Editing M4 Sherman (section)

===Effectiveness===
The armor of the Sherman was ineffective against most Axis tanks (such as tanks like the [[Panzer IV]] with 7.5&nbsp;cm cannon and above) along with anti-tank weapon fire early in the war during multiple occasions.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Poor Defense: Sherman tanks in WW2 – University of Illinois Archives |url=https://archives.library.illinois.edu/blog/poor-defense-sherman-tanks-ww2/ |access-date=2022-10-21 |website=archives.library.illinois.edu}}</ref> So it was decided it needed a compound angle to resist later German tank and anti-tank guns. The distinctive protruding "hatchways" of the early Sherman compromised the 56 degree-angled glacis plate, making them weak points where the effect of the glacis plate's slope was greatly reduced. In 1943, to make the thickness of these areas equal with the rest of the glacis plate, {{convert|1|in|mm|adj=mid|thick}} appliqué armor plates were fitted in front of them.

A [[Waffenamt|''Waffenamt-Prüfwesen'' 1]] report estimated{{sfn|Jentz|Doyle|1993|p=20}} that with the M4 angled 30 degrees sideways and APCBC round, the Tiger I's 8.8&nbsp;cm KwK 36 L/56 gun would be capable of penetrating the differential case of an American M4 Sherman from {{convert|2,100|m|abbr=on}} and the turret front from {{convert|1,800|m|abbr=on}}, but the Tiger's 88&nbsp;mm gun would not penetrate the upper glacis plate at any range{{sfn|Jentz|Doyle|1993|p=19}} and that the Panther, with its long barreled 7.5&nbsp;cm KwK 42 L/70, would have to close in to {{convert|100|meters|yards|abbr=on}} to achieve a penetration in the same situation.{{sfn|Jentz|Doyle|1995|p=129}} However, other German documents suggested that the glacis of a Sherman could be penetrated at a range of {{convert|800|m|abbr=on}} by the Tiger I. The Tiger I was estimated to be able to penetrate the Sherman in most other armor plates at a range of {{convert|2|km|abbr=on}} or above, far exceeding the ranges at which the tank itself was vulnerable to fire from the Sherman.<ref name=ShermanChart/>

Although the later-model German medium and heavy tanks were greatly feared, Buckley opined "The vast majority of German tanks encountered in Normandy were either inferior or merely equal to the Sherman." ([[Panzer III]] or Panzer IV){{sfn|Buckley|2006|p=117}}

Research for tank casualties in Normandy from 6 June to 10 July 1944 conducted by the British No. 2 [[Operations research|Operational Research]] Section concluded that from a sample of 40 Sherman tanks, 33 tanks burned (82 percent) and 7 tanks remained unburned following an average of 1.89 penetrations. In comparison, from a sample of five Panzer IVs, four tanks burned (80 percent) and one tank remained unburned, following an average of 1.5 penetrations. The Panther tank burned 14 times (63 percent) from a sample of 22 tanks and following 3.24 penetrations, while the Tiger burned four times (80 percent) out of a sample of five tanks following 3.25 penetrations.{{sfn|Copp|2000|pp=399–406}} John Buckley, using a case study of the British [[8th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom)|8th]] and [[29th Armoured Brigade (United Kingdom)|29th Armoured Brigades]], found that of their 166 Shermans knocked out in combat during the Normandy campaign, 94 (56.6 percent) burned out. Buckley also notes that an American survey carried out concluded that 65% of tanks burned out after being penetrated.{{sfn|Buckley|2006|p=127}} United States Army research proved that the major reason for this was the stowage of main gun ammunition in the vulnerable sponsons above the tracks. A U.S. Army study in 1945 concluded that only 10–15 percent of wet stowage Shermans burned when penetrated, compared to 60–80 percent of the older dry-stowage Shermans.{{sfn|Zaloga|2008|pp=116–118}} As a burned tank was unrecoverable, it was prudent in combat to continue to fire at a tank until it caught fire.{{sfn|Moran (6 June 2015) ''Myths of American Armor''}}

At first, a partial remedy to ammunition fires in the M4 was found in 1943 by welding {{convert|1|in|mm|adj=mid|thick}} appliqué armor plates to the sponson sides over the ammunition stowage bins, though there was doubt that these had any effect.{{citation needed|date=June 2021}} Later models moved ammunition stowage to the hull floor, with water jackets surrounding each storage bin. The practice, known as "wet stowage", reduced the chance of fire after a hit to about 15 percent.{{sfn|Buckley|2006|p=128}} The Sherman allegedly gained the grim nickname "Tommy Cooker" (by the Germans, who referred to British soldiers as "[[Tommy Atkins|Tommies]]"; a [[tommy cooker]] was a [[World War I]]-era trench [[stove]]), though no evidence appears to exist beyond anecdote on the Allied side and post-war. Conversely, it was also allegedly called "[[Ronson (company)|Ronson]]" or "Zippo" due to the flamethrower version of the tank, and not because "it lights the first time, every time"; this nickname story has been almost conclusively proven to be a fabrication as the Ronson company did not begin using the slogan until the 1950s and the average soldier did not have a Ronson lighter.<ref>[https://medium.com/@gary23zhang/thoughts-on-the-sherman-myths-357cc9105870 The Sherman Myths]</ref><ref>[https://tankhistoria.com/wwii/sherman-ronson-myth/ The Sherman "Ronson" Myth, Ed Webster, 4 August 2023]</ref>{{sfn|Moran (6 June 2015) ''Myths of American Armor''}} Fuel fires occasionally occurred, but such fires were far less common and less deadly than ammunition fires.{{sfn|Zaloga|2008|pp=116–118}} In many cases, the fuel tank of the Sherman was found intact after a fire. Tankers described "fierce, blinding jets of flame", which is consistent with burning pressurized hydraulic fluid, but not gasoline-related fires.{{sfn|Buckley|2006|p=127}}