Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

====Suez Crisis and aftermath====
The presidential order did not restrict U-2 flights outside eastern Europe. In May 1956, Turkey approved the deployment of Detachment B at [[Incirlik Air Base]], near [[Adana, Turkey]]. Before the new detachment was ready, however, Detachment A in late August used Adana as a refueling base to photograph the Mediterranean. The aircraft found evidence of many British troops on [[Malta]] and [[Cyprus]] as the United Kingdom prepared for its forthcoming [[Suez Crisis|intervention in Suez]]. The U.S. released some of the photographs to the British government. As the crisis grew in seriousness, the project converted from a source of strategic reconnaissance, which prioritized high quality over speed (the film was processed by its maker, then analyzed in Washington), to a tactical reconnaissance unit that provided immediate analysis. The Photo Intelligence Division set up a lab at Wiesbaden; as Detachment B took over from A and flew over targets that remain classified {{as of|2013|07|lc=y}}, the Wiesbaden lab's rapid reports helped the U.S. government to predict the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt three days before it began on 29 October. On 1 November a flight flew over the Egyptian air base at Almaza twice, 10 minutes apart; in between the British and French attacked the base, and the visible results of the attack in the "10-minute reconnaissance" impressed Eisenhower. Beginning on 5 November, flights over Syria showed that the Soviets had not sent aircraft there despite their threats against the British, French and Israelis, a cause of worry for the U.S.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=113–120}}

In the four years following the Suez Crisis, repeated U-2 missions over the Middle East were launched, particularly in times of tension. The end of the [[1958 Lebanon crisis]] saw a decline in U-2 operations, although Detachment B U-2s operating from Turkey still sometimes overflew the Middle East along with occasional missions over Albania to check for Soviet missile activity. Israel was a major target of U-2 missions during this period, with U-2 missions detecting the construction of the [[Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center|Negev Nuclear Research Center]] in 1958, first bringing [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|Israel's nuclear program]] to the attention of the US. The overflights drew the attention of the [[Israeli Air Force]]. Its radars detected and tracked the overflights, and on numerous occasions, Israeli fighter aircraft were scrambled to intercept them but were unable to reach their altitude. The Israeli government was baffled by the overflights. However, Israeli fighter pilots were twice able to spot the intruding aircraft. On 11 March 1959, two Israeli [[Dassault Super Mystère|Super Mystère]] fighters were directed to intercept a U-2 detected over Israel by Israeli ground-based radar. Although the aircraft were unable to make an intercept, the formation leader, Major [[Yosef Alon]], managed to get a good look at the aircraft. He subsequently identified it out of a book as a U-2, registered as a weather reconnaissance aircraft to the US Weather Service. On 22 July 1959, after an overflight was detected, an Israeli Air Force [[Sud Aviation Vautour|Vautour]] jet was deployed to photograph the mysterious aircraft. The Vautour came within visual range and the U-2 was successfully photographed. In spite of this, it was not until the 1960 shootdown of a U-2 over the Soviet Union and its subsequent public exposure as a spy plane that the Israeli government understood the identity of the mystery aircraft.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-u-2-planes-flew-over-israel-in-1950s-1.5293435|title=U.S. Espionage Planes Violated Israeli Airspace in the 1950s, IAF Archives Reveal|date=2012-08-30|work=Haaretz|access-date=2019-12-18|language=en|archive-date=18 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191218155122/https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-u-2-planes-flew-over-israel-in-1950s-1.5293435|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780679415633|url-access=registration|quote=Ehud Yonay.|title=No Margin for Error: The Making of the Israeli Air Force|last=Yonay|first=Ehud|date=1993|publisher=Pantheon Books|isbn=978-0-679-41563-3|language=en}}</ref>{{r|michael20120902}}