase stability, equations of state, and elasticity of high-pressure silica|journal=PNAS|volume=107|issue=21|pages=9519–9524|arxiv=1001.2066|bibcode=2010PNAS..107.9519D|doi=10.1073/pnas.0912130107|pmc=2906913|pmid=20457932|doi-access=free}}<!--|access-date=20 November 2012--></ref> could be verbosely expressed in terms of [[quantum field theory]], it is convenient to use levels of abstraction like [[molecules]], [[Cell (biology)|cells]], or the [[Mantle (geology)|mantle]]. It is often difficult to decompose these levels without heavy analysis<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pyykko|first=Pekka|date=21 July 2012|title=The Physics behind Chemistry and the Periodic Table|journal=Chem. Rev.|volume=112|issue=1|pages=371–384|doi=10.1021/cr200042e|pmid=21774555|s2cid=46487006}}<!--|access-date=10 November 2012--></ref> and computation.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pyykko|first=Pekka|title=A suggested periodic table up to Z ≤ 172, based on Dirac–Fock calculations on atoms and ions|journal=Physical Chemistry Chemical Physics|date=22 Oct 2010|volume=13|issue=1|pages=161–168|doi=10.1039/C0CP01575J|pmid=20967377|bibcode=2011PCCP...13..161P|s2cid=31590563}}</ref> Sober has also advanced philosophical arguments against the notion of irreducibility.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sober|first=Elliott|date=December 1999|title=The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=66|issue=4|pages=542–564|doi=10.1086/392754|jstor=188749|s2cid=54883322}}<!--|access-date=20 November 2012--></ref>

===Argument from personal identity===
This argument concerns the differences between the applicability of [[counterfactual conditionals]] to physical objects, on the one hand, and to conscious, personal agents on the other.<ref name="MG">Madell, G. 1981. ''The Identity of the Self''. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.</ref> In the case of any material object, e.g. a printer, we can formulate a series of counterfactuals in the following manner:

# This printer could have been made of straw.
# This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube transistors.
# This printer could have been made of 95% of what it is actually made of and 5% vacuum-tube transistors, etc..

Somewhere along the way from the printer's being made up exactly of the parts and materials which actually constitute it to the printer's being made up of some different matter at, say, 20%, the question of whether this printer is the same printer becomes a matter of arbitrary convention.

Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a slightly [[genetically modified sperm]]. Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity of Frederick. In this latter case, it has been claimed, ''overlap of constitution'' cannot be applied to the identity of mind. As Madell puts it:<ref name="MG" />

:But while my present body can thus have its partial counterpart in some possible world, my present consciousness cannot. Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either is or is not mine. There is no question of degree here.

If the counterpart of Frederick, Frederickus, is 70% constituted of the same physical substance as Frederick, does this mean that it is also 70% mentally identical with Frederick? Does it make sense to say that something is mentally 70% Frederick?<ref>Shoemaker, S., and [[Richard Swinburne]]. 1984. ''Personal Identity''. Oxford: Blackwell.</ref> A possible solution to this dilemma is that of [[open individualism]].

[[Richard Swinburne]], in his book ''The Existence of God'', put forward an argument for mind-body dualism based upon personal identity. He states that the brain is composed of two hemispheres and a cord linking the two and that, as modern science has shown, either of these can be removed without the person losing any memories or mental capacities.

He then cites a thought-experiment for the reader, asking what would happen if each of the two hemispheres of one person were placed inside two different people. Either, Swinburne claims, one of the two is me or neither is—and there is no way of telling which, as each will have similar memories and mental capacities to the other. In fact, Swinburne claims, even if one's mental capacities and memories are far more similar to the original person than the others' are, they still may not be him.

From here, he deduces that even if we know what has happened to every single atom inside a person's brain, we still do not know what has happened to 'them' as an identity. From here it follows that a part of our mind, or our soul, is immaterial, and, as a consequence, that mind-body dualism is true.<ref name="SR">[[Richard Swinburne|Swinburne, Richard]]. 1979. ''The Existence of God''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref>

[[Christian List]] argues that Benj Hellie's [[vertiginous question]], i.e. why people exist as themselves and not as someone else, and the existence of first-personal facts, are a refutation of physicalist philosophies of consciousness. List argues that first personal facts cannot supervene on third personal facts. However, List also argues that this also refutes standard versions of mind-body dualism that have purely third-personal metaphysics.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LISTFA |title=The first-personal argument against physicalism |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher= |access-date=3 September 2024 |quote=}}</ref>

===Argument from reason===
{{Main|Argument from reason}}

Philosophers and scientists such as [[Victor Reppert]], [[William Hasker]], and [[Alvin Plantinga]] have developed an argument for dualism dubbed the "argument from reason". They credit [[C. S. Lewis]] with first bringing the argument to light in his book ''[[Miracles (book)|Miracles]]''; Lewis called the argument "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism", which was the title of chapter three of ''Miracles''.<ref name="Reppert">[[Victor Reppert|Reppert, Victor]]. 2003. ''C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea''. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. {{ISBN|0-8308-2732-3}}</ref>

The argument postulates that if, as naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. However, knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it (or anything else), except by a fluke.<ref name=Reppert />

Through this logic, the statement "I have reason to believe naturalism is valid" is inconsistent in the same manner as "I never tell the truth."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://infidels.org/library/modern/darek_barefoot/dangerous.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220020836/http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/darek_barefoot/dangerous.html|url-status=dead|title=A Response to Richard Carrier's Review of C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea|archive-date=20 December 2008|website=infidels.org}}</ref> That is, to conclude its truth would eliminate the grounds from which to reach it. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes [[J. B. S. Haldane]], who appeals to a similar line of reasoning:<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://philosophy.uncc.edu/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220015347/http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/Intro/csl3.html|url-status=dead|title=Philosophy Homepage &#124; Department of Philosophy &#124; UNC Charlotte|archive-date=20 December 2008|website=philosophy.uncc.edu}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|text=If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.|sign=J. B. S. Haldane|source=p. 209|title=''Possible Worlds''}}

In his essay "Is Theology Poetry?", Lewis himself summarises the argument in a similar fashion when he writes:

{{Blockquote|text=If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry (in the long run) on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the trees.|sign=C. S. Lewis|source=p. 139|title=''[[The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses]]''}}

But Lewis later agreed with [[Elizabeth Anscombe]]'s response to his ''Miracles'' argument.<ref>{{cite book|last=Sayer|first=George|title=Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis|year=2005|publisher=Crossway|isbn=978-1581347395|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/jacklifeofcslewi0000saye}}</ref> She showed that an argument could be valid and ground-consequent even if its propositions were generated via [[causality (physics)|physical cause and effect]] by non-rational factors.<ref>''The Socratic Digest'', No. 4 (1948)</ref> Similar to Anscombe, [[Richard Carrier]] and John Beversluis have written extensive objections to the [[argument from reason]] on the untenability of its first postulate.<ref>{{cite book|last=Beversluis|first=John|title=C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Revised and Updated)|year=2007|publisher=Prometheus Books|isbn=978-1591025313}}</ref>

===Cartesian arguments===
{{Main|Meditations on the First Philosophy}}

Descartes puts forward two main arguments for dualism in ''[[Meditations on the First Philosophy|Meditations]]'': firstly, the "modal argument," or the "clear and distinct perception argument," and secondly the "indivisibility" or "divisibility" argument.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Summary of the 'modal argument'<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#ModArg|title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter = Dualism|year = 2020|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>
| colspan="4" |It is imaginable that one's mind might exist without one's body.
|-
| colspan="4" |''therefore''
|-
| colspan="4" |It is conceivable that one's mind might exist without one's body.
|-
| colspan="4" |''therefore''
|-
| colspan="4" |It is possible one's mind might exist without one's body.
|-
| colspan="4" |''therefore''
|-
| colspan="4" |One's mind is a different entity from one's body.
|}
The argument is distinguished from the [[Zombie Argument]] as it establishes that the mind could continue to exist without the body, rather than that the unaltered body could exist without the mind.<ref>[[Howard Robinson|Robinson, Howard]]. [2003] 2016. "[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#ModArg Dualism § The Modal Argument]." ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]],<ref>[[Robert Lawrence Kuhn|Kuhn, Robert Lawrence]], host. 2009. "[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOTn_wRwDE0 Is the Person All Material?]" Ep. 43 in ''[[Closer to Truth|Closer to the Truth]]'' (television series). via YouTube.</ref> [[J. P. Moreland]],<ref>Everist, Randy. 30 December 2015. "[https://www.randyeverist.com/2015/12/the-modal-argument-for-substance.html The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism: A Spirited Defense, Part 1]." ''Possible Worlds''. Accessed 31 July 2020.</ref> and [[Edward Feser]]<ref>Feser, Edward. 13 April 2009. "[http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/04/descartes-clear-and-distinct-perception.html Descartes' "clear and distinct perception" argument]." {{Blogspot|edwardfeser|Edward Feser}}.</ref> have both supported the argument, although Feser and Moreland think that it must be carefully reformulated to be effective.

The ''indivisibility argument'' for dualism was phrased by Descartes as follows:<ref>Calef, Scott. n.d. "[https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#SH3a Dualism and Mind § The Argument From Indivisibility]." ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.</ref><blockquote>[T]here is a great difference between a mind and a body, because the body, by its very nature, is something divisible, whereas the mind is plainly indivisible...insofar as I am only a thing that thinks, I cannot distinguish any parts in me.... Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, nevertheless, were a foot or an arm or any other bodily part amputated, I know that nothing would be taken away from the mind...</blockquote>The argument relies upon [[Leibniz]]' [[identity of indiscernibles|principle of the identity of indiscernibles]], which states that two things are the same if and only if they share all their properties. A counterargument is the idea that matter is not infinitely divisible, and thus that the mind could be identified with material things that cannot be divided, or potentially Leibnizian [[Monad (philosophy)|monads]].<ref>[[Edward Feser|Feser, Edward]]. 27 February 2017. "[http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/02/descartes-indivisibility-argument.html Descartes' "indivisibility" argument]." {{Blogspot|edwardfeser|Edward Feser}}.</ref>