Editing Immanuel Kant (section)

====Categorical imperative====
Kant makes a distinction between categorical and [[hypothetical imperative]]s. A ''hypothetical'' imperative is one that must be obeyed to satisfy contingent desires. A ''categorical'' imperative binds [[rational agent]]s regardless of their desires: for example, all rational agents have a duty to respect other rational agents as individual ends in themselves, regardless of circumstances, even though it is sometimes in one's selfish interest to not do so. These imperatives are morally binding because of the categorical form of their maxims, rather than contingent facts about an agent.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 83.</ref> Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which bind us insofar as we are part of a group or society which we owe duties to, we cannot opt out of the categorical imperative, because we cannot opt out of being rational agents. We owe a duty to rationality by virtue of being rational agents; therefore, rational moral principles apply to all rational agents at all times.{{sfn|Johnson|2008}} Stated in other terms, with all forms of instrumental rationality excluded from morality, "the moral law itself, Kant holds, can only be the form of lawfulness itself, because nothing else is left once all content has been rejected".{{sfn|Schneewind|2010|p=261}}

Kant provides three formulations for the categorical imperative. He claims that these are necessarily equivalent, as all being expressions of the pure universality of the moral law as such;<ref>Kant, ''G''. 4:420–421, 436.</ref> many scholars are not convinced.<ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–78</ref> The formulas are as follows:
* ''Formula of Universal Law'':
**"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal law";<ref name="Kant, G 4:421">Kant, ''G'' 4:421</ref> alternatively,
***''Formula of the Law of Nature'': "So act, as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."<ref name="Kant, G 4:421"/>
* ''Formula of Humanity as End in Itself'':
**"So act that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:429</ref>
* ''Formula of Autonomy'':
**"the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law",<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:431; cf. 4:432</ref> or "Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law";<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:440; cf. 4:432, 434, 438</ref> alternatively,
***''Formula of the Realm of Ends'': "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends."<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:439; cf. 4:433, 437–439</ref><ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, p.6</ref>

Kant defines ''maxim'' as a "subjective principle of volition", which is distinguished from an "objective principle or 'practical law.{{'"}} While "the latter is valid for every rational being and is a 'principle according to which they ought to act[,]' a maxim 'contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often their ignorance or inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act.{{'"}}<ref>Caygill, Howard. (1995) ''A Kant Dictionary''. Blackwell Publishing, p. 289, citing ''GMM''.</ref>

Maxims fail to qualify as practical laws if they produce a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will when universalized. A contradiction in conception happens when, if a maxim were to be universalized, it ceases to make sense, because the "maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:403.</ref> For example, if the maxim 'It is permissible to break promises' was universalized, no one would trust any promises made, so the idea of a promise would become meaningless; the maxim would be [[Self-refuting idea|self-contradictory]] because, when it is universalized, promises cease to be meaningful. The maxim is not moral because it is logically impossible to universalize{{mdash}}that is, we could not conceive of a world where this maxim was universalized.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 88.</ref> A maxim can also be immoral if it creates a contradiction in the will when universalized. This does not mean a logical contradiction, but that universalizing the maxim leads to a state of affairs that no ''rational'' being would desire.