Editing History of Ghana (section)

==Since 1966==
{{Main|History of Ghana (1966–1979)}}
Leaders of the 1966 military coup justified their takeover by charging that the CPP administration was abusive and corrupt, that Nkrumah's involvement in African politics was overly aggressive, and that the nation lacked democratic practices.<ref>{{Citation|last=Newland|first=Lynda|title=Religion and politics: The Christian churches and the 2006 coup in Fiji|date=2009|work=The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?|publisher=ANU Press|doi=10.22459/mtf.04.2009.09|isbn=978-1-921536-50-2|doi-access=free}}</ref> They claimed that the military coup of 1966 was a nationalist one because it liberated the nation from Nkrumah's dictatorship. All symbols and organizations linked to Nkrumah and he quickly vanished, such as the Young Pioneers.<ref>Goody (1968) pp 338–39.</ref> Despite the vast political changes that were brought about by the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, many problems remained, including ethnic and regional divisions, the country's economic burdens, and mixed emotions about a resurgence of an overly strong central authority.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Smith|first=Sylvia|date=26 June 1996|title=Difficult birth|journal=Nursing Standard|volume=10|issue=40|pages=16|doi=10.7748/ns.10.40.16.s40|pmid=8718012|issn=0029-6570}}</ref> A considerable portion of the population had become convinced that effective, honest government was incompatible with competitive political parties.<ref>{{cite book|last=Maisel|first=L. Sandy|author-link=L. Sandy Maisel|chapter=American Political Parties: Still Central to a Functioning Democracy?|pages=103–121|editor-last1=Cohen|editor-first1=Jeffrey E.|editor-last2=Fleisher|editor-first2=Richard|editor-last3=Kantor|editor-first3=Paul|title=American Political Parties: Decline or Resurgence|year=2001|publisher=CQ Press|doi=10.4135/9781483329871.n6|isbn=9781568025858}}</ref> Many Ghanaians remained committed to nonpolitical leadership for the nation, even in the form of military rule. The problems of the Busia administration, the country's first elected government after Nkrumah's fall, illustrated the problems Ghana would continue to face.<ref name=fnr>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "The Fall of the Nkrumah Regime and its Aftermath".</ref> It has been argued that the coup was supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency;<ref>Interview with [[John Stockwell (CIA officer)|John Stockwell]] in ''[[PandoNkrumah was overthrown by a military coup in 1966.ra's Box (television documentary series)|Pandora's Box]]: Black Power'' ([[Adam Curtis]], BBC Two, 22 June 1992).</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/s.html |title=Foreign Relations of The United States 1964–1968, Volume XXIV |website=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/history/cia_nkrumah.php |title=Richard Helms (CIA) file on Nkrumah |website=GhanaWeb}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=75990 |title=24th February - A Dark Day In Our National History |website=GhanaWeb}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Gaines |first=Kevin |date=2006 |title=American Africans in Ghana, Black expatriates and the Civil Rights Era |location=Chapel Hill, NC |publisher=University of North Carolina Press}}</ref>

The [[National Liberation Council]] (NLC), composed of four army officers and four police officers, assumed executive power.<ref>{{Citation|last=O'Neill|first=Megan|title=Researching Police Community Support Officers in England and Wales|date=18 April 2019|work=Police Community Support Officers|pages=27–44|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/oso/9780198803676.003.0002|isbn=978-0-19-880367-6}}</ref> It appointed a cabinet of civil servants and promised to restore democratic government as quickly as possible.<ref name="Chan">{{Cite thesis|title=Motivating civil servants: a case study on Hong Kong police officers|publisher=The University of Hong Kong Libraries|first=Ka-yi, Ada|last=Chan|year=2011 |doi=10.5353/th_b4677951}}</ref> These moves culminated in the appointment of a representative assembly to draft a constitution for the Second Republic of Ghana. Political parties were allowed to operate beginning in late 1968.<ref name="Chan"/> In Ghana's [[Ghanaian parliamentary election, 1969|1969 elections]], the first competitive nationwide political contest since 1956, the major contenders were the Progress Party (PP), headed by [[Kofi Abrefa Busia]], and the [[National Alliance of Liberals]] (NAL), led by [[Komla Agbeli Gbedemah|Komla A. Gbedemah]].<ref name="auto3">{{Citation|title=Busia, Dr Kofi Abrefa, (11 July 1913–28 Aug. 1978), Prime Minister of Ghana, 1969–72|date=1 December 2007|work=Who Was Who|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u152838}}</ref> The PP gained 59 per cent of the popular vote and 74 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly.<ref name=nlc>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "The National Liberation Council and the Busia Years, 1966–71".</ref><ref name="BIRTH OF THE CPP"/>

Gbedemah, who was soon barred from taking his National Assembly seat by a [[Supreme Court of Ghana|Supreme Court]] decision, retired from politics, leaving the NAL without a strong leader.<ref>{{Citation|title=Eastham, His Honour Sir Tom, (died 11 April 1967), QC 1922; DL Surrey 1953; Senior Official Referee of Supreme Court of Judicature, 1944–54, retired|date=1 December 2007|work=Who Was Who|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u53255}}</ref> In October 1970, the NAL absorbed the members of three other minor parties in the assembly to form the [[Justice Party (Ghana)|Justice Party]] (JP) under the leadership of [[Joe Appiah|Joseph Appiah]].<ref>{{Citation|title=Nehru, Pandit Motilal, (6 May 1861–6 Feb. 1931), Advocate, High Court; President, Indian National Congress, 1928; Leader of Congress Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly since 1927|date=11 December 2007|work=Who Was Who|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u214651}}</ref> Their combined strength constituted what amounted to a southern bloc with a solid constituency among most of the Ewe and the peoples of the coastal cities.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Cite book|date=7 May 2013|chapter=Belgian cities are among the most congested in the OECD|doi=10.1787/eco_surveys-bel-2013-graph30-en|title=OECD Economic Surveys: Belgium 2013|isbn=9789264183001}}</ref>

PP leader Busia became prime minister in September 1970. After a brief period under an interim three-member presidential commission, the electoral college chose as president Chief Justice [[Edward Akufo-Addo]], one of the leading nationalist politicians of the UGCC era and one of the judges dismissed by Nkrumah in 1964.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Citation|title=Olmert, Ehud, (born 30 Sept. 1945), Prime Minister of Israel, 2006–09 (Acting, Jan.–April 2006, Interim Prime Minister, April–May 2006); Member, Knesset, 1973–98 and 2003–09|date=1 December 2007|work=Who's Who|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u245508}}</ref>

Two early measures initiated by the Busia government were the expulsion of large numbers of non-citizens from the country and a companion measure to limit foreign involvement in small businesses.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Figure 8.4. Measurement of ICT financial benefits in the central government, for businesses and citizens, 2015 |journal= |doi=10.1787/888933431421}}</ref> The moves were aimed at relieving the unemployment created by the country's precarious economic situation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hashimoto|first=Ken-ichi|date=4 September 2014|title=Tariffs, Offshoring and Unemployment in A Two-Country Model|journal=Japanese Economic Review|volume=66|issue=3|pages=371–392|doi=10.1111/jere.12050|s2cid=67831174|issn=1352-4739|url=http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/e_dis/e_dis272/e_dis272.pdf}}</ref> The policies were popular because they forced out of the retail sector of the economy those foreigners, especially Lebanese, Asians, and Nigerians, who were perceived as unfairly monopolizing trade to the disadvantage of Ghanaians.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Small|first=Mario Luis|date=19 October 2017|title=Because They Were There|journal=Oxford Scholarship Online|volume=1 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190661427.003.0007}}</ref> Many other Busia moves, however, were not popular. Busia's decision to introduce a loan programme for university students, who had hitherto received free education, was challenged because it was interpreted as introducing a class system into the country's highest institutions of learning. Some observers even saw Busia's devaluation of the national currency and his encouragement of foreign investment in the industrial sector of the economy as conservative ideas that could undermine Ghana's sovereignty.<ref name=nlc /><ref name="auto3"/>

The ruling PP emphasized the need for development in rural areas, both to slow the movement of population to the cities and to redress regional imbalance in levels of development. The JP and a growing number of PP members favoured suspension of payment on some foreign debts of the Nkrumah era.<ref>{{Citation|title=Adapting regional development policy to future megatrends|date=19 March 2019|work=OECD Regional Outlook 2019|series=OECD Regional Outlook |pages=49–80|publisher=OECD|doi=10.1787/8db6535e-en|isbn=978-92-64-31281-4|s2cid=243195067}}</ref> This attitude grew more popular as debt payments became more difficult to meet. Both parties favoured creation of a West African economic community or an economic union with the neighboring West African states.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Citation|last=Udogu|first=E. Ike|title=Economic Community of West African States: From an Economic Union to a Peacekeeping Mission?|date=16 January 2018|work=Leading Issues in Black Political Economy|pages=357–376|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781351320443-26|isbn=978-1-351-32044-3|url=http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Udogu_Ike_1999_Economic_Community.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Korthals Altes, Willem F.|title=Information law towards the 21st century|date=1992|publisher=Kluwer|isbn=90-6544-627-3|oclc=474488703}}</ref>

Despite broad popular support garnered at its inception and strong foreign connections, the Busia government fell victim to an army coup within twenty-seven months. The crucial causes were the country's continuing economic difficulties, both those stemming from the high foreign debts incurred by Nkrumah and those resulting from internal problems.<ref>{{Citation|last=Almeyda|first=Clodomiro|title=The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government|date=1979|work=Chile 1970–73: Economic Development and its International Setting|pages=103–134|place=Dordrecht|publisher=Springer Netherlands|doi=10.1007/978-94-011-8902-6_4|isbn=978-94-011-8233-1}}</ref> The PP government had inherited US$580&nbsp;million in medium- and long-term debts, an amount equal to 25 per cent of the gross domestic product of 1969. By 1971 the US$580&nbsp;million had been further inflated by US$72&nbsp;million in accrued interest payments and US$296&nbsp;million in short-term commercial credits. Within the country, an even larger internal debt fueled inflation.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Carr|first=John E.|date=2006|title=The Million Things We Wish Someone Had Taught Us|journal=PsycCRITIQUES|volume=51|issue=26|doi=10.1037/a0002873|issn=1554-0138}}</ref>

Ghana's economy remained largely dependent upon the often difficult cultivation of and market for cocoa. Cocoa prices had always been volatile, but exports of this crop normally provided about half of the country's foreign currency earnings. Beginning in the 1960s, however, a number of factors combined to limit severely this income.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Meidrieswida|first=Adrine Gladia|title=Effect of Number of Cocoa Production, World Cocoa Price, Exchange Rate, and Cocoa Export Prices on Cocoa Exports in Indonesia|date=28 July 2018|journal=Jurnal Dinamika Ekonomi Pembangunan|volume=1|issue=2|pages=82–89|doi=10.33005/jdep.v1i2.73|doi-broken-date=11 November 2024 |issn=2614-2546|doi-access=free}}</ref> These factors included foreign competition (particularly from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire), a lack of understanding of free-market forces (by the government in setting prices paid to farmers), accusations of bureaucratic incompetence in the Cocoa Marketing Board, and the smuggling of crops into Côte d'Ivoire. As a result, Ghana's income from cocoa exports continued to fall dramatically.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Losch|first=Bruno|date=2002|title=Global Restructuring and Liberalization: Cote d 'Ivoire and the End of the International Cocoa Market?|journal=Journal of Agrarian Change|volume=2|issue=2|pages=206–227|doi=10.1111/1471-0366.00031|bibcode=2002JAgrC...2..206L |issn=1471-0358|url=http://agritrop.cirad.fr/507695/}}</ref>

Austerity measures imposed by the Busia administration, although wise in the long run, alienated influential farmers, who until then had been PP supporters. These measures were part of Busia's economic structural adjustment efforts to put the country on a sounder financial base. The austerity programmes had been recommended by the International Monetary Fund.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Nassir wondered what things would have been like if he had been a country musician instead |journal=Anthropology Matters |doi=10.22582/am.v14i1.272.g668}}</ref> The recovery measures also severely affected the middle class and the salaried work force, both of which faced wage freezes, tax increases, currency devaluations, and rising import prices. These measures precipitated protests from the Trade Union Congress. In response, the government sent the army to occupy the trade union headquarters and to block strike actions—a situation that some perceived as negating the government's claim to be operating democratically.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Citation|work=The Operating Engineers|place=Cambridge, MA and London, England|publisher=Harvard University Press|doi=10.4159/harvard.9780674421813.c7|isbn=978-0-674-42181-3|title=Chapter 6. The Government of the International Union of Operating Engineers|year=1964}}</ref>

As the leader of the anti-Busia coup declared on January 13, 1972, even those amenities enjoyed by the army during the Nkrumah regime were no longer available. Knowing that austerity had alienated the officers, the Busia government began to change the leadership of the army's combat elements.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ansprenger|first1=Franz|last2=Traeder|first2=Heide|last3=Tetzlaff|first3=Rainer|date=1972|title=Die politische Entwicklung Ghanas von Nkrumah bis Busia|journal=Verfassung in Recht und Übersee|volume=5|issue=4|pages=468–471|doi=10.5771/0506-7286-1972-4-468|issn=0506-7286|doi-access=free}}</ref> This, however, was the last straw. Lieutenant Colonel [[Ignatius Kutu Acheampong]], temporarily commanding the First Brigade around Accra, led a bloodless coup that ended the Second Republic.<ref name=nlc /><ref>{{Citation|last=Ayelazuno|first=Jasper|title=Acheampong, Ignatius Kutu|date=8 December 2011|work=African American Studies Center|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/acref/9780195301731.013.48140|isbn=978-0-19-530173-1}}</ref>

=== National Redemption Council years, 1972–79 ===
Despite its short existence, the Second Republic was significant in that the development problems the nation faced came clearly into focus.<ref>{{Citation|title=The Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939) : The short-lived success of the liberal national project|work=Spain : Inventing the Nation|year=2014|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|doi=10.5040/9781474210980.ch-006|isbn=978-1-4411-3355-7}}</ref> These included uneven distribution of investment funds and favouritism toward certain groups and regions.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Quantity of zooarchaeological remains per phase |journal=Online Book |doi=10.3998/mpub.9231782.cmp.13}}</ref> Important questions about developmental priorities remained unanswered, and after the failure of both the Nkrumah and the Busia regimes (one a one-party state, and the other a multi-party parliamentary democracy) Ghana's path to political stability was obscure.<ref name=nrc>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "The National Redemption Council Years, 1972–79".</ref>

Acheampong's National Redemption Council (NRC) claimed that it had to act to remove the ill effects of the currency devaluation of the previous government and thereby, at least in the short run, to improve living conditions for individual Ghanaians.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Upadhyaya|first=Kamal P.|date=August 1999|title=Currency devaluation, aggregate output, and the long run: an empirical study|journal=Economics Letters|volume=64|issue=2|pages=197–202|doi=10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00088-9|issn=0165-1765}}</ref> To justify their takeover, coup leaders leveled charges of corruption against Busia and his ministers. The NRC sought to create a truly military government and did not outline any plan for the return of the nation to democratic rule.<ref name=nrc />

In matters of economic policy, Busia's austerity measures were reversed, the Ghanaian currency was revalued upward, foreign debt was repudiated or unilaterally rescheduled, and all large foreign-owned companies were nationalized.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brandon|first=Henry|date=1973|title=Were We Masterful...|journal=Foreign Policy|issue=10|pages=158–170|doi=10.2307/1147788|jstor=1147788|issn=0015-7228}}</ref> The government also provided price supports for basic food imports, while seeking to encourage Ghanaians to become self-reliant in agriculture and the production of raw materials.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Data S1: Raw data for all measures were well-organized |journal=Online Books |doi=10.7717/peerj.4687/supp-1 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Any economic successes were overridden by other basic economic factors. Industry and transportation suffered greatly as oil prices rose in 1974, and the lack of foreign exchange and credit left the country without fuel.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=28 November 2011|title=Sectoral credit growth, commodity prices and exchange rate index: New Zealand|journal=OECD Economic Outlook |volume=2011 |issue=2|doi=10.1787/eco_outlook-v2011-2-graph112-en|isbn=9789264092495|issn=1609-7408}}</ref> Basic food production continued to decline even as the population grew. Disillusionment with the government developed, and accusations of corruption began to surface.<ref name=nrc />

The reorganization of the NRC into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975 saw military officers put in charge of all ministries and state enterprises down to the local level.<ref>{{Citation|title=All of My Questions Have Been Answered|work=Out of Uniform|year=2012|pages=161–165|publisher=Potomac Books|doi=10.2307/j.ctt1djmhm2.64|isbn=978-1-59797-720-3}}</ref> Shortly after, the government sought to stifle opposition by issuing a decree forbidding the propagation of rumors and by banning a number of independent newspapers and detaining their journalists.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=SEG 62-905. Priene. Honorary decree for an anonymous benefactor, shortly after 100|journal=Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum|doi=10.1163/1874-6772_seg_a62_905}}</ref> Also, armed soldiers broke up student demonstrations, and the government repeatedly closed the universities, which had become important centres of opposition to NRC policies.

The SMC by 1977 found itself constrained by mounting<ref>{{Cite thesis|title=An Opposition in Search of Itself: Modern French Cinema and the Algerian War|publisher=Carleton University|first=Matthew|last=Croombs|year=2013 |doi=10.22215/etd/2013-10009|doi-access=free}}</ref> non-violent opposition. Although the various opposition groups (university students, lawyers, and other organized civilian groups) called for a return to civilian constitutional rule, Acheampong and the SMC favoured a union government—a mixture of elected civilian and appointed military leaders—but one in which party politics would be abolished.<ref>{{Citation|last=Isaacs|first=Anita|title=Civilian Opposition|date=1993|work=Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972–92|pages=67–95|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|doi=10.1007/978-1-349-08922-2_4|isbn=978-1-349-08924-6}}</ref> University students and many intellectuals criticized the union government idea, but others, such as Justice [[Gustav Koranteng-Addow]], who chaired the seventeen-member ad hoc committee appointed by the government to work out details of the plan, defended it as the solution to the nation's political problems. Supporters of the union government idea viewed multiparty political contests as the perpetrators of social tension and community conflict among classes, regions, and ethnic groups.<ref>{{Citation|author1-link=Daniel Treisman|last=Treisman|first=Daniel|title=Ethnic Conflict and Secession|work=The Architecture of Government|year=2007|pages=236–246|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511619151.012|isbn=978-0-511-61915-1}}</ref> Unionists argued that their plan had the potential to depoliticize public life and to allow the nation to concentrate its energies on economic problems.<ref name=nrc />

A national referendum was held in March 1978 to allow the people to accept or reject the union government concept. A rejection of the union government meant a continuation of military rule. Given this choice, it was surprising that so narrow a margin voted in favour of union government.<ref>{{Citation|work=Union Policies in the Leather Industry|place=Cambridge, MA and London, England|publisher=Harvard University Press|doi=10.4159/harvard.9780674493018.c18|isbn=978-0-674-49301-8|title=Chapter Xiv. Union Structure and Government|year=1947}}</ref> Opponents of the idea organized demonstrations against the government, arguing that the referendum vote had not been free or fair. The Acheampong government reacted by banning several organizations and by jailing as many as 300 of its opponents.<ref name=nrc />

The agenda for change in the union government referendum called for the drafting of a new constitution by an SMC-appointed commission, the selection of a constituent assembly by November 1978, and general elections in June 1979. The ad hoc committee had recommended a nonparty election, an elected executive president, and a cabinet whose members would be drawn from outside a single-house National Assembly. The military council would then step down, although its members could run for office as individuals.<ref name=nrc />

In July 1978, in a sudden move, the other SMC officers forced Acheampong to resign, replacing him with Lieutenant General [[Fred Akuffo|Frederick W. K. Akuffo]]. The SMC apparently acted in response to continuing pressure to find a solution to the country's economic dilemma. Inflation was estimated to be as high as 300 per cent that year. There were shortages of basic commodities, and cocoa production fell to half its 1964 peak.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2015|title=July 2015: SMC decisions|journal=The Pharmaceutical Journal|doi=10.1211/pj.2015.20068990|issn=2053-6186}}</ref> The council was also motivated by Acheampong's failure to dampen rising political pressure for changes. Akuffo, the new SMC chairman, promised publicly to hand over political power to a new government to be elected by 1 July 1979.<ref name=nrc />

Despite Akuffo's assurances, opposition to the SMC persisted. The call for the formation of political parties intensified. In an effort to gain support in the face of continuing strikes over economic and political issues, the Akuffo government at length announced that the formation of political parties would be allowed after January 1979. Akuffo also granted amnesty to former members of both Nkrumah's CPP and Busia's PP, as well as to all those convicted of subversion under Acheampong.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Manning|first1=Carrie|title=Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war|date=7 December 2018|work=From Bullets to Ballots|pages=4–21|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-315-11220-6|last2=Smith|first2=Ian|doi=10.4324/9781315112206-2|s2cid=239577237|url=https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/3187882}}</ref> The decree lifting the ban on party politics went into effect on 1 January 1979, as planned. The constitutional assembly that had been working on a new constitution presented an approved draft and adjourned in May. All appeared set for a new attempt at constitutional government in July, when a group of young army officers overthrew the SMC government in June 1979.<ref name=nrc />

=== Rawlings era ===
{{further|June 4th revolution in Ghana}}
On 15 May 1979, less than five weeks before constitutional elections were to be held, a group of junior officers led by Flight Lieutenant [[Jerry John Rawlings]] attempted a coup. Initially unsuccessful, the coup leaders were jailed and held for [[court-martial]]. On 4 June, however, sympathetic military officers overthrew the Akuffo regime and released Rawlings and his cohorts from prison fourteen days before the scheduled election.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kaifala|first=Joseph|author-link=Joseph Kaifala|chapter=Second NPRC Military Coup and Elections Before Peace|date=2016-11-23|title=Free Slaves, Freetown, and the Sierra Leonean Civil War|pages=241–257|place=New York|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US|doi=10.1057/978-1-349-94854-3_10|isbn=978-1-349-94853-6}}</ref> Although the SMC's pledge to return political power to civilian hands addressed the concerns of those who wanted civilian government, the young officers who had staged the June 4th coup insisted that issues critical to the image of the army and important for the stability of national politics had been ignored. [[Naomi Chazan]], a leading analyst of Ghanaian politics, assessed the significance of the 1979 coup:<ref name=re>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "Ghana and the Rawlings Era".</ref>

<blockquote>Unlike the initial SMC II [the Akuffo period, 1978–1979] rehabilitation effort which focused on the power elite, this second attempt at reconstruction from a situation of disintegration was propelled by growing alienation. It strove, by reforming the guidelines of public behavior, to define anew the state power structure and to revise its inherent social obligations....<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cast|first=Alicia D.|date=2003|title=Power and the Ability to Define the Situation|journal=Social Psychology Quarterly|volume=66|issue=3|pages=185–201|doi=10.2307/1519821|jstor=1519821|issn=0190-2725}}</ref> In retrospect the most irreversible outcome of this phase was the systematic eradication of the SMC leadership.... [Their] executions signaled not only the termination of the already fallacious myth of the nonviolence of Ghanaian politics, but, more to the point, the deadly serious determination of the new government to wipe the political slate clean.<ref name=re /></blockquote>

Rawlings and the young officers formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The armed forces were purged of senior officers accused of corrupting the image of the military. Despite the coup and the subsequent executions of former heads of military governments, the planned elections took place, and Ghana had returned to constitutional rule by the end of September 1979. The AFRC position was that the nation's political leaders, at least those from within the military, had not been accountable to the people. The administration of Hilla Limann, inaugurated on 24 September 1979, at the beginning of the Third Republic, was thus expected to measure up to the new standard advocated by the AFRC.<ref name=re />

Limann's People's National Party (PNP) began the Third Republic with control of only seventy-one of the 140 legislative seats. As Limann himself observed, the ruling PNP included people of conflicting ideological orientations. They sometimes disagreed strongly among themselves on national policies. Many observers, therefore, wondered whether the new government was equal to the task confronting the state.<ref name=re /> The most immediate threat to the Limann administration, however, was the AFRC, especially those officers who organized themselves into the "June 4th Movement" to monitor the civilian administration. The government ordered Rawlings and several other army and police officers associated with the AFRC into retirement; nevertheless, Rawlings and his associates remained a latent threat, particularly as the economy continued its decline.<ref>{{Citation|title=King, Dr John William Beaufoy, (28 June 1927–12 Jan. 2006), director, Advanced Breeders Ltd, since 1988; Head of AFRC Animal Breeding Liaison Group, 1982–87|date=1 December 2007|work=Who Was Who|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u23128}}</ref> The first Limann budget estimated the Ghanaian inflation rate at 70 per cent for that year, with a budget deficit equal to 30 per cent of the gross national product. A rash of strikes, many considered illegal by the government, resulted, each one lowering productivity and therefore national income. In September the government announced that all striking public workers would be dismissed. These factors rapidly eroded the limited support the Limann government enjoyed among civilians and soldiers. The government fell on 31 December 1981, in another Rawlings-led coup.<ref name=re />

Rawlings and his colleagues suspended the 1979 constitution, dismissed the president and his cabinet, dissolved the parliament, and proscribed existing political parties. They established the [[Provisional National Defence Council]] (PNDC), initially composed of seven members with Rawlings as chairman, to exercise executive and legislative powers.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sin|first=Gisela|title=Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization|date=2014|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-27005-3|location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/cbo9781107270053}}</ref> The existing judicial system was preserved, but alongside it the PNDC created the National Investigation Committee to root out corruption and other economic offenses, the anonymous <!-- There is no Wikipedia article for [[Citizens' Vetting Committee]], Please create a article if you can. Thanks-->''Citizens' Vetting Committee'' to punish tax evasion, and the Public Tribunals to try various crimes. The PNDC proclaimed its intent to allow the people to exercise political power through defence committees to be established in communities, workplaces, and in units of the armed forces and police. Under the PNDC, Ghana remained a unitary government.<ref name=re />

In December 1982, the PNDC announced a plan to decentralize government from Accra to the regions, the districts, and local communities, but it maintained overall control by appointing regional and district secretaries who exercised executive powers and also chaired regional and district councils. Local councils, however, were expected progressively to take over the payment of salaries, with regions and districts assuming more powers from the national government. In 1984, the PNDC created a National Appeals Tribunal to hear appeals from the public tribunals, changed the Citizens' Vetting Committee into the Office of Revenue Collection and replaced the system of defence committees with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.<ref name=re />

In 1984, the PNDC also created a National Commission on Democracy to study ways to establish participatory democracy in Ghana. The commission issued a "Blue Book" in July 1987 outlining modalities for district-level elections, which were held in late 1988 and early 1989, for newly created district assemblies. One-third of the assembly members are appointed by the government.<ref name=re />

==== Second coming of Rawlings: the first six years, 1982–87 ====
The new government that took power on 31 December 1981, was the eighth in the fifteen years since the fall of Nkrumah. Calling itself the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), its membership included Rawlings as chairman, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah (whom Limann had dismissed as army commander), two other officers, and three civilians. Despite its military connections, the PNDC made it clear that it was unlike other soldier-led governments. This was immediately proved by the appointment of fifteen civilians to cabinet positions.<ref name=scr>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "The second coming of Rawlings: the first six years, 1982–87".</ref>

Opposition to the PNDC administration developed nonetheless in different sectors of the political spectrum. The most obvious groups opposing the government were former PNP and PFP members. Further opposition came from the [[Ghana Bar Association]] (GBA), which criticized the government's use of people's tribunals in the administration of justice. Members of the Trade Union Congress were also angered when the PNDC ordered them to withdraw demands for increased wages. The National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS) went even farther, calling on the government to hand over power to the attorney general, who would supervise new elections.<ref name=scr /> By the end of June 1982, an attempted coup had been discovered, and those implicated had been executed. Many who disagreed with the PNDC administration were driven into exile, where they began organizing their opposition.<ref name=scr />

In keeping with Rawlings's commitment to populism as a political principle, the PNDC began to form governing coalitions and institutions that would incorporate the populace at large into the machinery of the national government. Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs), People's Defence Committees (PDCs), Citizens' Vetting Committees (CVCs), Regional Defence Committees (RDCs), and National Defence Committees (NDCs) were all created to ensure that those at the bottom of society were given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.<ref>{{Cite book|date=2017|publisher=IEEE|pages=i–iii|doi=10.1109/acdt.2017.7886141|isbn=978-1-5090-4791-8 |chapter=Organizing Committees |title=2017 Third Asian Conference on Defence Technology (ACDT)}}</ref> These committees were to be involved in community projects and community decisions, and individual members were expected to expose corruption and "anti-social activities". Public tribunals, which were established outside the normal legal system, were also created to try those accused of antigovernment acts. And a four-week workshop aimed at making these cadres morally and intellectually prepared for their part in the revolution was completed at the University of Ghana, Legon, in July and August 1983.<ref name=scr />

Various opposition groups criticized the PDCs and WDCs, however. The aggressiveness of certain WDCs, it was argued, interfered with management's ability to make the bold decisions needed for the recovery of the national economy. In response to such criticisms, the PNDC announced on 1 December 1984, the dissolution of all PDCs, WDCs, and NDCs, and their replacement with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). With regard to public boards and statutory corporations, excluding banks and financial institutions, Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) that acted as advisory bodies to managing directors were created.<ref name=scr />

The public tribunals, however, despite their characterization as undemocratic by the GBA, were maintained. Although the tribunals had been established in 1982, the law providing for the creation of a national public tribunal to hear and determine appeals from, and decisions of, regional public tribunals was not passed until August 1984. Section 3 and Section 10 of the PNDC Establishment Proclamation limited public tribunals to cases of a political and an economic nature.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Elliott|first1=Mark|title=16. Tribunals|date=25 May 2017|work=Public Law|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-876589-9|last2=Thomas|first2=Robert|doi=10.1093/he/9780198765899.003.0016|doi-broken-date=11 November 2024 }}</ref> The limitations placed on public tribunals by the government in 1984 may have been an attempt by the administration to redress certain weaknesses. The tribunals, however, were not abolished; rather, they were defended as "fundamental to a good legal system" that needed to be maintained in response to "growing legal consciousness on the part of the people."<ref name=scr />

At the time when the foundations of these socio-political institutions were being laid, the PNDC was also engaged in a debate about how to finance the reconstruction of the national economy. The country had indeed suffered from what some described as the excessive and unwise, if not foolish, expenditures of the Nkrumah regime. The degree of decline under the NRC and the SMC had also been devastating. By December 1981, when the PNDC came to power, the inflation rate topped 200 per cent, while real GDP had declined by 3 per cent per annum for seven years. Not only cocoa production but even diamonds and timber exports had dropped dramatically. Gold production had also fallen to half its pre-independence level.<ref name=scr />

At the end of its first year in power, the PNDC announced a four-year programme of economic austerity and sacrifice that was to be the first phase of an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). If the economy were to improve significantly, there was need for a large injection of capital—a resource that could only be obtained from international financial institutions of the West. The PNDC recognized that it could not depend on friendly nations such as Libya to address the economic problems of Ghana. The magnitude of the crisis—made worse by widespread bush fires that devastated crop production in 1983–1984 and by the return of more than one million Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria in 1983, which had intensified the unemployment situation—called for monetary assistance from institutions with bigger financial chests.<ref name=scr />

Phase One of the ERP began in 1983. Its goal was economic stability. In broad terms, the government wanted to reduce inflation and to create confidence in the nation's ability to recover. By 1987 progress was clearly evident. The rate of inflation had dropped to 20 per cent, and between 1983 and 1987, Ghana's economy reportedly grew at 6 per cent per year. Official assistance from donor countries to Ghana's recovery programme averaged US$430&nbsp;million in 1987, more than double that of the preceding years. The PNDC administration also made a remarkable payment of more than US$500&nbsp;million in loan arrears dating to before 1966.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Figure 1.2. Wage inflation more stable than CPI inflation |journal=  |doi=10.1787/115600578101}}</ref> In recognition of these achievements, international agencies had pledged more than US$575&nbsp;million to the country's future programmes by May 1987. With these accomplishments in place, the PNDC inaugurated Phase Two of the ERP, which envisioned privatization of state-owned assets, currency devaluation, and increased savings and investment, and which was to continue until 1990.<ref name=scr />

Notwithstanding the successes of Phase One of the ERP, many problems remained, and both friends and foes of the PNDC were quick to point them out. One commentator noted the high rate of Ghanaian unemployment as a result of the belt-tightening policies of the PNDC. In the absence of employment or redeployment policies to redress such problems, he wrote, the effects of the austerity programmes might create circumstances that could derail the PNDC recovery agenda.<ref name=scr />

Unemployment was only one aspect of the political problems facing the PNDC government; another was the size and breadth of the PNDC's political base. The PNDC initially espoused a populist programme that appealed to a wide variety of rural and urban constituents. Even so, the PNDC was the object of significant criticism from various groups that in one way or another called for a return to constitutional government. Much of this criticism came from student organizations, the GBA, and opposition groups in self-imposed exile, who questioned the legitimacy of the military government and its declared intention of returning the country to constitutional rule. So vocal was the outcry against the PNDC that it appeared on the surface as if the PNDC enjoyed little support among those groups who had historically moulded and influenced Ghanaian public opinion. At a time when difficult policies were being implemented, the PNDC could ill afford the continued alienation and opposition of such prominent critics.<ref name=scr />

By the mid-1980s, therefore, it had become essential that the PNDC demonstrate that it was actively considering steps towards constitutionalism and civilian rule. This was true notwithstanding the recognition of Rawlings as an honest leader and the perception that the situation he was trying to redress was not of his creation. To move in the desired direction, the PNDC needed to weaken the influence and credibility of all antagonistic groups while it created the necessary political structures that would bring more and more Ghanaians into the process of national reconstruction. The PNDC's solution to its dilemma was the proposal for district assemblies.<ref name=scr />

==== District assemblies ====
Although the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) had existed as an agency of the PNDC since 1982, it was not until September 1984 that Justice Daniel F. Annan, himself a member of the ruling council, was appointed chairman. The official inauguration of the NCD in January 1985 signaled PNDC determination to move the nation in a new political direction. According to its mandate, the NCD was to devise a viable democratic system, utilizing public discussions. Annan explained the necessity for the commission's work by arguing that the political party system of the past lost track of the country's socio-economic development processes. There was the need, therefore, to search for a new political order that would be functionally democratic. Constitutional rules of the past were not acceptable to the new revolutionary spirit, Annan continued, which saw the old political order as using the ballot box "merely to ensure that politicians got elected into power, after which communication between the electorate and their elected representative completely broke down."<ref name=da>McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), "The District Assemblies".</ref>

After two years of deliberations and public hearings, the NCD recommended the formation of district assemblies as local governing institutions that would offer opportunities to the ordinary person to become involved in the political process. The PNDC scheduled elections of the proposed assemblies for the last quarter of 1988.<ref name="da" />

Once in session, an assembly was to become the highest political authority in each district. Assembly members were to be responsible for deliberation, evaluation, coordination, and implementation of programmes accepted as appropriate for the district's economic development; however, district assemblies were to be subject to the general guidance and direction of the central government. To ensure that district developments were in line with national policies, one-third of assembly members were to be traditional authorities (chiefs) or their representatives; these members were to be approved by the PNDC in consultation with the traditional authorities and other "productive economic groups in the district." In other words, a degree of autonomy may have been granted to the assemblies in the determination of programmes most suited to the districts, but the PNDC left itself with the ultimate responsibility of making sure that such programmes were in line with the national economic recovery programme.<ref name=da />

District assemblies as outlined in PNDC documents were widely discussed. Some hailed the proposal as compatible with the goal of granting the people opportunities to manage their own affairs, but others (especially those of the political right) accused the government of masking its intention to remain in power. If the government's desire for democracy were genuine, a timetable for national elections should have been its priority rather than the preoccupation with local government, they argued. Some questioned the wisdom of incorporating traditional chiefs and the degree to which these traditional leaders would be committed to the district assembly idea, while others attacked the election guidelines as undemocratic and, therefore, as contributing to a culture of silence in Ghana. To such critics, the district assemblies were nothing but a move by the PNDC to consolidate its position.<ref name=da />

Rawlings, however, responded to such criticism by restating the PNDC strategy and the rationale behind it:<ref name=da />

<blockquote>Steps towards more formal political participation are being taken through the district-level elections that we will be holding throughout the country as part of our decentralisation policy. As I said in my nationwide broadcast on December 31, if we are to see a sturdy tree of democracy grow, we need to learn from the past and nurture very carefully and deliberately political institutions that will become the pillars upon which the people's power will be erected. A new sense of responsibility must be created in each workplace, each village, each district; we already see elements of this in the work of the CDRs, the December 31 Women's Movement, the June 4 Movement, Town and Village Development Committees, and other organizations through which the voice of the people is being heard.<ref name=da /></blockquote>

Rawlings's explanation notwithstanding, various opposition groups continued to describe the PNDC-proposed district assemblies as a mere public relations ploy designed to give political legitimacy to a government that had come to power by unconstitutional means. Longtime observers of the Ghanaian political scene, however, identified two major issues at stake in the conflict between the government and its critics: the means by which political stability was to be achieved, and the problem of attaining sustained economic growth. Both had preoccupied the country since the era of Nkrumah. The economic recovery programmes implemented by the PNDC in 1983 and the proposal for district assemblies in 1987 were major elements in the government's strategy to address these fundamental and persistent problems. Both were very much part of the national debate in Ghana in the late 1980s.<ref name=da />

==== End of one-party state ====
[[File:Ghana's 50th Independence Anniversary.jpg|thumb|right|Ghana's 50th Independence Anniversary parade in Accra, March 2007.]]
Under international and domestic pressure for a return to democracy, the PNDC allowed the establishment of a 258-member Consultative Assembly made up of members representing geographic districts as well as established civic or business organizations. The assembly was charged to draw up a draft constitution to establish a fourth republic, using PNDC proposals. The PNDC accepted the final product without revision, and it was put to a [[Ghanaian constitutional referendum, 1992|national referendum]] on 28 April 1992, in which it received 92% approval.

On 18 May 1992, the ban on party politics was lifted in preparation for multi-party elections. The PNDC and its supporters formed a new party, the [[National Democratic Congress (Ghana)|National Democratic Congress]] (NDC), to contest the elections. [[Ghanaian presidential election, 1992|Presidential elections]] were held on 3 November and [[Ghanaian parliamentary election, 1992|parliamentary elections]] on 29 December that year. Members of the opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections, however, which resulted in a 200-seat Parliament with only 17 opposition party members and two independents.

===Fourth Republic (1993–present)<span class="anchor" id="Fourth Republic"></span>===
The Constitution entered into force on 7 January 1993, to found the Fourth Republic. On that day, Rawlings was inaugurated as president and members of Parliament swore their oaths of office. In 1996, the opposition fully contested the [[Ghanaian presidential election, 1996|presidential]] and [[Ghanaian parliamentary election, 1996|parliamentary elections]], which were described as peaceful, free, and transparent by domestic and international observers. Rawlings was re-elected with 57% of the popular vote. In addition, Rawlings' NDC party won 133 of the Parliament's 200 seats, just one seat short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution, although the election returns of two parliamentary seats faced legal challenges.

In the presidential election of 2000, Jerry Rawlings endorsed his vice-president, John Atta-Mills, as the candidate for the ruling NDC. [[John Kufuor]] stood for the [[New Patriotic Party]] (NPP), won the election, and became the president on 7 January 2001. The vice president was [[Aliu Mahama]]. The presidential election of 2000 was viewed as free and fair.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Ghana.pdf |title=Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992–2002 |website=Democracy Coalition Project |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428175704/http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/Ghana.pdf |archive-date=28 April 2011}}</ref> Kufuor won another term again in the presidential election in 2004.

The presidency of Kufuor saw several social reforms, such as the reform in the system of [[National Health Insurance (Ghana)|National Health Insurance]] of Ghana in 2003.<ref>Pflanz, Mike. [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ghana/3659680/Ghana-says-goodbye-to-President-John-Kufuor-a-good-man-in-Africa.html Ghana says goodbye to President John Kufuor a good man in Africa]. ''[[The Daily Telegraph]]''. 7 December 2008.</ref> In 2005 saw the start of the Ghana School Feeding Programme, in which a free hot meal per day was provided in public schools and kindergartens in the poorest areas.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.snvworld.org/en/countries/ghana/Documents/GSFP;A%20practical%20exploration.pdf |title=The Ghana School Feeding Programme: A practical exploration of the 'behind the façade' approach |last=De Hauwere |first=Karen |date=2011 |website=[[SNV Netherlands Development Organisation]]}}</ref> Although some projects were criticised as unfinished or unfunded, the progress of Ghana was noted internationally.<ref>{{cite book |url=http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05174.pdf |title=Ghana: From Kufuor to Mills |location=London |publisher=[[House of Commons Library]]}}</ref>
President Kufuor soon gave up power in 2008. The ruling [[New Patriotic Party]] chose [[Nana Akufo-Addo]], son of Edward Akufo-Addo, as their candidate while [[National Democratic Congress (Ghana)|National Democratic Congress's]] [[John Atta Mills]] stood for the third time. After a run-off, John Atta Mills won the election.
On 24 July 2012, the president died. Power was then given to his vice-president, [[John Dramani Mahama]]. The National Democratic Congress won the 2012 election, making John Mahama rule again, his first term.

[[John Atta Mills]] was sworn in as president on 7 January 2009 in a peaceful transition after Nana Akuffo Addo was narrowly defeated.<ref>Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, "The 2008 Freedom House Survey: Another Step Forward for Ghana." ''Journal of Democracy'' 20.2 (2009): 138–152 [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/262756/summary excerpt].</ref> Mills died and was succeeded by vice-president [[John Dramani Mahama]] on 24 July 2012.<ref>{{cite news|title=Atta Mills dies|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/africa/john-atta-mills-ghanas-president-dies-68.html|work=The New York Times|date=25 July 2012|access-date=9 May 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140709161829/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/africa/john-atta-mills-ghanas-president-dies-68.html|archive-date=9 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

Following the [[Ghanaian presidential election, 2012]], [[John Mahama|John Dramani Mahama]] became President-elect and was inaugurated on 7 January 2013.<ref name="Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama sworn in">{{cite news|url=http://english.sina.com/world/p/2013/0107/545991.html|title=Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama sworn in|publisher=[[Sina Corp]]|date=7 January 2013|access-date=30 July 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131005011622/http://english.sina.com/world/p/2013/0107/545991.html|archive-date=5 October 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> Ghana was a stable democracy.<ref name="Elections in Ghana">{{cite web |title=Elections in Ghana |url=http://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120530060759/http://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html |archive-date=30 May 2012 |access-date=1 June 2013 |work=Africanelectionstripod.}}</ref>

As a result of the [[Ghanaian presidential election, 2016]],<ref>{{cite web |date=7 December 2016 |title=What the world media is saying about Ghana's 2016 elections |url=https://yen.com.gh/85240-what-world-media-ghanas-2016-elections.html#85240 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161208122522/https://yen.com.gh/85240-what-world-media-ghanas-2016-elections.html#85240 |archive-date=8 December 2016 |access-date=7 December 2016 |work=Yen Ghana}}</ref> [[Nana Akufo-Addo]] became President-elect and was inaugurated as the fifth President of the Fourth Republic of Ghana and eighth President of Ghana on 7 January 2017.<ref>{{cite web|title=2016 Presidential Results|url=http://www.thumbsapp.com.gh/|website=Ghana Electoral Commission|access-date=18 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519211542/http://www.thumbsapp.com.gh/|archive-date=19 May 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> In December 2020, President Nana Akufo-Addo was re-elected after a tightly contested [[2020 Ghanaian general election|election]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55236356|title = Ghana election: Nana Akufo-Addo re-elected as president|work = BBC News|date = December 9, 2020}}</ref>